Equal Societies, Autonomous Lives: Reconciling social equality and relational autonomy

Relational egalitarians flesh out the idea of what it means to treat persons as equals in society. On many influential accounts, relating as equals requires, among other things, to respect others as equal, autonomous agents (Hojlund, 2021; Scheffler, 2015; Schemmel 2021a; Schuppert, 2015). However, the attempt to subsume respect for personal autonomy under social equality is prima facie suspect: people can presumably endorse social inequalities. We can ask two sets of questions when confronted with situations such as these: first, are these truly autonomous choices? For instance, following substantivist approaches to autonomy, some may question whether choosing subservience or a subordinate status can be an autonomous choice because one would thereby fail to be self-respecting, to see what is effectively in their own interest, or because this choice is often made against a social background that diminishes their available options or controls over their life (Babbitt 1993; Hill, 1991; Oshana, 2006). And, second, these types of cases raise a challenge for relational egalitarians in that it is unclear what it means to treat presumably autonomous agents as equals here. On one hand, respecting their autonomy requires that one should respect their decisions to endorse social inequalities. On the other hand, relational egalitarians should be capable of criticizing social hierarchies and should aim to equalize them. How, then, can we resolve this apparent tension? In this article, I show how debates between relational autonomy theorists hold important lessons for relational egalitarians. The connections between the two theoretical families have not been extensively studied (for recent exceptions, see Stoljar & Voigt, 2021a). Relational autonomy theorists argue that personal autonomy is deeply connected to the social relations we engage in our lives and our socio-political position in society (Mackenzie, 2014; Mackenzie & Stoljar, 2000a, 2000b; Meyers, 2002, 2005; Westlund, 2009). Similarly, relational egalitarians argue that egalitarians should be concerned first and foremost with how people are treated and regarded in society (Anderson, 1999; Fourie et al., 2015; Lippert-Rasmussen, 2018; Schemmel, 2021a). I argue that by connecting social equality and relational autonomy, it is possible to resolve this apparent tension between respect for autonomy and the protection of social equality. More precisely, I argue that relational egalitarians should adopt a constitutivist, externalist understanding of autonomy. I point out that a constitutivist, externalist understanding of autonomy is not designed to evaluated particular individual decisions, but rather to identify the required external conditions to guarantee a substantive level of personal autonomy. The externalist approach consequently allows to say both that some non-egalitarian choices can be deserving of respect and that egalitarian should adopt a structural perspective to promote personal autonomy globally. Below, I first briefly introduce relational egalitarianism and relational autonomy. Second, I distinguish between three ways of conceptualizing the connection between social equality and autonomy: the instrumental approach, the deontic approach, and the constitutivist position. I argue that both the instrumental and deontic approaches fail to provide convincing answers to the tension between autonomy and (social) equality. Consequently, I show that if relational egalitarians want to argue that social equality requires, among other things, to treat autonomous agents as equals qua autonomous agents, they should adopt a constitutive, externalist conception of autonomy. Relational egalitarianism and relational autonomy share many aspects. As Stoljar and Voigt (2021b) points out, first, they both consider that theories of justice "should take the fact of people's social embeddedness as their starting point" (2021b, 1). Second, for both relational egalitarianism and relational autonomy, they do not refer to single theories but are "umbrella terms that encompass different conceptions of the way in which social conditions should be included in an analysis of autonomy and equality" (2021b, 1). However, both theoretical families have fundamentally different aims. Relational autonomy theorists identify the conditions under which an agent is autonomous. In contrast, relational egalitarians identify the conditions ensuring that people are treated as equals in society. Nonetheless, given their family resemblance, their connection is fruitful especially since many relational egalitarians presume that social equality requires, among other things, that autonomous agents should be treated as equals in society. Moreover, beyond this family resemblance, the move toward relational autonomy provides relational egalitarians with precious resources to think through what it means to respect and foster personal autonomy in society. This, in turn, enables us to clarify what it means to treat persons as equals. There are two things to note here, however. First, this is not to say that autonomy is the only reason explaining why social equality is required or valuable. The claim here is simply that since many relational egalitarians aim to respect autonomous agents equally, it is relevant to explore what adopting a relational conception of autonomy would mean for our conception of social equality. Second, it does not follow that we should treat nonautonomous or nonagential persons as unequals in society (see Bengtson & Lippert-Rasmussen, 2023; Lippert-Rasmussen, 2022).1 Relational egalitarianism emerged in reaction to the perceived dominance of distributive egalitarianism in political philosophy (for general overviews, see Fourie et al., 2015; Nath, 2020; Voigt, 2020). Broadly, relational egalitarians argue that equality is not reducible to distributive concerns. For them, equality is about how social, political, and interpersonal relationships are structured. Relational egalitarianism comes under negative and positive forms. Negatively, it states that certain types of relations are incompatible with the equal social status of all. More positively, it highlights that certain background conditions must be met to ensure that persons are treated as equals and relate to one another as such. There are debates concerning which inegalitarian relationships ought to be criticized and, conversely, which relationships should be equalized. However, relational egalitarians are typically concerned with self-regarding attitudes, interpersonal relations, and institutional structures. Self-respect and the ability to regard oneself as an equal is often presented as deeply connected to relational egalitarianism (Schemmel, 2011, 2019; Stoljar & Voigt, 2021c; Wolff, 2015). For instance, Stoljar and Voigt argue that to be able to stand as an equal, it is necessary to see oneself as an equal: a requirement which has both institutional and interpersonal, affective dimensions (Stoljar & Voigt, 2021c). Moreover, relational egalitarians are also concerned with what can be called the state or the basic structure of society. State actions and the behavior of socio-political institutions can be evaluated in at least three ways from a relational egalitarian perspective (Voigt, 2020, pp. 17–21). First, institutions are instrumentally useful to create and maintain egalitarian social relations or to avoid oppression, exploitation, or other objectionable social hierarchies (Anderson, 1999, pp. 316–318; Schemmel, 2011; Viehoff, 2014). Second, political institutions are themselves required to follow some relational requirements both because the actions of a democratic state reflect how citizens consider one another (Anderson, 1999, p. 314), and because the state is an agent to whom relational requirements apply directly (Schemmel, 2012). This may require, for instance, that states be equally responsive to the interests of all their citizens, that they be accountable to them, and that they be in a position to justify their decisions adequately. Third, and finally, political institutions may also be evaluated based on the attitudes they express vis-à-vis citizens (Anderson & Pildes, 2000; Dworkin, 1977; Schemmel, 2012; Schemmel, 2021a; Voigt, 2018). Therefore, relational egalitarianism points toward a very broad understanding of equality that includes three different levels: how persons relate to themselves, how they relate to each other, and how they relate to socio-political institutions. However, as will be discussed throughout, it is then unclear how relational egalitarians can effectively reconcile these different levels. Ensuring that states treat all as equals seems to require respecting that individuals may endorse interpersonal social hierarchies and consider themselves as unequals. In a manner akin to the debate between relational and distributive egalitarians, relational autonomy was developed in response to the perceived dominance of an overly rationalistic and atomist models of autonomy such as the ones associated with Kant (1948 [1785]); Rawls (1999 [1971]); or Hobbes (1966 [1642]) (for overviews, see Lee, 2023; Stoljar, 2018b). A recurring argument shared by relational autonomy theorists is that this move is inherently problematic: we cannot abstract away from the social embeddedness of the self and presuppose that agents are isolated, self-sufficient beings. Rationalist and atomist approaches fail to capture how our projects and ambitions are informed by our social context; how social norms can impact our capacity to be autonomous and our available choices; and, more deeply, how some relationships may be constitutive of personal autonomy (Stoljar, 2018b).2 Broadly speaking, theories of relational autonomy are relational due to three shared assumptions. As Mackenzie (2014, pp. 21–22) points out, relational autonomy theorists reject the view that persons are purely rational contractors, self-sufficient, or independent, but rather accept as a given that individuals are socially embedded, dependent on one another, and thus vulnerable. Second, this social, cultural, and historical embeddedness means that a person's identity does not develop in the abstract, but is affected and even perhaps constituted by the relations they engage in. Third, these considerations support the general conclusion that "social conditions restricting the exercise of self-determination are unjust" (Mackenzie, 2014, p. 22).3 In other words, by giving a greater weight to human vulnerability and our embedded social identity, Mackenzie underlines that relational autonomy theorists develop analyzes that are responsive to the negative effects of unjust social relations such as unjust social hierarchies of standing, authority, and esteem that track people in different spheres of life (within the family, in the workplace, in civil society, etc.). In that sense, for Mackenzie, relational autonomy theories play the role of diagnostic tools that highlight how "social domination, oppression, stigmatization, and injustice can thwart individual autonomy" as well as to propose solutions on how social relations could be reformed to protect and foster personal autonomy (Mackenzie, 2014, p. 23).4 Therefore, at first sight, relational egalitarianism and relational autonomy should be mutually supportive. Both theoretical families tend to be deeply concerned with intrapersonal attitudes, interpersonal relationships, and socio-political relations. There is, of course, a debate between internalist and externalist theories of autonomy—that is, on the question of whether autonomy can be captured by considering the internal structure of a person's will or psychology only, or if we should also consider external social and political structures (for a recent overview, see Mackenzie, 2021, pp. 33–39). However, some elements of self-authorization, self-respect, and the presence of interpersonal relationships that foster our individual capacities for agency are typically central to relational autonomy. However, as discussed in Section 2 below, despite this initial resonance between the two theoretical families, some tensions remain between equality and autonomy on many accounts of relational autonomy. is the bridge between liberal insistence on respect for personal autonomy and egalitarian conceptions of social justice in much of contemporary liberal egalitarianism: it is the former that ultimately underpins the latter, (…) [by] continuously ensuring (roughly) equal substantive liberty to live one's life as one sees fit. (Schemmel 2021a, p. 9) However, it is somewhat unclear how we should understand this appeal to agency rather than personal autonomy in the work of Anderson and Schuppert.5 Agency is typically understood as the capacities to plan, weigh competing options, be rational and be capable of self-control (Stoljar, 2014, pp. 246–249; Stoljar 2018a; Mackenzie, 2015). However, autonomy requires more. What autonomy requires depends on the theory of (relational) autonomy one prefers. Roughly, proceduralists add authenticity conditions to agential capacities—such as reflexive endorsement (Friedman, 2003). Weakly substantive approaches maintain that autonomy also includes some weak normative content, like self-regarding attitudes such as self-respect (Benson, 2005a; Benson, 2011; Meyers, 1989). And externalist conceptions maintain that autonomy should moreover include an adequate range of external options and conditions (Mackenzie, 2021; Oshana, 2006; Stoljar, 2018a). Stoljar takes the example of Jehovah's Witnesses imprisoned in concentration camp in Nazi Germany to illustrate the importance of external options. Many imprisoned Jehovah's Witnesses continued to live according to their religious convictions despite imprisonment (Stoljar, 2018a p. 231; see also Bettelheim 1960, pp. 122–123). In this case, the Jehovah's Witnesses remained agents, and were even autonomous in some sense; they continued to live an authentic moral life. Nonetheless, to say that they were fully autonomous would miss how one essential aspect of their autonomy was infringed on: as political prisoners, they lacked access to a set of adequate external options (Stoljar 2018a, p. 244ff; see also Raz 1986, pp. 373–374). Accordingly, for externalists, authenticity and weak normative content is insufficient to consider that an agent is substantively autonomous. to be capable of functioning as an equal citizen involves not just the ability to effectively exercise specifically political rights, but also to participate in the various activities of civil society more broadly, including participation in the economy. And functioning in these ways presupposes functioning as a human being. (…) To be capable of functioning as a human being requires effective access to the means of sustaining one biological existence (…) and access to the basic conditions of human agency—knowledge of one's circumstances and options, the ability to deliberate about means and ends, the psychological conditions of autonomy, including the self-confidence to think and judge for oneself, freedom of though and movement. (Anderson, 1999, pp. 317–318) Similarly, Schuppert discusses gender hierarchies to illustrate what it means to stand as an equal (Schuppert, 2015, p. 123). He writes that social equality is violated by gendered hierarchies because: "repeated instances of gendered misrecognition can both undermine a person's self-respect and lead her to adopting 'conforming' behavior in line with existing biases" (Schuppert, 2015, p. 123). He goes on to argue that subscribing to a gendered hierarchy can lead to "self-respect undermining adaptive behaviour." Of course, I cannot here delve into the debate on adaptive preferences, since this would take me too far from the main question at hand. However, notice that standing as an equal seems to come with substantive constraints on what can be considered to be an autonomous, authentic behavior for Schuppert. However, this attempt to subsume (2) under (1) can lead to puzzlement. People can presumably choose to live non-egalitarian and hierarchical lives autonomously. Respecting personal autonomy would then require accepting that certain social hierarchies may be legitimate if they are autonomously chosen, which sits uneasily with the idea that equality requires that all be treated as equals. Indeed, as shown above, the position of Schuppert supports the conclusion that some social hierarchies are incompatible with personal autonomy and social equality. However, this may be too hasty: after all many have shown that social relations are deeply connected to personal autonomy. Accordingly, it is fruitful to consider the different ways in which it is possible to connect social equality and relational autonomy to see whether it is possible to resolve the apparent tension between SEC and AC. There are at least three ways to connect social equality and relational autonomy. In this section, I consider each in turn. I start with the instrumental approach. Second, I consider procedural and weakly substantive approaches. Third, I evaluate constitutivist positions. I argue that only the latter are promising to resolve the tension between SEC and AC. A first way to connect both social equality and relational autonomy would be to say that social equality is instrumentally valuable at least in part because it promotes autonomy. Stated negatively, this claim holds that social inequalities are wrong at least in part because they negatively affect personal autonomy by, for instance, damaging self-regarding attitudes or one's ability to reflect critically. Some claims by relational autonomy theorists support this point (Johnston, 2021, p. 139; Mackenzie, 2014, p. 18). Consider, for example, the work of Govier (1993) and Benson (1994). They highlight that for a decision to truly count as one's own, it has to be grounded in certain positive attitudes toward one's capacity to reflect critically (Govier, 1993, p. 101; see also Cudd, 2006, pp. 176–178). This supports the idea that social relationships that damage some self-regarding attitudes could be objectionable given that they undermine or prevent autonomy. Although he focuses on agency rather than personal autonomy, the position of Litalien (2021) is helpful to consider how this argument could play out when it is extended to personal autonomy. He argues that social inequalities are wrong at least in part because they affect individual agency negatively. He defines agency as a two-pronged capacity for intentional action: "(1) a capacity for forming intentions (and other intentional states) and (2) a capacity to carry out those intentions, to have an effect in the world" (Litalien 2021, p. 89). Although he is open to the possibility that the wrongness of relational inequalities may be overdetermined (Litalien 2021, p. 87), he maintains that the instrumental account is the best account to explain why social inequalities are wrongful. we can hypothesize that, globally, relational equality promotes agency, even if it might be true that, locally, certain inegalitarian relations might promote agency better than relational equality would in the same context. This implies that it would be a mistake, as a matter of political philosophy, to assess each relation individually. (…) We should (…) favor the policy (or policy package) that promotes agency globally. What I suggest here is that it is a policy (or policy package) that aims at relational equality that will best further that goal. (2021, pp. 92–93). To illustrate (3), one could think of a society of benevolent masters where society is divided into two groups such that one group, the "carers," are entrusted with the care of the members of the second groups, the "carees," unbeknownst to the carees. The carers are respectful, they consider the strong interests of the carees, and the carers act to promote the well-being of the carees when they can. To do so, the carers can paternalistically intervene in their carees choice without their carees' knowledge when they judge that it would be better for the carees to purse some options compared to others to ensure that they will be better able to carry out their intentions in the future. If it turns out that by carefully separating the carers and the carees such that the position of the carees is, in fact, improved in the sense that they are better able to have an effect in the world than they would without the carers, the objectionable from a relational egalitarian perspective in fact, from the perspective of many autonomy theorists such as that the carers that are on the carees can them. However, from an instrumental we should policy If we accept the claims that social inequalities are wrong to the that they negatively affect individual agency and that we only have an reason to aim for social equality because egalitarian relations promote individual agency, then we have reason to (2) over However, as Litalien is more in agency rather than autonomy. that we move from agency to autonomy, then we would have to (2) over This of would on the particular conception of personal autonomy that one However, from this through an agency, the instrumental approach seems like an to and reconcile social equality and personal autonomy. a purely instrumental as us from a policy that is but which also the when we have to that the of social equality will foster personal autonomy. it only provides us with a of relational from an instrumental to protect and foster agency and for social equality are simply two which can come and with one another, they may to in Accordingly, we have to beyond to consider how social equality and personal autonomy can work in A way to about is to consider the different ways in which autonomy theorists have of the importance of social relations for personal autonomy. A to which I turn. Consequently, it is to consider other ways of connecting social equality (and social relationships and personal autonomy. options are one may that the connection is in or that some socio-political relations are constitutive of with the first procedural and weakly substantive accounts (Friedman, Meyers, 2002, 2005; see also point toward the idea that the relation between equality and autonomy is not only procedural approaches are do not normative (Benson, p. on the content of an they on how are or agents are agents reflect critically about their preferences, and in such a way that they can consider to be their Weakly substantivist on their also do not normative on the content of an preferences, but add some normative content to their conception of autonomy, such as that autonomous agents have some moral attitudes like self-respect (Govier, 1993; Benson for an overview, see Stoljar, 2018). these procedural and weakly substantive approaches to autonomy, one could move beyond to highlight that the connection between equality and autonomy is a deontic where some norms simply how we ought to treat autonomous agents in society. As from a deontic the of egalitarian relations is not in to personal or but in their being the response to the equal moral status of each as a being with a certain of moral On this equality in relationships is not (or not as to be but as a that is to be p. Of course, here is in the equal moral status of all rather than autonomy. Nonetheless, a deontic approach could be to that respect is to autonomous agents and to their autonomous choices this deontic approach, social equality would not be instrumentally useful to promote social but it how we should treat autonomous agents and autonomous In a it requires respecting the choices of autonomous even if they are substantively Below, I consider procedural and weakly substantive in to show how they with this deontic To respect autonomous agents and their autonomous choices would simply be the way to treat others as even if their choices are not substantively has to do with the respect to persons as Many that respect is to persons simply by of their for being autonomous, whether or not this is of autonomy may another of also connected to (…) On a respect to people's choices (…) to the choices made by with the to choose and act what would not (Friedman, p. the of self-determination has been in terms of a certain of that one might and to a of this to autonomy a must first reflect on her and on and take an with respect to them. can endorse or identify with in some way or be to them, or can reject or or be only to them. (…) or in with or that has and her endorsement is a part of her then, (…) is autonomously. (Friedman, pp. To the agent choosing to be is, in a sense, autonomous than we can say that they are autonomous if they have the autonomy a by p. p. Meyers, p. if some can be autonomous, by more available options, for instance, individuals are autonomous agents when they the What they choose to be or do does not the fact that they could be autonomous agents of course, on the of the the he the he to and he is in the to a in for to have a more her own and by does not simply to her in certain spheres as a for in other On the not to her own and and when as important than her p. see also Westlund, pp. This procedural account with the liberal approach to social equality. This approach is developed by Schemmel He to a liberal view of justice explaining why certain socio-political relations are unjust but from individuals how they should live their lives (Schemmel, 2021a, p. Schemmel to the idea that relational when it is understood as a theory of does not require to equalize and all some interpersonal relations that from the (social) egalitarian are not unjust on this view (Schemmel, 2015, p. a liberal since justice is concerned with how to the of then it is not unjust for people to relationships, which the basic this deontic understanding of social it means that relational egalitarians should promote the relations necessary to ensure that all have the to develop the relevant autonomy for instance, should protect the and of all equally without certain ways of life. to treat others as social equals is to equally respecting the autonomous choices of all we should respect the individual choice to endorse and act on a of but should remain concerning the content of these of life. However, this position would relational egalitarians to a often against accounts of relational autonomy: this approach is too to fully capture the ways in which different social norms can be (see Benson, 1991; Mackenzie, 2021; Stoljar, 2018b). This deontic position an

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