Equal Societies, Autonomous Lives: Reconciling social equality and relational autonomy

Relational egalitarians flesh out the idea of what it means to treat persons as equals in society. On many influential accounts, relating as equals requires, among other things, to respect others as equal, autonomous agents (Hojlund, 2021; Scheffler, 2015; Schemmel 2021a; Schuppert, 2015). However, the attempt to subsume respect for personal autonomy under social equality is prima facie suspect: people can presumably endorse social inequalities. We can ask two sets of questions when confronted with situations such as these: first, are these truly autonomous choices? For instance, following substantivist approaches to autonomy, some may question whether choosing subservience or a subordinate status can be an autonomous choice because one would thereby fail to be self-respecting, to see what is effectively in their own interest, or because this choice is often made against a social background that diminishes their available options or controls over their life (Babbitt 1993; Hill, 1991; Oshana, 2006). And, second, these types of cases raise a challenge for relational egalitarians in that it is unclear what it means to treat presumably autonomous agents as equals here. On one hand, respecting their autonomy requires that one should respect their decisions to endorse social inequalities. On the other hand, relational egalitarians should be capable of criticizing social hierarchies and should aim to equalize them. How, then, can we resolve this apparent tension? In this article, I show how debates between relational autonomy theorists hold important lessons for relational egalitarians. The connections between the two theoretical families have not been extensively studied (for recent exceptions, see Stoljar & Voigt, 2021a). Relational autonomy theorists argue that personal autonomy is deeply connected to the social relations we engage in our lives and our socio-political position in society (Mackenzie, 2014; Mackenzie & Stoljar, 2000a, 2000b; Meyers, 2002, 2005; Westlund, 2009). Similarly, relational egalitarians argue that egalitarians should be concerned first and foremost with how people are treated and regarded in society (Anderson, 1999; Fourie et al., 2015; Lippert-Rasmussen, 2018; Schemmel, 2021a). I argue that by connecting social equality and relational autonomy, it is possible to resolve this apparent tension between respect for autonomy and the protection of social equality. More precisely, I argue that relational egalitarians should adopt a constitutivist, externalist understanding of autonomy. I point out that a constitutivist, externalist understanding of autonomy is not designed to evaluated particular individual decisions, but rather to identify the required external conditions to guarantee a substantive level of personal autonomy. The externalist approach consequently allows to say both that some non-egalitarian choices can be deserving of respect and that egalitarian should adopt a structural perspective to promote personal autonomy globally. Below, I first briefly introduce relational egalitarianism and relational autonomy. Second, I distinguish between three ways of conceptualizing the connection between social equality and autonomy: the instrumental approach, the deontic approach, and the constitutivist position. I argue that both the instrumental and deontic approaches fail to provide convincing answers to the tension between autonomy and (social) equality. Consequently, I show that if relational egalitarians want to argue that social equality requires, among other things, to treat autonomous agents as equals qua autonomous agents, they should adopt a constitutive, externalist conception of autonomy. Relational egalitarianism and relational autonomy share many aspects. As Stoljar and Voigt (2021b) points out, first, they both consider that theories of justice “should take the fact of people's social embeddedness as their starting point” (2021b, 1). Second, for both relational egalitarianism and relational autonomy, they do not refer to single theories but are “umbrella terms that encompass different conceptions of the way in which social conditions should be included in an analysis of autonomy and equality” (2021b, 1). However, both theoretical families have fundamentally different aims. Relational autonomy theorists identify the conditions under which an agent is autonomous. In contrast, relational egalitarians identify the conditions ensuring that people are treated as equals in society. Nonetheless, given their family resemblance, their connection is fruitful especially since many relational egalitarians presume that social equality requires, among other things, that autonomous agents should be treated as equals in society. Moreover, beyond this family resemblance, the move toward relational autonomy provides relational egalitarians with precious resources to think through what it means to respect and foster personal autonomy in society. This, in turn, enables us to clarify what it means to treat persons as equals. There are two things to note here, however. First, this is not to say that autonomy is the only reason explaining why social equality is required or valuable. The claim here is simply that since many relational egalitarians aim to respect autonomous agents equally, it is relevant to explore what adopting a relational conception of autonomy would mean for our conception of social equality. Second, it does not follow that we should treat nonautonomous or nonagential persons as unequals in society (see Bengtson & Lippert-Rasmussen, 2023; Lippert-Rasmussen, 2022).1 Relational egalitarianism emerged in reaction to the perceived dominance of distributive egalitarianism in political philosophy (for general overviews, see Fourie et al., 2015; Nath, 2020; Voigt, 2020). Broadly, relational egalitarians argue that equality is not reducible to distributive concerns. For them, equality is about how social, political, and interpersonal relationships are structured. Relational egalitarianism comes under negative and positive forms. Negatively, it states that certain types of relations are incompatible with the equal social status of all. More positively, it highlights that certain background conditions must be met to ensure that persons are treated as equals and relate to one another as such. There are debates concerning which inegalitarian relationships ought to be criticized and, conversely, which relationships should be equalized. However, relational egalitarians are typically concerned with self-regarding attitudes, interpersonal relations, and institutional structures. Self-respect and the ability to regard as an equal is often as deeply connected to relational egalitarianism Stoljar & Voigt, 2015). For instance, Stoljar and Voigt argue that to be to as an equal, it is to see as an a which both institutional and & Voigt, Moreover, relational egalitarians are concerned with what can be the or the of society. and the of socio-political can be evaluated in three ways a relational egalitarian perspective First, are to and egalitarian social relations or to or other social hierarchies (Anderson, Schemmel, Second, political are required to follow some relational both because the of a how consider one another (Anderson, and because the is an agent to relational may for instance, that states be to the of their that they be to them, and that they be in a position to their decisions and political may be evaluated the they & Schemmel, Schemmel, 2021a; Voigt, relational egalitarianism points toward a understanding of equality that three different how persons relate to how they relate to and how they relate to socio-political However, as be it is unclear how relational egalitarians can effectively these different that states treat as equals to respecting that may endorse interpersonal social hierarchies and consider as In a to the between relational and distributive relational autonomy in to the perceived dominance of an and of autonomy such as the with or (for overviews, see 2023; Stoljar, by relational autonomy theorists is that this move is we the social embeddedness of the and that agents are and approaches fail to how our and are by our social how social can our to be autonomous and our available and, how some relationships may be of personal autonomy theories of relational autonomy are relational to three As Mackenzie points out, relational autonomy theorists the that persons are or but rather as a given that are one and Second, this social, and embeddedness means that a does not in the but is and by the relations they engage these the general that conditions the of are (Mackenzie, In other by a to and our social Mackenzie that relational autonomy theorists that are to the negative of social relations such as social hierarchies of and that people in different of life the in the in In that for relational autonomy theories the of that how and can individual as as to how social relations be to and foster personal autonomy (Mackenzie, first relational egalitarianism and relational autonomy should be theoretical families to be deeply concerned with attitudes, interpersonal and socio-political There of a between and externalist theories of the question of whether autonomy can be by the of a or or if we should consider external social and political (for a recent see However, some of and the of interpersonal relationships that foster our individual for are typically to relational autonomy. However, as in this between the two theoretical some between equality and autonomy many of relational autonomy. is the between respect for personal autonomy and egalitarian conceptions of social justice in of it is the that the ensuring equal substantive to life as one However, it is unclear how we should this to rather personal autonomy in the of and is typically as the to be and be capable of Stoljar 2015). 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