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Record W4407186954 · doi:10.48550/arxiv.2502.02543

Posted Price Mechanisms for Online Allocation with Diseconomies of Scale

2025· preprint· en· W4407186954 on OpenAlexfundno aff
Hossein Nekouyan Jazi, Bo Sun, Raouf Boutaba, Xiaoqi Tan

Bibliographic record

VenueArXiv.org · 2025
Typepreprint
Languageen
FieldDecision Sciences
TopicAuction Theory and Applications
Canadian institutionsnot available
FundersNatural Sciences and Engineering Research Council of CanadaAlberta Machine Intelligence Institute
KeywordsDiseconomies of scaleScale (ratio)EconomicsComputer scienceMicroeconomicsEconomies of scaleGeographyCartography

Abstract

fetched live from OpenAlex

This paper addresses the online $k$-selection problem with diseconomies of scale (OSDoS), where a seller seeks to maximize social welfare by optimally pricing items for sequentially arriving buyers, accounting for increasing marginal production costs. Previous studies have investigated deterministic dynamic pricing mechanisms for such settings. However, significant challenges remain, particularly in achieving optimality with small or finite inventories and developing effective randomized posted price mechanisms. To bridge this gap, we propose a novel randomized dynamic pricing mechanism for OSDoS, providing a tighter lower bound on the competitive ratio compared to prior work. Our approach ensures optimal performance in small inventory settings (i.e., when $k$ is small) and surpasses existing online mechanisms in large inventory settings (i.e., when $k$ is large), leading to the best-known posted price mechanism for optimizing online selection and allocation with diseconomies of scale across varying inventory sizes.

Fetched live from OpenAlex and de-inverted. Abstracts are not stored in this database: the inverted indexes are 8.6 GB of the frame’s 9.3 GB of text, and the host has 13 GB free.

How this classification was reachedexpand

Full frame distilled prediction

Teacher imitation

Not calibrated prevalence, not ground truth. Human validation pending. Learned from the 10,348 direct Codex labels and 10,348 direct Gemma labels. Candidate is the union of thresholded teacher heads; consensus is their intersection. These outputs are machine_predicted_unvalidated and are not human labels or direct frontier model labels.

metaresearch head score (Codex)0.001
metaresearch head score (Gemma)0.000
Version: codex-gemma-dda1882f352aValidation status: machine_predicted_unvalidated
Candidate categoriesnone
Consensus categoriesnone
DomainCandidate signal: none · Consensus signal: none
Study designCandidate signal: Theoretical or conceptual · Consensus signal: Theoretical or conceptual
GenreCandidate signal: Empirical · Consensus signal: Empirical
Teacher disagreement score0.415
Threshold uncertainty score0.545

Codex and Gemma teacher scores by category

CategoryCodexGemma
Metaresearch0.0010.000
Meta-epidemiology (narrow)0.0000.000
Meta-epidemiology (broad)0.0000.000
Bibliometrics0.0000.000
Science and technology studies0.0000.000
Scholarly communication0.0000.000
Open science0.0010.000
Research integrity0.0000.000
Insufficient payload (model declined to judge)0.0000.000

Machine scores (provisional)

The two teacher heads of the student model, read on this work. A score orders the frame for review; it never asserts a category, and the validation status ships verbatim with every row.

Baseline scores from an immature model (maturity gate not passed, 7 training rounds). Scores rank; they never assert a category.

Opus teacher head0.115
GPT teacher head0.380
Teacher spread0.265 · how far apart the two teachers sit on this one work
Validation statusscore_only:v0-immature-baseline · verbatim from the scoring run: score_only means the number may rank works, and no category label ships from it

Classification

machine, unvalidated

Machine predicted; a candidate call from one teacher head, not a consensus.

The models applied no category: nothing in the taxonomy fit this work.
Study designTheoretical or conceptual
Domainnot available
GenreEmpirical

How this classification was reached, model by model and score by score, is at the end of the page under "How this classification was reached".

Quick stats

Citations0
Published2025
Admission routes1
Has abstractyes

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