A Comprehensive Analysis of Explainable AI for Malware Hunting
Bibliographic record
Abstract
In the past decade, the number of malware variants has increased rapidly. Many researchers have proposed to detect malware using intelligent techniques, such as Machine Learning (ML) and Deep Learning (DL), which have high accuracy and precision. These methods, however, suffer from being opaque in the decision-making process. Therefore, we need Artificial Intelligence (AI)-based models to be explainable, interpretable, and transparent to be reliable and trustworthy. In this survey, we reviewed articles related to Explainable AI (XAI) and their application to the significant scope of malware detection. The article encompasses a comprehensive examination of various XAI algorithms employed in malware analysis. Moreover, we have addressed the characteristics, challenges, and requirements in malware analysis that cannot be accommodated by standard XAI methods. We discussed that even though Explainable Malware Detection (EMD) models provide explainability, they make an AI-based model more vulnerable to adversarial attacks. We also propose a framework that assigns a level of explainability to each XAI malware analysis model, based on the security features involved in each method. In summary, the proposed project focuses on combining XAI and malware analysis to apply XAI models for scrutinizing the opaque nature of AI systems and their applications to malware analysis.
Fetched live from OpenAlex and de-inverted. Abstracts are not stored in this database: the inverted indexes are 8.6 GB of the frame’s 9.3 GB of text, and the host has 13 GB free.
How this classification was reachedexpand
Full frame machine prediction
Teacher imitationNot calibrated prevalence, not ground truth. Human validation pending. The Gemma side is a direct model label for every work in the frame, read from the title-only record. The Codex side is a classifier learned from the 10,348 direct Codex labels and calibrated to design-weighted sample rates; fields without enough sample support carry no Codex call. Candidate is the union of the two sides; consensus is their intersection. These outputs are machine_predicted_unvalidated and are not human labels.
Distilled classifier scores by category (both heads)
| Category | Codex | Gemma |
|---|---|---|
| Metaresearch | 0.001 | 0.005 |
| Meta-epidemiology (narrow) | 0.001 | 0.000 |
| Meta-epidemiology (broad) | 0.001 | 0.001 |
| Bibliometrics | 0.004 | 0.003 |
| Science and technology studies | 0.001 | 0.001 |
| Scholarly communication | 0.002 | 0.003 |
| Open science | 0.001 | 0.001 |
| Research integrity | 0.001 | 0.002 |
| Insufficient payload (model declined to judge) | 0.002 | 0.001 |
Machine scores (provisional)
The two teacher heads of the student model, read on this work. A score orders the frame for review; it never asserts a category, and the validation status ships verbatim with every row.
Baseline scores from an immature model (maturity gate not passed, 7 training rounds). Scores rank; they never assert a category.
score_only:v0-immature-baseline · verbatim from the scoring run: score_only means the number may rank works, and no category label ships from itClassification
machine, unvalidatedMachine predicted; a candidate call from one source (direct Gemma or distilled Codex), not a consensus.
How this classification was reached, model by model and score by score, is at the end of the page under "How this classification was reached".