Can supervisor reminders help prevent fraud in the mutual funds sector
Bibliographic record
Abstract
Purpose This study is based on the enforcement record from Canada’s natural mutual fund regulator. This record documented a small subset of mutual fund dealers who had been disciplined for their misconduct from 2007 to 2014. The purpose of this paper is to determine what factors contribute to mutual fund dealers’ time to first financial fraud offense. The longer the time to fraud, the healthier the mutual fund industry and the better a mutual fund dealer’s career. Design/methodology/approach Based on the belief that adversity reveals true character, the study approaches a mutual dealer’s career success from human capital, socio-demographic and organizational sponsorship points of view by measuring dealers’ success as their time from career beginning to first instance of financial fraud. Ordinary least square regression analysis was used to identify if those factors, including provision of supervisor reminders, gender, position and penalties, are related to career success within the Canadian mutual fund regulatory framework. The research is based on a small sample of mutual fund dealers who had been disciplined for their misconduct from 2007 to 2014. Findings The study finds that a supervisor’s reminders positively contribute to the career success of a mutual fund dealer in the form of extending their time to fraud. As well, being female is an adverse factor to career success even when both female and male dealers received about the same level of supervisor reminders. It also finds that being in a management position has no association with time to fraud. Originality/value The study establishes the statistically significant positive relationship between time to fraud and supervisor’s reminders for mutual fund dealers. At the same time, it shows that human capital and access to organizational resources, measured by being in a management position, have no significant relation to when fraud is committed. This result indicates the value of continuing education for all mutual fund dealers, both inexperienced and experienced.
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How this classification was reachedexpand
Full frame distilled prediction
Teacher imitationNot calibrated prevalence, not ground truth. Human validation pending. Learned from the 10,348 direct Codex labels and 10,348 direct Gemma labels. Candidate is the union of thresholded teacher heads; consensus is their intersection. These outputs are machine_predicted_unvalidated and are not human labels or direct frontier model labels.
Codex and Gemma teacher scores by category
| Category | Codex | Gemma |
|---|---|---|
| Metaresearch | 0.001 | 0.000 |
| Meta-epidemiology (narrow) | 0.000 | 0.000 |
| Meta-epidemiology (broad) | 0.000 | 0.000 |
| Bibliometrics | 0.000 | 0.000 |
| Science and technology studies | 0.000 | 0.000 |
| Scholarly communication | 0.000 | 0.000 |
| Open science | 0.000 | 0.000 |
| Research integrity | 0.000 | 0.001 |
| Insufficient payload (model declined to judge) | 0.000 | 0.000 |
Machine scores (provisional)
The two teacher heads of the student model, read on this work. A score orders the frame for review; it never asserts a category, and the validation status ships verbatim with every row.
Baseline scores from an immature model (maturity gate not passed, 7 training rounds). Scores rank; they never assert a category.
score_only:v0-immature-baseline · verbatim from the scoring run: score_only means the number may rank works, and no category label ships from itClassification
machine, unvalidatedMachine predicted; a candidate call from one teacher head, not a consensus.
How this classification was reached, model by model and score by score, is at the end of the page under "How this classification was reached".