Bibliographic record
Abstract
Abstract Firms can form partial passive ownership arrangements by acquiring equity shares in competitors' profits. We consider a duopoly model in which products are differentiated along both vertical and horizontal dimensions and one firm may acquire the other firm's equity shares before they engage in strategic competition. We identify equilibrium equity shares and characterize how the choice of equity shares depends on three previously unexplored factors: (i) the size of the market, (ii) the degree of horizontal product differentiation and (iii) the degree of vertical product differentiation. Whether an increase in the size of the market increases firm's incentive to hold a stake in the rival depends on whether the acquiring firm is a high‐quality firm or a low‐quality firm. The effect of vertical product differentiation also depends on the type of the acquiring firm, high‐quality vis‐à‐vis low‐quality. On the contrary, an increase in horizontal product differentiation can increase firm's incentive to hold a stake in the rival, irrespective of the type of the acquiring firm. We also find that the equilibrium levels of consumer welfare and social welfare may be lower compared to the case of no partial passive ownership.
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How this classification was reachedexpand
Full frame machine prediction
Teacher imitationNot calibrated prevalence, not ground truth. Human validation pending. The Gemma side is a direct model label for every work in the frame, read from the title-only record. The Codex side is a classifier learned from the 10,348 direct Codex labels and calibrated to design-weighted sample rates; fields without enough sample support carry no Codex call. Candidate is the union of the two sides; consensus is their intersection. These outputs are machine_predicted_unvalidated and are not human labels.
Distilled classifier scores by category (both heads)
| Category | Codex | Gemma |
|---|---|---|
| Metaresearch | 0.001 | 0.003 |
| Meta-epidemiology (narrow) | 0.000 | 0.000 |
| Meta-epidemiology (broad) | 0.001 | 0.001 |
| Bibliometrics | 0.000 | 0.001 |
| Science and technology studies | 0.001 | 0.002 |
| Scholarly communication | 0.003 | 0.003 |
| Open science | 0.001 | 0.002 |
| Research integrity | 0.001 | 0.001 |
| Insufficient payload (model declined to judge) | 0.006 | 0.000 |
Machine scores (provisional)
The two teacher heads of the student model, read on this work. A score orders the frame for review; it never asserts a category, and the validation status ships verbatim with every row.
Baseline scores from an immature model (maturity gate not passed, 7 training rounds). Scores rank; they never assert a category.
score_only:v0-immature-baseline · verbatim from the scoring run: score_only means the number may rank works, and no category label ships from itClassification
machine, unvalidatedMachine predicted; a candidate call from one source (direct Gemma or distilled Codex), not a consensus.
How this classification was reached, model by model and score by score, is at the end of the page under "How this classification was reached".