Physical Layer Security of Wireless Communications: When Moving Target Defense Meets Unmanned Aerial Vehicles
Bibliographic record
Abstract
In the realm of unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) communication, the utilization of UAVs as aerial relays for ground nodes (GNs) introduces strategic flexibility, especially in scenarios where ground base stations may experience unforeseen impairments. However, this form of communication is vulnerable to eavesdropping by malicious entities due to the broadcast nature of wireless channels. In this paper, we tackle this problem by introducing a spatiotemporal diversification-based artificial noise (AN) injection strategy, known as moving target defense (MTD), aiming to confuse potential attackers without compromising legitimate communications. The proposed approach targets maximizing the average secrecy rate (ASR) by jointly optimizing the UAV's trajectory and transmit power, aligned with optimizing the MTD transmit power splitting factor between legitimate and AN signals at the GN source. The formulated problem is a non-convex mixed integer nonlinear programming (MINLP) problem due to the non-convexity of the secrecy rate. To solve it, we formulate our system as a Markov decision process, and then we propose a novel deep reinforcement learning (DRL)-based approach to enhance the ASR under various system constraints. Numerical results demonstrate the superiority of the proposed algorithm over benchmarks in terms of ASR and intercept probability, showcasing its effectiveness in enhancing the security of UAV-assisted communications.
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How this classification was reachedexpand
Full frame distilled prediction
Teacher imitationNot calibrated prevalence, not ground truth. Human validation pending. Learned from the 10,348 direct Codex labels and 10,348 direct Gemma labels. Candidate is the union of thresholded teacher heads; consensus is their intersection. These outputs are machine_predicted_unvalidated and are not human labels or direct frontier model labels.
Codex and Gemma teacher scores by category
| Category | Codex | Gemma |
|---|---|---|
| Metaresearch | 0.000 | 0.000 |
| Meta-epidemiology (narrow) | 0.000 | 0.000 |
| Meta-epidemiology (broad) | 0.000 | 0.000 |
| Bibliometrics | 0.000 | 0.000 |
| Science and technology studies | 0.000 | 0.000 |
| Scholarly communication | 0.000 | 0.000 |
| Open science | 0.001 | 0.001 |
| Research integrity | 0.000 | 0.001 |
| Insufficient payload (model declined to judge) | 0.000 | 0.000 |
Machine scores (provisional)
The two teacher heads of the student model, read on this work. A score orders the frame for review; it never asserts a category, and the validation status ships verbatim with every row.
Baseline scores from an immature model (maturity gate not passed, 7 training rounds). Scores rank; they never assert a category.
score_only:v0-immature-baseline · verbatim from the scoring run: score_only means the number may rank works, and no category label ships from itClassification
machine, unvalidatedMachine predicted; a candidate call from one teacher head, not a consensus.
How this classification was reached, model by model and score by score, is at the end of the page under "How this classification was reached".