Mapping Capital Ratios to Bank Lending Spreads: The Role of Efficiency and Asymmetry in Performance Indices
Why this work is in the frame
A frame that forgets how it found something cannot be audited. These are the routes that admitted this work.
Bibliographic record
Abstract
Beyond the 2007–2008 financial crisis, the collapse of the Silicon Valley Bank and the acquisition of Credit Suisse by the Swiss investment bank UBS Group AG in 2023 have brought fresh attention to the need for new regulatory capital, liquidity risk management, and leverage requirements. To meet tightened capital requirements, banks have to increase their capital ratios either by increasing equity or by decreasing risk-weighted assets. Both options lead to banks’ performance deterioration. One remedy for banks to recover is raising their lending spread. A critical question is how much the lending spread should be increased to offset the drop in the bank’s financial performance level. In this study, we focus on the asymmetries and efficiency consequences of performance indices such as economic value added (EVA) and the more commonly used return on equity (ROE) in determining the loan spread. Using data on the largest U.S. banks over the period 2018–2022, our results show that the ROE rule significantly overestimates the magnitude of the lending spreads required to offset the negative financial consequences of increases in capital ratios. The EVA approach, on the other hand, prescribes on average a significantly lower lending spread of 0.4505 basis points against a lending spread of 21.0441 basis points associated with the use of the ROE approach. The efficiency and the level of lending spreads should enable banks to maintain their competitive advantages in the loan markets impacting overall economic productivity and growth.
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Full frame distilled prediction
Teacher imitationNot calibrated prevalence, not ground truth. Human validation pending. Learned from the 10,348 direct Codex labels and 10,348 direct Gemma labels. Candidate is the union of thresholded teacher heads; consensus is their intersection. These outputs are machine_predicted_unvalidated and are not human labels or direct frontier model labels.
Codex and Gemma teacher scores by category
| Category | Codex | Gemma |
|---|---|---|
| Metaresearch | 0.002 | 0.000 |
| Meta-epidemiology (narrow) | 0.000 | 0.000 |
| Meta-epidemiology (broad) | 0.000 | 0.000 |
| Bibliometrics | 0.001 | 0.001 |
| Science and technology studies | 0.000 | 0.000 |
| Scholarly communication | 0.000 | 0.000 |
| Open science | 0.000 | 0.000 |
| Research integrity | 0.000 | 0.000 |
| Insufficient payload (model declined to judge) | 0.000 | 0.000 |
Machine scores (provisional)
The two teacher heads of the student model, read on this work. A score orders the frame for review; it never asserts a category, and the validation status ships verbatim with every row.
Baseline scores from an immature model (maturity gate not passed, 7 training rounds). Scores rank; they never assert a category.
score_only:v0-immature-baseline · verbatim from the scoring run: score_only means the number may rank works, and no category label ships from it