Warfare and Logistics Along the US-Canadian Border during the War of 1812

Christopher Dishman, the author of a recent study of the 1846 Battle of Monterrey, has chosen the northern border of the United States for his latest publishing effort. As the author’s somewhat unwieldy title informs us, his intention is to examine military operations and their logistical underpinning during the War of 1812. This in itself is worthy of praise because most American historians of the conflict prefer to discuss the campaigns in the Chesapeake and Louisiana or the series of single-ship victories in the first year of the war that resulted in victories for the United States rather than the protracted and often inconclusive fighting along the young republic’s northern frontier. The importance of this theater cannot be underestimated—by 1814 almost two-thirds of the US Regular Army was deployed in this area or on the march to it.Dishman is also aware (unlike many American historians) that there is a sound and very lively Canadian historiography of the war that has increased dramatically in the last two decades. When discussing military operations, he accesses this scholarship to give a more balanced view of military operations along the border. He has also made use of the archival resources available in Canada, a task that in recent years must have been made difficult because of widespread restrictions to institutional access during the COVID pandemic.At its outset, the War of 1812 was viewed as a certain American victory. A population of approximately six million Americans was pitted against the six separate British colonies in North America whose inhabitants did not number more than six hundred thousand. American confidence in ultimate victory was exemplified by former president Thomas Jefferson’s remark in the opening weeks of the conflict that “the acquisition of Canada this year as far as the neighborhood of Quebec will be a mere matter of marching” (Thomas Jefferson to William Duane, August 4, 1812, Series 1, Reel 46, Jefferson Papers, Library of Congress). Canadian historians have been dining out on this greatly inaccurate prophecy and Jefferson’s somewhat boastful words can often be found quoted in their work. (The reader should note that the reviewer is a Canadian.)The problem for the United States was that between the larger American population, which was clustered along the Eastern Seaboard, and the Great Lakes basin, where the greater part of the fighting on the northern border took place, lay a considerable obstruction—the high ground of the Allegheny Mountain Range. This barrier hampered both communications and logistics. In terms of waterborne transport—the easiest and most economical method of transporting heavy goods—only the Hudson-Mohawk river system could be used and this was hampered by the limited capacity of the few locks. Land transport was very difficult because the few roads were very primitive. The National Road only reached as far as Wheeling, Virginia, and progress beyond that point utilized what were little more than cart tracks.British logistical problems were, if anything, even worse. Almost all military materiel had to shipped by sea from the United Kingdom. Seagoing vessels could reach as far as Montreal, but the shipping season was limited in duration to the period, April to early October, after which the lower St. Lawrence was subject to freezing. From Montreal to Kingston, the largest British base in the Great Lakes, water transport was by small boat convoys as far as Prescott where cargo was transshipped to lake vessels. These convoys had to run the five rapids between the two points, which sometimes required offloading and transporting by land. There was a continuous road along the north bank of the St. Lawrence, which in winter served as a sleigh route, but for much of the length of this logistical corridor it was vulnerable to interdiction, as American territory was on the opposite bank of the river. In fact, the War of 1812 was one of those rare military conflicts where the line of communication was also the line of contact.Taking all this into consideration, it is surprising that Dishman does not delve more deeply into the logistical aspect of the war in the north. Logistics, which are part of his title, are not deeply discussed and analyzed in this book. One would have expected to have seen more information on such topics as the British Corps of Voyageurs, which conducted boat traffic on the St. Lawrence, as well as the difficulties of the Hudson-Mohawk corridor and their effect on American naval construction on Lake Ontario. There is some mention of the subject in the book, but one is surprised that there is not more, considering that it apparently forms a major theme of the work.The author is on much steadier ground when dealing with warfare—strategy, operations, and tactics—in the northern theater. He covers all the major campaigns and battles in detail and his coverage is mainly unbiased although his unfamiliarity with the structure and tactics of the British army is, in places, evident. The problem with Dishman’s description of the military actions, which sometimes descend into minute tactical detail, is that there are no accompanying maps to illustrate the positions and movements of the opposing forces. What is a reader to make of a passage such as this:There are many similar examples. When an author descends into detail such as this, it is axiomatic that he or she provides good maps for the reader.Despite these blemishes, Warfare and Logistics along the US-Canadian Border is a useful addition to a growing body of historical literature on the so-called forgotten War of 1812.

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