A welfare analysis of genetic testing in health insurance markets with adverse selection and prevention
Bibliographic record
Abstract
Abstract Personalized medicine remains in its early stages, with expensive genetic tests offering limited actionable insights for prevention. As a result, few individuals undergo testing, and health insurance contracts pool all agents regardless of genetic background. However, as tests become cheaper and more informative, more people may choose to get tested, influencing both insurance pricing and contract types. We examine how the proportion of individuals taking genetic tests and the informativeness of these tests affect whether equilibrium contracts remain pooling or become separating. We find that increasing test uptake can reduce welfare, particularly when it leads to a shift from pooling to separating contracts. Similarly, lower prevention effort costs, reflecting more informative tests, can harm welfare if they induce separation. These findings suggest that policies promoting genetic testing or reducing prevention costs may not always be beneficial, especially when the market equilibrium remains in a pooling state.
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How this classification was reachedexpand
Full frame machine prediction
Teacher imitationNot calibrated prevalence, not ground truth. Human validation pending. The Gemma side is a direct model label for every work in the frame, read from the title-only record. The Codex side is a classifier learned from the 10,348 direct Codex labels and calibrated to design-weighted sample rates; fields without enough sample support carry no Codex call. Candidate is the union of the two sides; consensus is their intersection. These outputs are machine_predicted_unvalidated and are not human labels.
Distilled classifier scores by category (both heads)
| Category | Codex | Gemma |
|---|---|---|
| Metaresearch | 0.010 | 0.031 |
| Meta-epidemiology (narrow) | 0.001 | 0.001 |
| Meta-epidemiology (broad) | 0.002 | 0.002 |
| Bibliometrics | 0.002 | 0.001 |
| Science and technology studies | 0.002 | 0.004 |
| Scholarly communication | 0.004 | 0.005 |
| Open science | 0.002 | 0.003 |
| Research integrity | 0.004 | 0.003 |
| Insufficient payload (model declined to judge) | 0.013 | 0.001 |
Machine scores (provisional)
The two teacher heads of the student model, read on this work. A score orders the frame for review; it never asserts a category, and the validation status ships verbatim with every row.
Baseline scores from an immature model (maturity gate not passed, 7 training rounds). Scores rank; they never assert a category.
score_only:v0-immature-baseline · verbatim from the scoring run: score_only means the number may rank works, and no category label ships from itClassification
machine, unvalidatedMachine predicted; a candidate call from one source (direct Gemma or distilled Codex), not a consensus.
How this classification was reached, model by model and score by score, is at the end of the page under "How this classification was reached".