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Record W4402153668 · doi:10.26599/tst.2024.9010056

Mixed Strategy Nash Equilibrium for Scheduling Games on Batching-Machines with Activation Cost

2024· article· en· W4402153668 on OpenAlex

Why this work is in the frame

A frame that forgets how it found something cannot be audited. These are the routes that admitted this work.

affAt least one author lists a Canadian institution in the pinned OpenAlex snapshot.

Bibliographic record

VenueTsinghua Science & Technology · 2024
Typearticle
Languageen
FieldDecision Sciences
TopicGame Theory and Applications
Canadian institutionsUniversity of New Brunswick
FundersNational Natural Science Foundation of China
KeywordsNash equilibriumComputer scienceScheduling (production processes)Epsilon-equilibriumBest responseMathematical optimizationMathematical economicsEconomicsMathematics

Abstract

fetched live from OpenAlex

This paper studies two scheduling games on identical batching-machines with activation cost, where each game comprises <tex xmlns:mml="http://www.w3.org/1998/Math/MathML" xmlns:xlink="http://www.w3.org/1999/xlink">$n$</tex> jobs being processed on <tex xmlns:mml="http://www.w3.org/1998/Math/MathML" xmlns:xlink="http://www.w3.org/1999/xlink">$m$</tex> identical batching-machines. Each job, as an agent, chooses a machine (or, more accurately, a batch on a machine) for processing in order to minimize its disutility, which is comprised of its machine's load and the activation cost it shares. Based on previous results, we present the Mixed strategy Nash Equilibria (MNE) for some special cases of the two games. For each game, we first analyze the conditions for the nonexistence of Nash equilibrium, then provide the MNE for the conditions, and offer the efficiency of MNE (mixed price of anarchy).

Fetched live from OpenAlex and de-inverted. Abstracts are not stored in this database: the inverted indexes are 8.6 GB of the frame’s 9.3 GB of text, and the host has 13 GB free.

Full frame distilled prediction

Teacher imitation

Not calibrated prevalence, not ground truth. Human validation pending. Learned from the 10,348 direct Codex labels and 10,348 direct Gemma labels. Candidate is the union of thresholded teacher heads; consensus is their intersection. These outputs are machine_predicted_unvalidated and are not human labels or direct frontier model labels.

metaresearch head score (Codex)0.003
metaresearch head score (Gemma)0.002
Version: codex-gemma-dda1882f352aValidation status: machine_predicted_unvalidated
Candidate categoriesnone
Consensus categoriesnone
DomainCandidate signal: none · Consensus signal: none
Study designCandidate signal: Theoretical or conceptual · Consensus signal: Theoretical or conceptual
GenreCandidate signal: Empirical · Consensus signal: Empirical
Teacher disagreement score0.219
Threshold uncertainty score0.751

Codex and Gemma teacher scores by category

CategoryCodexGemma
Metaresearch0.0030.002
Meta-epidemiology (narrow)0.0000.000
Meta-epidemiology (broad)0.0000.000
Bibliometrics0.0020.006
Science and technology studies0.0010.002
Scholarly communication0.0010.001
Open science0.0020.000
Research integrity0.0000.000
Insufficient payload (model declined to judge)0.0000.000

Machine scores (provisional)

The two teacher heads of the student model, read on this work. A score orders the frame for review; it never asserts a category, and the validation status ships verbatim with every row.

Baseline scores from an immature model (maturity gate not passed, 7 training rounds). Scores rank; they never assert a category.

Opus teacher head0.100
GPT teacher head0.401
Teacher spread0.301 · how far apart the two teachers sit on this one work
Validation statusscore_only:v0-immature-baseline · verbatim from the scoring run: score_only means the number may rank works, and no category label ships from it