Bidding for the 1968 Olympic Games: International Sport's Cold War Battle with NATO

In Bidding for the 1968 Olympic Games: International Sport's Cold War Battle with NATO, Heather L. Dichter analyzes the competition to host the 1968 Olympic Games. Dichter promises to detail “how and why NATO and its member states confronted sport during the height of the Cold War and how international sport responded to this overt political interference” (ix). She succeeds, giving us new perspectives on how sport and NATO interacted during the 1960s.Dichter focuses on the German problem—whether and how to include athletes from East Germany in international sports competition. NATO adhered to the Hallstein Doctrine, a policy of nonrecognition of East Germany, and a corresponding restriction on travel. Given the high visibility of sport, the exclusion of East German athletes from competition became a problem for the alliance. East Germany played the victim, complaining about exclusion while sometimes submitting incomplete or late travel documents, despite it having built the Berlin Wall and restricted the egress of its citizens. NATO was on the losing side of sports diplomacy. Moreover, NATO's hardline was challenged by the need of potential host cities to satisfy the IOC and international sports federations and by domestic disapproval within some NATO countries at the exclusion of top-ranked East German athletes. In 1962, during the lead-up to site selection for the 1968 Olympics, the exclusion of East German athletes and teams from international sports competitions in NATO countries produced negative publicity for the alliance, most notably during the Alpine world ski championship at Chamonix, France, and the ice hockey world championships at Colorado Springs.When it came to the competition for the 1968 Olympic Games, NATO member states competed against one another in a game of national self-interest. NATO member nations offered five bids for the 1968 Olympic Games—Detroit and Lyon (summer) and Calgary, Grenoble, and Lake Placid, New York (winter). Dichter demonstrates that the debate over travel restrictions is a perfect lens to understand the role smaller nations played within NATO. Since decisions related to sport were not the life-or-death military matters that might cripple the alliance, “all member states could voice their views, particularly with the hope that they could achieve a change in NATO policy” (85). Canada and Norway—powers in winter sport—boxed above their weight when it came to intra-NATO discussions on the travel question. Canada, eager to host its first Olympics, was willing to challenge the NATO hardline on East German travel and upset its allies to win the games for Calgary. Norway, focused on the more realistic chance of hosting the 1966 Nordic skiing championships, similarly shifted against the agreed policy.The only athlete who plays any substantial role in Bidding for the 1968 Olympic Games is the East German ski jumper Helmut Recknagel, the 1960 Olympic champion. In 1962, Recknagel was denied entry into Norway to participate in the annual Holmenkollen ski festival. The exclusion of Recknagel, a previous champion at Holmenkollen, fueled fears that Norwegian public opinion might turn against NATO, a fascinating and previously forgotten episode.Dichter's analysis complicates traditional accounts of the workings of NATO. Deliberations in Washington and Paris become secondary to the actions of smaller nations, candidate host cities, and sport federations, all attempting to influence the policy on travel. Heavy-handed diplomatic attempts on the part of the United States on behalf of Detroit's bid and West Germany's pleading for the nonrecognition of East Germany proved counterproductive, as Avery Brundage and the International Olympic Committee stood firm on their position that politics and the Olympics should never mix.Despite the prevailing view that Lyon and Detroit were the favorites for the 1968 Summer Olympics, Mexico City won in the first round of voting due to a host of factors, including the German problem. The surprise Grenoble victory for the Winter Olympics in the third round of voting complicates the idea that the question of athlete entry dominated, though Dichter cites the possible role of a French diplomat, in an informal discussion with Brundage, in improving the French city's chances.As Dichter shows, international sport became “the earliest field where NATO member states accepted détente with East Germany,” though the inspirations for détente were less noble than usually understood (161). In her compelling account, détente represents a response to the failures of NATO public diplomacy combined with national self-interest, the desire to host international sporting competitions.Some readers might expect more comparisons between the German problem and the matter of the two Chinas at the Olympics. While the China question proved more intractable, West Germany's capitulation on the matter of the East German Olympic team was momentous. Still, few historians will be able to match Dichter's abilities as a linguist and practitioner of international history. Crafted from archives in eight countries with deftly combined storylines, Bidding for the 1968 Olympic Games sets a high bar for scholars of sports diplomacy.

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