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Record W4392908482 · doi:10.1109/tdsc.2024.3376084

Achieving Practical and Privacy-Preserving kNN Query Over Encrypted Data

2024· article· en· W4392908482 on OpenAlex

Why this work is in the frame

A frame that forgets how it found something cannot be audited. These are the routes that admitted this work.

affAt least one author lists a Canadian institution in the pinned OpenAlex snapshot.

Bibliographic record

VenueIEEE Transactions on Dependable and Secure Computing · 2024
Typearticle
Languageen
FieldComputer Science
TopicCryptography and Data Security
Canadian institutionsUniversity of New Brunswick
FundersChina Postdoctoral Science FoundationNational Natural Science Foundation of China
KeywordsComputer scienceEncryptionInformation privacyQuery optimizationData miningComputer security

Abstract

fetched live from OpenAlex

As one of the most popular queries in big data era, the <inline-formula xmlns:mml="http://www.w3.org/1998/Math/MathML" xmlns:xlink="http://www.w3.org/1999/xlink"><tex-math notation="LaTeX">$k$</tex-math></inline-formula> nearest neighbors ( <inline-formula xmlns:mml="http://www.w3.org/1998/Math/MathML" xmlns:xlink="http://www.w3.org/1999/xlink"><tex-math notation="LaTeX">$k$</tex-math></inline-formula> NN) query plays a significant role in various applications, such as medical diagnosis, signal processing, and recommendation systems. Meanwhile, driven by the advancement of the cloud service, an emerging trend among applications is to outsource the dataset and the corresponding <inline-formula xmlns:mml="http://www.w3.org/1998/Math/MathML" xmlns:xlink="http://www.w3.org/1999/xlink"><tex-math notation="LaTeX">$k$</tex-math></inline-formula> NN query services to the cloud. However, as the cloud is not fully trusted, those applications will face vital privacy concerns, and thus they usually encrypt data before outsourcing them to the cloud. Because encrypted data are outsourced to cloud, the <inline-formula xmlns:mml="http://www.w3.org/1998/Math/MathML" xmlns:xlink="http://www.w3.org/1999/xlink"><tex-math notation="LaTeX">$k$</tex-math></inline-formula> NN query over encrypted data has become increasingly attractive, and many solutions have been put forth in recent years. However, existing solutions cannot fully satisfy the objects of returning exact query results, protecting database privacy and query privacy, achieving high query efficiency, and imposing low computational costs at the user side. To address these issues, in this paper, we propose a new practical and privacy-preserving <inline-formula xmlns:mml="http://www.w3.org/1998/Math/MathML" xmlns:xlink="http://www.w3.org/1999/xlink"><tex-math notation="LaTeX">$k$</tex-math></inline-formula> NN query scheme. Specifically, we first refine the general security requirements for the matrix encryption by systematically analyzing existing algorithms. Then, we design a novel asymmetric matrix encryption (AME) to securely achieve Euclidean distance computation and two distances comparison in a single-party and non-interactive way. Then, based on the AME scheme, we propose a privacy-preserving <inline-formula xmlns:mml="http://www.w3.org/1998/Math/MathML" xmlns:xlink="http://www.w3.org/1999/xlink"><tex-math notation="LaTeX">$k$</tex-math></inline-formula> NN query scheme, in which a max-heap of size <inline-formula xmlns:mml="http://www.w3.org/1998/Math/MathML" xmlns:xlink="http://www.w3.org/1999/xlink"><tex-math notation="LaTeX">$k$</tex-math></inline-formula> is used to accelerate query efficiency. Detailed security analysis shows that our proposed scheme is really privacy-preserving. In addition, extensive performance evaluations are conducted, and the results demonstrate that our proposed scheme is also highly efficient.

Fetched live from OpenAlex and de-inverted. Abstracts are not stored in this database: the inverted indexes are 8.6 GB of the frame’s 9.3 GB of text, and the host has 13 GB free.

Full frame distilled prediction

Teacher imitation

Not calibrated prevalence, not ground truth. Human validation pending. Learned from the 10,348 direct Codex labels and 10,348 direct Gemma labels. Candidate is the union of thresholded teacher heads; consensus is their intersection. These outputs are machine_predicted_unvalidated and are not human labels or direct frontier model labels.

metaresearch head score (Codex)0.001
metaresearch head score (Gemma)0.000
Version: codex-gemma-dda1882f352aValidation status: machine_predicted_unvalidated
Candidate categoriesScholarly communication
Consensus categoriesnone
DomainCandidate signal: none · Consensus signal: none
Study designCandidate signal: Simulation or modeling · Consensus signal: none
GenreCandidate signal: Empirical · Consensus signal: none
Teacher disagreement score0.982
Threshold uncertainty score1.000

Codex and Gemma teacher scores by category

CategoryCodexGemma
Metaresearch0.0010.000
Meta-epidemiology (narrow)0.0000.000
Meta-epidemiology (broad)0.0000.000
Bibliometrics0.0000.001
Science and technology studies0.0010.000
Scholarly communication0.0010.002
Open science0.0010.000
Research integrity0.0000.001
Insufficient payload (model declined to judge)0.0000.000

Machine scores (provisional)

The two teacher heads of the student model, read on this work. A score orders the frame for review; it never asserts a category, and the validation status ships verbatim with every row.

Baseline scores from an immature model (maturity gate not passed, 7 training rounds). Scores rank; they never assert a category.

Opus teacher head0.038
GPT teacher head0.311
Teacher spread0.273 · how far apart the two teachers sit on this one work
Validation statusscore_only:v0-immature-baseline · verbatim from the scoring run: score_only means the number may rank works, and no category label ships from it