A Novel Semi-Supervised Adversarially Learned Meta-Classifier for Detecting Neural Trojan Attacks
Bibliographic record
Abstract
Deep neural networks (DNNs) are highly vulnerable to neural Trojan attacks. To carry out such an attack, an adversary retrains a DNN with poisoned data or modifies its parameters to produce incorrect output. These attacks can remain unnoticed until triggered by a specific pattern in the input, making detection challenging. In this article, we propose a novel semi-supervised adversarially learned meta-classifier (SESALME) to detect if a target model has been trojaned. Unlike previous Trojan detection methods, SESALME assumes that the defender has no knowledge of the attack mechanisms, and no access to training data, poisoned data, or parameters/layers of a target model. In the absence of poisoned data and knowledge of the attack mechanisms, we use a set of shadow models to emulate normal behavior of the target model. Having learned the normal behavior of the target model, SESALME then uses one-class learning, implemented within a semi-supervised generative adversarial network (GAN), to detect abnormal behavior of a model to be investigated, if any. Behavior that deviates from the learned normal behavior indicates a high likelihood that the model is trojaned. We compare the performance of SESALME with that of state-of-the-art neural Trojan detectors using popular datasets such as MNIST, CIFAR-10, and SC. Experimental results show that SESALME outperforms state-of-the-art Trojan detection methods in terms of detection performance and inference time in almost all cases, while being attack-agnostic and requiring no access to training data, poisoned data, or parameters of the target model.
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How this classification was reachedexpand
Full frame machine prediction
Teacher imitationNot calibrated prevalence, not ground truth. Human validation pending. The Gemma side is a direct model label for every work in the frame, read from the title-only record. The Codex side is a classifier learned from the 10,348 direct Codex labels and calibrated to design-weighted sample rates; fields without enough sample support carry no Codex call. Candidate is the union of the two sides; consensus is their intersection. These outputs are machine_predicted_unvalidated and are not human labels.
Distilled classifier scores by category (both heads)
| Category | Codex | Gemma |
|---|---|---|
| Metaresearch | 0.001 | 0.003 |
| Meta-epidemiology (narrow) | 0.001 | 0.000 |
| Meta-epidemiology (broad) | 0.001 | 0.001 |
| Bibliometrics | 0.001 | 0.000 |
| Science and technology studies | 0.000 | 0.001 |
| Scholarly communication | 0.001 | 0.002 |
| Open science | 0.002 | 0.001 |
| Research integrity | 0.001 | 0.002 |
| Insufficient payload (model declined to judge) | 0.001 | 0.001 |
Machine scores (provisional)
The two teacher heads of the student model, read on this work. A score orders the frame for review; it never asserts a category, and the validation status ships verbatim with every row.
Baseline scores from an immature model (maturity gate not passed, 7 training rounds). Scores rank; they never assert a category.
score_only:v0-immature-baseline · verbatim from the scoring run: score_only means the number may rank works, and no category label ships from itClassification
machine, unvalidatedMachine predicted; a candidate call from one source (direct Gemma or distilled Codex), not a consensus.
How this classification was reached, model by model and score by score, is at the end of the page under "How this classification was reached".