Bibliographic record
Abstract
Abstract: This paper examines Hume’s views on the origin of religion, the priority of polytheism, and the difference between popular religion and philosophical theism in The Natural History of Religion (NHR). Firstly, the paper presents Hume’s account of the origin of religion as a criticism of Christianity. For Hume, both polytheism and popular, institutional monotheism have the same origin: ignorance about natural causes and laws, an unreliable tendency to anthropomorphize, irrational hope, and fear about uncertain future events. Secondly, this paper criticizes two rival interpretative strategies: the psychological reading (proposed by, among others, Emily Kelahan, Keith E. Yandell, and Richard Serjeantson) and the destabilizing reading (defended by Peter Kail). Both approaches interpret Hume’s positive remarks on philosophical theism and his contrast of popular with philosophical religion as either insincere or, at best, irrelevant and inconsequential to the understanding of his position. By contrast, this paper defends a positive reading according to which: (1) Hume’s positive remarks on philosophical theism should be taken in an epistemic sense, which implies the incompatibility of philosophical theism with popular religion (including Christianity); (2) his explanation of the origin of religion explains the origin of superstition only, and thus does not apply to philosophical theism. Although both theses are compatible with an agnostic reading of Hume’s position on theism, the textual and contextual evidence supports the conclusion that, in NHR, Hume took philosophical theism to be a reasonable position based on an inference from the evidence of design.
Fetched live from OpenAlex and de-inverted. Abstracts are not stored in this database: the inverted indexes are 8.6 GB of the frame’s 9.3 GB of text, and the host has 13 GB free.
How this classification was reachedexpand
Full frame machine prediction
Teacher imitationNot calibrated prevalence, not ground truth. Human validation pending. The Gemma side is a direct model label for every work in the frame, read from the title-only record. The Codex side is a classifier learned from the 10,348 direct Codex labels and calibrated to design-weighted sample rates; fields without enough sample support carry no Codex call. Candidate is the union of the two sides; consensus is their intersection. These outputs are machine_predicted_unvalidated and are not human labels.
Distilled classifier scores by category (both heads)
| Category | Codex | Gemma |
|---|---|---|
| Metaresearch | 0.004 | 0.005 |
| Meta-epidemiology (narrow) | 0.000 | 0.000 |
| Meta-epidemiology (broad) | 0.000 | 0.000 |
| Bibliometrics | 0.001 | 0.001 |
| Science and technology studies | 0.003 | 0.030 |
| Scholarly communication | 0.005 | 0.004 |
| Open science | 0.001 | 0.003 |
| Research integrity | 0.002 | 0.004 |
| Insufficient payload (model declined to judge) | 0.002 | 0.000 |
Machine scores (provisional)
The two teacher heads of the student model, read on this work. A score orders the frame for review; it never asserts a category, and the validation status ships verbatim with every row.
Baseline scores from an immature model (maturity gate not passed, 7 training rounds). Scores rank; they never assert a category.
score_only:v0-immature-baseline · verbatim from the scoring run: score_only means the number may rank works, and no category label ships from itClassification
machine, unvalidatedMachine predicted; a candidate call from one source (direct Gemma or distilled Codex), not a consensus.
How this classification was reached, model by model and score by score, is at the end of the page under "How this classification was reached".