Risk-Averse, Integrated Contract, and Open Market Procurement with Quantity Adjustment Costs
Bibliographic record
Abstract
This paper examines the issue cost-effective procurement of a commodity product when its spot (open) market prices are stochastic, contract prices are previously determined, and there are costs associated with adjusting (i.e., switching) the procurement quantities from an alternative. Spot (open) market and contract as sole modes of procurement could present risks of high magnitude and uncertainty of expenses for the buyer. To address these risks, a risk-averse buyer may consider simultaneous use of both alternatives with adjustment of the purchase quantities from both the alternatives over time. Scenarios when the switching costs depend on the relative prices of the two alternatives are considered. The problem being analytically intractable, a mixed method decision model combining analytical and computational techniques to analyze the problem is proposed. The model helps identify expected optimal contract and spot market procurement quantities with respect to unknown spot prices and known contract prices over the planned procurement horizon when procurement quantity adjustment costs are influenced by the spends. The analysis reveals that it is cost-effective to continue purchasing with an existing pattern of procurement from the two alternatives until the contract to spot market price ratio reaches a threshold level and then to change the proportion of quantity purchased from the two alternatives. Using numerical analysis, we illustrate the theoretical and managerial significance of this stickiness to continue with an existing pattern until an adjustment.
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How this classification was reachedexpand
Full frame machine prediction
Teacher imitationNot calibrated prevalence, not ground truth. Human validation pending. The Gemma side is a direct model label for every work in the frame, read from the title-only record. The Codex side is a classifier learned from the 10,348 direct Codex labels and calibrated to design-weighted sample rates; fields without enough sample support carry no Codex call. Candidate is the union of the two sides; consensus is their intersection. These outputs are machine_predicted_unvalidated and are not human labels.
Distilled classifier scores by category (both heads)
| Category | Codex | Gemma |
|---|---|---|
| Metaresearch | 0.003 | 0.010 |
| Meta-epidemiology (narrow) | 0.001 | 0.001 |
| Meta-epidemiology (broad) | 0.001 | 0.001 |
| Bibliometrics | 0.001 | 0.001 |
| Science and technology studies | 0.001 | 0.002 |
| Scholarly communication | 0.002 | 0.004 |
| Open science | 0.002 | 0.001 |
| Research integrity | 0.001 | 0.002 |
| Insufficient payload (model declined to judge) | 0.004 | 0.000 |
Machine scores (provisional)
The two teacher heads of the student model, read on this work. A score orders the frame for review; it never asserts a category, and the validation status ships verbatim with every row.
Baseline scores from an immature model (maturity gate not passed, 7 training rounds). Scores rank; they never assert a category.
score_only:v0-immature-baseline · verbatim from the scoring run: score_only means the number may rank works, and no category label ships from itClassification
machine, unvalidatedMachine predicted; a candidate call from one source (direct Gemma or distilled Codex), not a consensus.
How this classification was reached, model by model and score by score, is at the end of the page under "How this classification was reached".