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Record W4393259060 · doi:10.1287/opre.2020.0651

Optimal Auction Design with Deferred Inspection and Reward

2024· article· en· W4393259060 on OpenAlexaff
Saeed Alaei, Alexandre Belloni, Ali Makhdoumi, Azarakhsh Malekian

Bibliographic record

VenueOperations Research · 2024
Typearticle
Languageen
FieldDecision Sciences
TopicAuction Theory and Applications
Canadian institutionsUniversity of Toronto
Fundersnot available
KeywordsComputer scienceOperations researchMicroeconomicsBusinessEconomicsMathematics

Abstract

fetched live from OpenAlex

In a variety of auction contexts, particularly those facilitated by digital marketplaces, auctioneers are now empowered to review the valuations submitted by purchasers and modify the final payments accordingly. Alaei et al. formulate and study the optimal design of such auctions, demonstrating that both the analysis and implementation vastly depart from classical settings. In particular, the analysis requires tools from convex analysis and the calculus of variations, which could be of independent interest in other mechanism design questions.

Fetched live from OpenAlex and de-inverted. Abstracts are not stored in this database: the inverted indexes are 8.6 GB of the frame’s 9.3 GB of text, and the host has 13 GB free.

How this classification was reachedexpand

Full frame distilled prediction

Teacher imitation

Not calibrated prevalence, not ground truth. Human validation pending. Learned from the 10,348 direct Codex labels and 10,348 direct Gemma labels. Candidate is the union of thresholded teacher heads; consensus is their intersection. These outputs are machine_predicted_unvalidated and are not human labels or direct frontier model labels.

metaresearch head score (Codex)0.004
metaresearch head score (Gemma)0.001
Version: codex-gemma-dda1882f352aValidation status: machine_predicted_unvalidated
Candidate categoriesScholarly communication, Insufficient payload (model declined to judge)
Consensus categoriesnone
DomainCandidate signal: none · Consensus signal: none
Study designCandidate signal: Simulation or modeling · Consensus signal: none
GenreCandidate signal: Empirical · Consensus signal: none
Teacher disagreement score0.807
Threshold uncertainty score1.000

Codex and Gemma teacher scores by category

CategoryCodexGemma
Metaresearch0.0040.001
Meta-epidemiology (narrow)0.0000.000
Meta-epidemiology (broad)0.0000.000
Bibliometrics0.0010.002
Science and technology studies0.0010.000
Scholarly communication0.0010.001
Open science0.0000.000
Research integrity0.0000.000
Insufficient payload (model declined to judge)0.0000.001

Machine scores (provisional)

The two teacher heads of the student model, read on this work. A score orders the frame for review; it never asserts a category, and the validation status ships verbatim with every row.

Baseline scores from an immature model (maturity gate not passed, 7 training rounds). Scores rank; they never assert a category.

Opus teacher head0.422
GPT teacher head0.536
Teacher spread0.113 · how far apart the two teachers sit on this one work
Validation statusscore_only:v0-immature-baseline · verbatim from the scoring run: score_only means the number may rank works, and no category label ships from it

Classification

machine, unvalidated

Machine predicted; a candidate call from one teacher head, not a consensus.

Study designSimulation or modeling
Domainnot available
GenreEmpirical

How this classification was reached, model by model and score by score, is at the end of the page under "How this classification was reached".

Quick stats

Citations5
Published2024
Admission routes1
Has abstractyes

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