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Record W4401688102 · doi:10.1101/2024.08.16.24312144

The effect of an incentive billing code on heart failure management in primary care: a population-based study

2024· preprint· en· W4401688102 on OpenAlexafffundabout
Shijie Zhou, Douglas S. Lee, Francis Nguyen, Harsukh Benipal, Richard Perez, Peter C. Austin, Husam Abdel‐Qadir, Jacob A. Udell, Catherine Demers

Bibliographic record

VenuemedRxiv · 2024
Typepreprint
Languageen
FieldEconomics, Econometrics and Finance
TopicHealthcare Policy and Management
Canadian institutionsInstitute for Clinical Evaluative SciencesWomen's College HospitalMcMaster UniversityUniversity of Toronto
FundersCanadian Institutes of Health ResearchUniversity of Toronto
KeywordsIncentivePrimary careHeart failureCode (set theory)PopulationMedicineBusinessActuarial scienceFamily medicineNursingComputer scienceInternal medicineEconomicsEnvironmental healthProgramming languageMicroeconomics

Abstract

fetched live from OpenAlex

Background: To support family physicians (FPs) in managing patients with heart failure (HF), the Ministry of Health in Ontario, Canada, implemented the Q050 billing code in 2008, a pay-for-performance (P4P) incentive for guideline-based HF care. We studied whether the incentive was associated with any change in process-of-care measure, particularly the prescriptions of HF medications. Methods: We identified all patients with HF in Ontario of age>65, who were managed by FPs claiming the Q050 incentive between 2008 and 2021. We counted the number of patients who were prescribed renin-angiotensin system inhibitors (RASi), beta-blockers (BB), mineralocorticoid receptor antagonists (MRA), and diuretics three months before and after the Q050 billing code was claimed for these patients. Where applicable, we classified the agents within each class by whether they are guideline-directed as recommended by the Canadian Cardiovascular Society (CCS). Results: We included 39,425 HF patients in the study. The median age was 80 (IQR 73-85) years; 49% were female. Half were assessed by an internist or cardiologist during the six months before their HF diagnosis. Compared to pre-Q050, there was an increase in RASi prescriptions from 42.5% to 45.8%, BB from 51.9% to 54.4%, MRA from 9.2% to 11.7%, and diuretics from 63.2% to 65.7% after the incentive (p<0.05). There was a decrease in those not on any HF medications from 27.5% to 24.9% (p<0.001). Those with newly diagnosed HF and prompt follow-up with FPs experienced the largest but clinically modest increase in HF medications. Conclusions: To our knowledge, this is the first evaluation of process-of-care measures related to a pay-for-performance program in primary care HF management. The Q050 incentive led to a minimal increase in the prescription of HF medications; there is underutilization of disease-modifying agents. Further research is needed to understand why pay-for-performance programs had no effect on physician prescribing behaviours.

Fetched live from OpenAlex and de-inverted. Abstracts are not stored in this database: the inverted indexes are 8.6 GB of the frame’s 9.3 GB of text, and the host has 13 GB free.

How this classification was reachedexpand

Full frame machine prediction

Teacher imitation

Not calibrated prevalence, not ground truth. Human validation pending. The Gemma side is a direct model label for every work in the frame, read from the title-only record. The Codex side is a classifier learned from the 10,348 direct Codex labels and calibrated to design-weighted sample rates; fields without enough sample support carry no Codex call. Candidate is the union of the two sides; consensus is their intersection. These outputs are machine_predicted_unvalidated and are not human labels.

metaresearch head score (Codex)0.003
metaresearch head score (Gemma)0.015
Version: metacan-v3-hybrid-931329e0061cValidation status: machine_predicted_unvalidated
Candidate categoriesnone
Consensus categoriesnone
DomainCandidate signal: none · Consensus signal: none
Study designCandidate signal: Observational · Consensus signal: Observational
GenreCandidate signal: Empirical · Consensus signal: Empirical
Teacher disagreement score0.063
Threshold uncertainty score0.126

Distilled classifier scores by category (both heads)

CategoryCodexGemma
Metaresearch0.0030.015
Meta-epidemiology (narrow)0.0000.001
Meta-epidemiology (broad)0.0010.002
Bibliometrics0.0010.003
Science and technology studies0.0010.001
Scholarly communication0.0020.001
Open science0.0010.001
Research integrity0.0020.002
Insufficient payload (model declined to judge)0.0020.000

Machine scores (provisional)

The two teacher heads of the student model, read on this work. A score orders the frame for review; it never asserts a category, and the validation status ships verbatim with every row.

Baseline scores from an immature model (maturity gate not passed, 7 training rounds). Scores rank; they never assert a category.

Opus teacher head0.027
GPT teacher head0.287
Teacher spread0.260 · how far apart the two teachers sit on this one work
Validation statusscore_only:v0-immature-baseline · verbatim from the scoring run: score_only means the number may rank works, and no category label ships from it

Classification

machine, unvalidated

Machine predicted; a candidate call from one source (direct Gemma or distilled Codex), not a consensus.

The models applied no category: nothing in the taxonomy fit this work.
Study designObservational
Domainnot available
GenreEmpirical

How this classification was reached, model by model and score by score, is at the end of the page under "How this classification was reached".

Quick stats

Citations0
Published2024
Admission routes3
Has abstractyes

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