MétaCan
Menu
Back to cohort
Record W4403740956 · doi:10.1016/j.omega.2024.103218

Effect of counterfeits and fake reviews in markets for credence goods

2024· article· en· W4403740956 on OpenAlexafffund
Yongqin Lei, Fredrik Ødegaard, Hubert Pun

Bibliographic record

VenueOmega · 2024
Typearticle
Languageen
FieldComputer Science
TopicSpam and Phishing Detection
Canadian institutionsWestern UniversityUniversity of Winnipeg
FundersNatural Sciences and Engineering Research Council of Canada
KeywordsCredenceCredence goodCommerceBusinessAdvertisingEconomicsInformation asymmetryComputer scienceFinance

Abstract

fetched live from OpenAlex

• A competition between authentic seller and deceptive counterfeiter, with savvy and novice customers. • Sellers decide if acquire fake reviews to influence product endorsement and mislead customers. • In equilibrium, authentic seller does not acquire fake reviews, while counterfeiter may do so. • Amount of fake reviews is decreasing in the proportion of savvy consumers. • Option to acquire fake reviews may benefit both sellers but always hurts consumers. Counterfeits are a persistent problem in online marketplaces, in particular regarding credence goods (e.g., nutritional supplements), as their qualities are difficult or impossible to evaluate even after consumption. Concerned about product quality, customers frequently rely on external signals, such as product badges based on ratings. However, even product ratings are not foolproof as unethical sellers may acquire fake positive reviews to exploit product ratings and badge systems. To analyze the impact fake reviews have on credence goods, we consider a two-stage competition between an authentic seller and a deceptive counterfeiter. The market consists of two types of consumers: savvy customers, who understand that endorsement badges are product-dependent and not seller-dependent, and novice customers, who mistakenly believe product badges testify to a seller's authenticity. In the first stage, both sellers simultaneously decide on whether to acquire fake reviews, which partially influences if the product receives an endorsement badge. In the second stage, both sellers simultaneously set their prices and customers make purchasing decisions. Our results indicate that, in equilibrium, the authentic seller does not acquire fake reviews, while the counterfeiter may do so to mislead customers. Moreover, the amount of fake reviews is decreasing in the fraction of savvy consumers, suggesting that online platforms can combat fake reviews by, for instance, clearly highlighting that badges are product-dependent. We also find that having the option to acquire fake reviews may benefit both sellers but always hurts consumers, emphasizing the need for regulation to protect consumers.

Fetched live from OpenAlex and de-inverted. Abstracts are not stored in this database: the inverted indexes are 8.6 GB of the frame’s 9.3 GB of text, and the host has 13 GB free.

How this classification was reachedexpand

Full frame machine prediction

Teacher imitation

Not calibrated prevalence, not ground truth. Human validation pending. The Gemma side is a direct model label for every work in the frame, read from the title-only record. The Codex side is a classifier learned from the 10,348 direct Codex labels and calibrated to design-weighted sample rates; fields without enough sample support carry no Codex call. Candidate is the union of the two sides; consensus is their intersection. These outputs are machine_predicted_unvalidated and are not human labels.

metaresearch head score (Codex)0.005
metaresearch head score (Gemma)0.024
Version: metacan-v3-hybrid-931329e0061cValidation status: machine_predicted_unvalidated
Candidate categoriesnone
Consensus categoriesnone
DomainCandidate signal: none · Consensus signal: none
Study designCandidate signal: Simulation or modeling · Consensus signal: Simulation or modeling
GenreCandidate signal: Empirical · Consensus signal: Empirical
Teacher disagreement score0.042
Threshold uncertainty score0.139

Distilled classifier scores by category (both heads)

CategoryCodexGemma
Metaresearch0.0050.024
Meta-epidemiology (narrow)0.0010.001
Meta-epidemiology (broad)0.0030.002
Bibliometrics0.0010.000
Science and technology studies0.0020.002
Scholarly communication0.0060.006
Open science0.0020.002
Research integrity0.0040.004
Insufficient payload (model declined to judge)0.0420.002

Machine scores (provisional)

The two teacher heads of the student model, read on this work. A score orders the frame for review; it never asserts a category, and the validation status ships verbatim with every row.

Baseline scores from an immature model (maturity gate not passed, 7 training rounds). Scores rank; they never assert a category.

Opus teacher head0.014
GPT teacher head0.293
Teacher spread0.279 · how far apart the two teachers sit on this one work
Validation statusscore_only:v0-immature-baseline · verbatim from the scoring run: score_only means the number may rank works, and no category label ships from it

Classification

machine, unvalidated

Machine predicted; a candidate call from one source (direct Gemma or distilled Codex), not a consensus.

The models applied no category: nothing in the taxonomy fit this work.
Study designSimulation or modeling
Domainnot available
GenreEmpirical

How this classification was reached, model by model and score by score, is at the end of the page under "How this classification was reached".

Quick stats

Citations7
Published2024
Admission routes2
Has abstractyes

Explore more

Same venueOmegaSame topicSpam and Phishing DetectionFrench-language works237,207