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Record W4403296935 · doi:10.1109/tcomm.2024.3478111

Joint Task Offloading and Resource Allocation Strategy for Hybrid MEC-Enabled LEO Satellite Networks: A Hierarchical Game Approach

2024· article· en· W4403296935 on OpenAlexaff
Peixuan Li, Yichen Wang, Zhangnan Wang, Tao Wang, Julian Cheng

Bibliographic record

VenueIEEE Transactions on Communications · 2024
Typearticle
Languageen
FieldEngineering
TopicSatellite Communication Systems
Canadian institutionsUniversity of British Columbia, Okanagan CampusUniversity of British Columbia
FundersNational Natural Science Foundation of China
KeywordsComputer scienceJoint (building)Resource allocationResource management (computing)Task (project management)SatelliteGame theoryDistributed computingCommunications satelliteComputer networkEngineeringSystems engineering

Abstract

fetched live from OpenAlex

The multi-access edge computing (MEC)-enabled low Earth orbit (LEO) satellite network is a promising approach to meet the growing ubiquitous diverse computation demands around the world. In this paper, a joint task offloading and resource allocation strategy is proposed for hybrid MEC-enabled LEO satellite networks, where two types of MEC tasks, namely delay-sensitive edgy-cloud task and data-and computation-intensive cloudy-edge task, are considered simultaneously. Specifically, we first design the cost functions for the two types of tasks, which take the delay-sensitive feature of edgy-cloud task and data-and computation-intensive characteristics of cloudy-edge task into consideration. Then, an overall terminal cost minimization problem is formulated for task offloading and resource allocation under the communication and computation capability constraints and the service delay requirements. In practice, terminals usually only care about their own costs, but satellites pursue the overall cost minimization of all the served terminals. Thus, considering the individual and collective rationality simultaneously, a two-level hierarchical game is constructed to solve the formulated problem. In the upper level, a hedonic coalition formation game is established, which enables each terminal to make the coalition selection and task offloading decision based on the designed coalition switch rule. In the lower level, the joint channel and power allocation in each coalition is first formulated as a noncooperative game to represent the individual rationality of each terminal. Then, each satellite performs the optimal computation resource allocation to maximize the coalition value with collective rationality. We prove that the Nash equilibrium (NE) for the noncooperative game exists and the coalition partition converges to a Nash stable state. Simulation results are provided to demonstrate the superiority of the proposed strategy.

Fetched live from OpenAlex and de-inverted. Abstracts are not stored in this database: the inverted indexes are 8.6 GB of the frame’s 9.3 GB of text, and the host has 13 GB free.

How this classification was reachedexpand

Full frame distilled prediction

Teacher imitation

Not calibrated prevalence, not ground truth. Human validation pending. Learned from the 10,348 direct Codex labels and 10,348 direct Gemma labels. Candidate is the union of thresholded teacher heads; consensus is their intersection. These outputs are machine_predicted_unvalidated and are not human labels or direct frontier model labels.

metaresearch head score (Codex)0.001
metaresearch head score (Gemma)0.000
Version: codex-gemma-dda1882f352aValidation status: machine_predicted_unvalidated
Candidate categoriesMeta-epidemiology (narrow)
Consensus categoriesnone
DomainCandidate signal: none · Consensus signal: none
Study designCandidate signal: Simulation or modeling · Consensus signal: Simulation or modeling
GenreCandidate signal: Empirical · Consensus signal: none
Teacher disagreement score0.976
Threshold uncertainty score1.000

Codex and Gemma teacher scores by category

CategoryCodexGemma
Metaresearch0.0010.000
Meta-epidemiology (narrow)0.0000.000
Meta-epidemiology (broad)0.0000.000
Bibliometrics0.0000.001
Science and technology studies0.0000.000
Scholarly communication0.0000.000
Open science0.0010.000
Research integrity0.0000.001
Insufficient payload (model declined to judge)0.0000.000

Machine scores (provisional)

The two teacher heads of the student model, read on this work. A score orders the frame for review; it never asserts a category, and the validation status ships verbatim with every row.

Baseline scores from an immature model (maturity gate not passed, 7 training rounds). Scores rank; they never assert a category.

Opus teacher head0.056
GPT teacher head0.269
Teacher spread0.213 · how far apart the two teachers sit on this one work
Validation statusscore_only:v0-immature-baseline · verbatim from the scoring run: score_only means the number may rank works, and no category label ships from it

Classification

machine, unvalidated

Machine predicted; a candidate call from one teacher head, not a consensus.

Study designSimulation or modeling
Domainnot available
GenreEmpirical

How this classification was reached, model by model and score by score, is at the end of the page under "How this classification was reached".

Quick stats

Citations15
Published2024
Admission routes1
Has abstractyes

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