Issues in Australian Foreign Policy January to June 2023

International politics often seems like an ever-unfolding stream of crises, some predicted and some not, coupled with proclamations that we live in extraordinary times (sometimes to justify exceptional measures). The first half of 2023 did not disappoint in this regard. The year began with continued violence in Myanmar, Yemen, and Ukraine. By April, a new conflict had broken out in Sudan between the Sudanese Armed forces and the Rapid Support Forces.1 March marked the 20th anniversary of the Iraq War, a reminder of the profound and lasting impact it has had on global politics.2 Natural disasters and extreme weather events also featured heavily in the first half of 2023, often aggravating already precarious situations around the world. These included a tragic earthquake that crossed the border of Turkey and Syria, wildfires in Chile and Cyclone Gabrielle in New Zealand. On March 4, Vanuatu implemented a state of emergency after suffering two cyclones in a week,3 while a state of emergency was declared in Alberta, Canada on May 6 due to wildfires.4 June 2023 was recorded as the hottest June on record,5 while July was the hottest month ever in the global temperature record.6 Summer in the Northern Hemisphere saw heatwaves and record global daily temperatures being exceeded on numerous occasions. Despite a sense of impending doom around a future climate apocalypse, limited advances were made in tackling the problem. Worth noting in this regard was the passing of a UN resolution to secure a legal opinion from the International Court of Justice on the obligation of states to tackle the climate crisis.7 Heightened uncertainty around technological developments and how they will transform global politics also loomed large in the first half of 2023. Released at the end of 2022, ChatGPT burst onto the scene at the beginning of this year sparking a range of predictions and discussions around the role of Artificial Intelligence in global politics.8 The app TikTok continued to be at the heart of much controversy with a range of Western states banning its use on government devices. From 18 June, the world was captivated as rescuers sought to locate a tourist vessel that had imploded while visiting the submerged wreckage of the Titanic. The period was also marked by, sometimes controversial, leadership transitions. Charles III was crowned to both pomp and protest. On 8 January, supporters of Jair Bolsonaro stormed the congress in Brazil, in scenes reminiscent of the Capitol attacks in the US in 2021, after he lost the election to Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva.9 On 14 May, Recep Tayip Erdoğan won a hotly contested run-off election in Turkey, dashing hopes from his opponents that his reign was coming to an end.10 In another failed transition on the same day, the Move Forward Party won the most seats in the Thai general election but were unable to rule.11 Less controversial, but perhaps more surprising, was the resignation of New Zealand's Prime Minister Jacinda Ardern on 19 January. Showing her human side for one last time, Ardern suggested that she “no longer had enough left in the tank” to carry on.12 All the while, the spectre of power politics loomed and sometimes floated in the background. In late January, a Chinese balloon was discovered drifting over US airspace. The incident led to a crisis in which US Secretary of State Antony Blinken cancelled a planned trip to Beijing. The US eventually shot down the balloon claiming that it was being used for surveillance purposes while the Chinese government suggested that it was a meteorological device that had been blown off course. Beyond this incident, there was intense scrutiny of initiatives and actions taken by the Chinese government throughout the first half of the year in the West, including the brokering of a deal between Iran and Saudi Arabia,13 and Xi Jinping's visit to Russia on 20-22 March.14 In the region, there was some international concern when a Chinese state company was awarded a contract to redevelop the port in Honiara, Solomon Island.15 Seeking to expand on their own influence in the Pacific, the US signed a security deal with Papua New Guinea.16 This foreign policy review will explore how Australia has sought to negotiate these, predictably, extraordinary times. It will do this by, first, chronicling key developments in Australian foreign policy between January and June 2023. Second, it will discuss the discursive framing of Australian foreign policy articulated by the Labor government during this period, building on analysis provided by Kate Clayton in the previous review.17 It will focus particularly on how the government has framed national identity and interests, the situation it sees itself to be operating in, and how it considers national interests to be best pursued in this context. Third, it will outline some questions that arise from unresolved tensions between the discourse and conduct of foreign policy during this period: How will military build-up be balanced with action on climate change? How will an agenda for Indigenous diplomacy fit within a largely ‘business as usual' approach to foreign policy? Will claims to defend the rules-based international order be credible with ongoing questions around human rights abuses? This section will chronicle key developments in Australian foreign policy during this period. There has been substantial change as well as a lot of inertia. While being ostensibly a ‘domestic’ issue, it is impossible to overlook the significance of the upcoming (or past at the time of publication) referendum on constitutional recognition of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander peoples and the creation of the Voice to Parliament.18 The first half of 2023 saw intense, and often divisive, public debate on the Voice. A few weeks before the design principles of the Voice were released, Justin Mohamed was announced as the first Ambassador for First Nations people,19 marking a significant advance in efforts to formulate an Indigenous foreign policy.20 Despite some fundamental questions being raised regarding the foundations of Australia as a nation,21 and how it pursues its interests, the conduct of foreign policy followed largely familiar patterns, oblivious to the debates occurring around it. Both in the media and in political discourse, the primary focus continues to be on geopolitical competition. The drums of war were beating ever faster in certain sectors. Notable in this regard was the ‘Red Alert’ series published in The Age and The Sydney Morning Herald on 6–7 March, in which it was claimed that Australia faced the threat of war with China within the next three years.22 Given such coverage, it was quite unsurprising that three quarters of Australians were found to believe that it was likely that China would become a military threat to Australia in the next two decades in a study appearing on 20 June.23 The Albanese government attempted to stabilise the difficult relationship with China in the context of such coverage, with some improvements made in terms of trade relations. According to Penny Wong, the government has sought to “cooperate where we can, disagree where we must, manage our differences wisely, and above all else, engage in and vigorously pursue our own national interest”.24 A shipment of Australian coal arrived in Chinese ports on 8 February after an unofficial ban was lifted following a meeting between trade minister Don Farrell and China's commerce minister Wang Wentao.25 Tariffs on Australian barley were later lifted,26 and the first in-person meeting between Trade Ministers since 2019 was held in Beijing on 13 May. AUKUS will come at a huge financial cost and with great uncertainty of its success. It is likely to compound Australia's strategic risks, heighten geopolitical tensions, and undermine efforts at nuclear non-proliferation. It puts Australia at odds with our closest neighbours in the region, distracts us from addressing climate change, and risks increasing the threat of nuclear war. Australia's defence autonomy will only be further eroded because of AUKUS. All of this will be done to support the primacy of an ally whose position in Asia is more fragile than commonly assumed, and whose domestic politics is increasingly unstable.30 A little over a month after the unveiling of AUKUS, a public version of the Defence Strategic Review was published. The recommendations of the review, such as the acquisition of weaponry, defence capabilities and regulation, and investment to support the Australian Defence industry were embraced by the Albanese government to much fanfare.31 The review marked a significant shift in Australia's strategic doctrine, arguing for a move away from the “Defence of Australia” doctrine to a new doctrine of “National Defence”. The former was aimed at deterring low-level threats from small and middle powers in the region.32 In contrast, National Defence entails a whole-of-government approach focused on the maintenance of a desirable regional balance of power, and regional stability, in the Indo-Pacific. The focus here is not only on the acceleration of defence acquisitions and procurement, but also on active diplomacy and statecraft within the Indo-Pacific.33 The shift has been prompted by the government's assessment of the increasing risks of great power conflict in the region as strategic competition between the US and China advances, and the resulting reduction in the previously assumed ten-year warning time for conflict or the use of force or coercion against Australia.34 There were several other key developments regarding strategic alliances. The Quad Summit to be held in Sydney on 17 May was cancelled when Joe Biden withdrew to deal with domestic issues. The leaders of Australia, India, Japan, and the US later met on the sidelines of the G7 meeting in Hiroshima, reaffirming commitments and deepening an agenda in a joint statement released on 20 May.35 India's Prime Minister Narendra Modi then visited Sydney on 23 May, receiving a rock-star welcome. Criticism of Modi and his Bharatiya Janata party (BJP) for discriminatory policies against Muslims and their broader Hindu Nationalist agenda were largely ignored during the visit.36 The government also made efforts to strengthen relationships in the Pacific in reaction to concerns regarding increased geopolitical competition. A new security between Australia and Papua New was announced on January. Albanese the as being of a to security in the The included in to influence in the Pacific and and the same time, Australia's support for continued to be a of with its Vanuatu minister Australia continues to of the which we in the Pacific including Australia, is the threat to our between Australia's in the Pacific and the it to will be in more later in the tensions were also in domestic in a of In it was announced that surveillance by Chinese and were to be from Australian government following in the US and The Australian government followed the of by banning the use of TikTok on government the end of March, the government a that would to over the of security minister that this will to Australia's most capabilities and in a context of increased foreign In June, emergency was to the for a new in national security we the world we the of our foreign Australian foreign policy the Albanese government has been marked by some discursive as well as with to previous In this we will outline how this framing has been during the period in this The discursive framing be a of we a of the situation in which foreign policy is to be and a of to be done to further the national at the beginning of this section the government not approach foreign policy as an but one that is by national national interests and national the we the world we the of our foreign do In with previous Labor the government has sought to locate Australia's identity in the region, most commonly to as the three our interests the of the There was some controversy at the beginning of the year when Penny Australia from its and that we a in the region as a with substantial when a at the for at This to a is on from the region, including but also on the of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander often how the of Australia our in the Australians out to the we in it as the world itself in also to by between that sought from the of that Nations were this first and and that First Nations will Australia to around the particularly in the claims regarding Australia's national identity most in discourse but much more in the of other key government This of Australia's identity in to a broader of the state of in global it is is a in which the rules-based order is the threat of conflict is and foreign is more than live in time of profound geopolitical both in our region and around the where is longer with a strategic is occurring military and The region we the is framed as most region of our time and for to This is to and in the region as well as the competition that is the position in the region, and the to great but also new The threat is to come from to the order and particularly of and The conflict in is often as a of such a war that has we the security and of our region for This often with to the for a conflict to in In his at the for from the war in to China's military threats commonly also to China such as trade political and international and that from trade to human The of how to pursue our national interests in this context on from this framing of we and the situation we In this the government has sought to some of the in the media regarding the of future and to stabilise with It has that be a of diplomacy and Labor often to and of the UN as the of approach that to be This is to be done by international that powers and a at the and to be to a to their and middle such as Australia, to be more than in a world by great the framing national interests to be pursued the region due to in security and trade with the Indo-Pacific. The region is not for great power and states to a region that is and of international and the Pacific the Asia and other regional A key of much of the discourse in this regard around the of to the It is often that will in the and of This is due to a to and trade in the It is that Australia's trade over the next to be found in the the of a Asia to trade and the resulting it is will also to The Pacific is the other of The is but also a of strategic due to The government that it to the Pacific and to to the of our It this as a as not It to its with the Pacific as more than previous initiatives such as the Pacific of the this is to be done is the creation of a new policy and an in over the next than this is framed as being for strategic regarding security and has that is to It our regional become more and their own particularly in the context of This with government claims that it is action on climate change, of from the previous While it is that regional such as and the Pacific for regional and that with the region is for addressing such as climate change and it is also suggested that force is to the rules-based to secure strategic and the of trade and to the discourse here of and is that “no and is to be to their own and not be by great powers and this is only of it is to the of international Strategic that of regional including with the Defence New and the Quad India, and and AUKUS in that the nuclear to be AUKUS to Australia to our to the security of our region, and to the maintenance of the global rules-based and the of new strategic as in the Defence Strategic to be to the rules-based There of more to foreign policy than the that we this it is not to the discursive framing of the government at but to this is by there between and and there in the In this we to out several questions that from between the we and the in which The first of these, and perhaps the most is around addressing climate How will military build-up and defence be balanced with action on climate change? The Albanese government has away from the climate of the previous framing action on climate change as an international and The action on climate change, with the In this out with previous and for a much more in with the is the government's to a on to and new In to is the of the approach in the Defence Strategic Review and pursued AUKUS. It seems difficult to how such initiatives will be pursued further aggravating the climate by the Defence Strategic Review a approach to security and broader of global a while climate change and largely framed as that from the more of the defence The is on building military and as well as the that power than concerns to the the Defence Strategic Review be to government both the Defence Strategic Review and AUKUS heavily with a and not for security Albanese has claimed that AUKUS is much more than it the that it much more for for for industry and for will be one of the Australia has ever the of the or the of the Australian Albanese how it be a for and that will throughout the Australian and Australians for the of Kate Clayton and to tensions between with the while AUKUS, in and to Western in the The climate impact how tensions between and than we to this how a new around be with action on climate change? in the context of increasing extreme weather military and climate security to be as with the military In this claims to be action on climate change likely to be particularly by Pacific The framing of the by the government will to as a that while the concerns of Pacific is regarding efforts to an approach to Indigenous most by the of an Ambassador for First Nations How will an agenda for Indigenous diplomacy fit within a largely approach to foreign policy? has on Indigenous to our in the region and to has that First Nations will strengthen our the world and in our region, the The discourse in this regard often seems and is sometimes framed as an to in our to that been for This to questions around this is and Indigenous or Indigenous concerns and will come to the of policy The is out on it seems that Indigenous will be taken when they come with broader we to the Defence Strategic Review and AUKUS that around a of the and the that to this be by Indigenous First Nations peoples on with military build-up on their we the to which the continued focus on be it or with Indigenous this in we that we when it is to do and when for some of be found in a published of Australian of and by and on Australia's International to the discussions of and in in the of the conduct of Australia's foreign its it its and for Indigenous and the of and foreign policy in a context where the and efforts to the Australian state not taken and where and foreign policy do engage with Indigenous or to the concerns of Indigenous This to the that the will be difficult not A be with to an agenda for Indigenous diplomacy that not a broader with the foundations of the Australian state and its foreign would that an to other geopolitical and the of only be after has taken not as a In it is that the future of an Indigenous foreign policy much with the debate around the referendum for the Voice to the divisive, and debate the that we from in this regard. there a between Australia's claims to be a of the rules-based order and its record on human 2023 Australia's on human rights and climate due to of First Nations peoples and as well as its continued of this in we claims the rules-based international order will be credible addressing ongoing human rights issues. The rules-based as used by the Australian often seems to to US and of and when they to the border policies that concerns regarding Australia's of and of its human rights this year has been marked by the of Australian particularly to the where the the has where there is ongoing controversy around for in and an Australian company won the contract to the Australia has become a for an international order where has been for political on this year around the from the in to the of While the Albanese government has some of the regarding the border it continues to to the three of and the role of the Australian on the move to and as a of such this more than after their off the of while government the situation like a not a questions were also raised when it was that had been that had war in in a he against the Sydney Morning The Age and The The to of war by Australian in further on Australia's human rights A of Australian of this by and analysis of the war including the and of that such and the to within the Australian Defence the first half of 2023, the Albanese government has further its foreign policy Minister for Penny Wong, has taken an active role in Australia's in the world to with the This in continues a of by previous Labor the same time, the by the government to to the of the last that has our region as the Indo-Pacific. the is where Australia's risks and to The government has pursued the by an active role in the international particularly regional and It has attempted to off threats to this order by and and strategic alliances. The discourse, and the actions it not and out of with the key of our times. we in the context of increasingly extreme weather events and global on a to a defence industry be at the of our the same time, much more is regarding the international order we military particularly this is to be around Indigenous and a fundamental of such a and there been some developments in this regard. a much broader with the foundations of the Australian state and its foreign policy will be we to to a international around such seems to that in that continues to be by The of Western Australia, as of the The of Western Australia the of Australian

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