Performance Assessment of a Rehabilitation Transportation Reservation Matching Service with Market Design Mechanisms
Bibliographic record
Abstract
Government agencies provide huge amount of subsidies to support the rehabilitation transportation service over the past decade in eastern Taiwan; however, low demand request fulfillment rate, limited medical and transportation resources, long travel distances, and an extremely high percentage of dead mileages are still the main challenges faced by rehabilitation transportation service providers. This study applies the market design theory to match the rehabilitation buses with the requests of patients, so as to improve resource utilization efficiency in rural areas. The developed market design mechanisms aim to allocate resources to those who need them most in a matching manner, by using the deferred acceptance algorithm and the top trading cycle approach. The model is initialized with the requests of those who choose the rehabilitation bus based on their desired boarding time slots. On the other hand, the service providers of the rehabilitation bus would determine patients’ schedule based on their disability level, willingness to share the ride, number of fulfilled appointments during this month, and the travel distance of this trip as the order of preference. Since the current vehicle dispatching rule is to reserve seats of a rehabilitation bus on the “first-come-first-served” basis, and it cannot fully satisfy patients need. In accordance with the historical data, 63 of 72 demand requests could successfully reserve the seats. In the “first-come, first-served” mode, 48 requests obtained the first-ranking shift (i.e., their desired time slots), and the sum of their disability level score is 155. In the market design matching mode, 57 requests obtained the first-ranking shift, and the sum of their disability level score is 170, which demonstrates that the proposed market design matching mechanism outperforms than the conventional rules.
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How this classification was reachedexpand
Full frame machine prediction
Teacher imitationNot calibrated prevalence, not ground truth. Human validation pending. The Gemma side is a direct model label for every work in the frame, read from the title-only record. The Codex side is a classifier learned from the 10,348 direct Codex labels and calibrated to design-weighted sample rates; fields without enough sample support carry no Codex call. Candidate is the union of the two sides; consensus is their intersection. These outputs are machine_predicted_unvalidated and are not human labels.
Distilled classifier scores by category (both heads)
| Category | Codex | Gemma |
|---|---|---|
| Metaresearch | 0.006 | 0.010 |
| Meta-epidemiology (narrow) | 0.001 | 0.000 |
| Meta-epidemiology (broad) | 0.001 | 0.001 |
| Bibliometrics | 0.001 | 0.001 |
| Science and technology studies | 0.001 | 0.001 |
| Scholarly communication | 0.002 | 0.001 |
| Open science | 0.002 | 0.001 |
| Research integrity | 0.001 | 0.001 |
| Insufficient payload (model declined to judge) | 0.004 | 0.000 |
Machine scores (provisional)
The two teacher heads of the student model, read on this work. A score orders the frame for review; it never asserts a category, and the validation status ships verbatim with every row.
Baseline scores from an immature model (maturity gate not passed, 7 training rounds). Scores rank; they never assert a category.
score_only:v0-immature-baseline · verbatim from the scoring run: score_only means the number may rank works, and no category label ships from itClassification
machine, unvalidatedMachine predicted; a candidate call from one source (direct Gemma or distilled Codex), not a consensus.
How this classification was reached, model by model and score by score, is at the end of the page under "How this classification was reached".