Réinstitution du concept de sujet dans une approche phénoménologique zoocentrique. Sujets imaginaires et réalisme écologique
Bibliographic record
Abstract
Pouvons-nous sortir de la bulle anthropocentrique qui maintient de nombreuses cultures humaines contemporaines dans un état d’aveuglement et de déni et les condamne largement à l’inefficacité ? Les philosophies postmodernes sont certainement des alliées précieuses à cet égard, car elles déconstruisent les schémas de pensée sclérosés, mais leur suspicion à l’endroit des sujets peut devenir un obstacle significatif au développement de nouvelles perspectives et agentivités écologiques. Cet article explore une voie alternative, en adoptant une approche phénoménologique renouve-lée qui part de la subjectivité animale et étudie les liens entre les sujets animaux non-humains et les sujets animaux humains. La question centrale : comment l’intégration de sujets animaux non-humains dans notre perspective modifie-t-elle notre relation au monde ? À partir d’une réflexion sur les travaux de Merleau-Ponty, Deleuze, Derrida et Haraway, j’étudie les structures d’une phéno-ménologie de l’intersubjectivité homme-animal et je développe le concept de sujets imaginaires. Can we exit the anthropocentric bubble in which many human cul-tures are trapped and which is a source of blindness, denial, and inefficiency? Postmodern philosophies are valuable allies in this re-spect, as they explode ossified thinking patterns, but their suspicion toward subjects can also become a barrier to the development of new ecological worldviews and agencies. This article explores an alternative path, adopting a renewed phenomenological approach that starts from animal subjectivity and investigates the links be-tween non-human and human animal subjects. The central ques-tion: how does the integration of non-human animal subjects into our perspective modify our relation to the world? Discussing Mer-leau-Ponty’s, Deleuze’s, Derrida’s, and Haraway’s works, I investi-gate the structures of a phenomenology of human-animal intersub-jectivity and I develop the concept of imaginary subjects.
Fetched live from OpenAlex and de-inverted. Abstracts are not stored in this database: the inverted indexes are 8.6 GB of the frame’s 9.3 GB of text, and the host has 13 GB free.
How this classification was reachedexpand
Full frame machine prediction
Teacher imitationNot calibrated prevalence, not ground truth. Human validation pending. The Gemma side is a direct model label for every work in the frame, read from the title-only record. The Codex side is a classifier learned from the 10,348 direct Codex labels and calibrated to design-weighted sample rates; fields without enough sample support carry no Codex call. Candidate is the union of the two sides; consensus is their intersection. These outputs are machine_predicted_unvalidated and are not human labels.
Distilled classifier scores by category (both heads)
| Category | Codex | Gemma |
|---|---|---|
| Metaresearch | 0.007 | 0.006 |
| Meta-epidemiology (narrow) | 0.001 | 0.000 |
| Meta-epidemiology (broad) | 0.001 | 0.001 |
| Bibliometrics | 0.003 | 0.003 |
| Science and technology studies | 0.007 | 0.068 |
| Scholarly communication | 0.011 | 0.017 |
| Open science | 0.003 | 0.007 |
| Research integrity | 0.004 | 0.008 |
| Insufficient payload (model declined to judge) | 0.006 | 0.001 |
Machine scores (provisional)
The two teacher heads of the student model, read on this work. A score orders the frame for review; it never asserts a category, and the validation status ships verbatim with every row.
Baseline scores from an immature model (maturity gate not passed, 7 training rounds). Scores rank; they never assert a category.
score_only:v0-immature-baseline · verbatim from the scoring run: score_only means the number may rank works, and no category label ships from itClassification
machine, unvalidatedMachine predicted; a candidate call from one source (direct Gemma or distilled Codex), not a consensus.
How this classification was reached, model by model and score by score, is at the end of the page under "How this classification was reached".