A political economy analysis of the legislative response to unhealthy food and beverage marketing in Chile, Canada and the UK
Bibliographic record
Abstract
United Nations bodies call for legal responses to restrict children's exposure to unhealthy food marketing; however, few governments have introduced legislative controls. This research studies the underlying political economy influences that impacted the introduction of legal responses. We used a multiple case study methodology to examine the political economy influences on the policy process in three contexts (Chile, Canada and the UK). Data from documentary evidence and 21 semi-structured key informant interviews were analysed using a political economy framework studying the institutions, interests, ideas and the associated power dynamics that shaped the policy process. The prevailing neoliberal ideologies and overarching institutional paradigm, in which all actors were operating, meant any form of government intervention had to be justified, evidence-based and no more intrusive on commercial enterprise and public life than necessary. The neoliberal paradigm permeated each of the political economy elements (institutions, ideas and interests). In addition, its influence was observed in all stages of the policy process, from introduction through to adoption of the resulting law or regulation, and experienced in both the executive and legislative branches of government. A paradigm shift away from the protection and primacy of commercial enterprise and limited government interference would reduce the barriers governments face when introducing legislative responses to unhealthy food marketing. These dynamics may be tempered if institutional, actor and discursive power is harnessed in support of the legitimate public health measure, which would involve a strong mandate for the ministry responsible and a dedicated and influential policy entrepreneur. - Provides an insight into how three different governments legislated unhealthy food marketing. - Provides lessons for other governments about what challenges those countries faced and how they overcame them. - Considers the political reality behind policy making that impacts on how evidence-based policy making occurs.
Fetched live from OpenAlex and de-inverted. Abstracts are not stored in this database: the inverted indexes are 8.6 GB of the frame’s 9.3 GB of text, and the host has 13 GB free.
How this classification was reachedexpand
Full frame distilled prediction
Teacher imitationNot calibrated prevalence, not ground truth. Human validation pending. Learned from the 10,348 direct Codex labels and 10,348 direct Gemma labels. Candidate is the union of thresholded teacher heads; consensus is their intersection. These outputs are machine_predicted_unvalidated and are not human labels or direct frontier model labels.
Codex and Gemma teacher scores by category
| Category | Codex | Gemma |
|---|---|---|
| Metaresearch | 0.003 | 0.001 |
| Meta-epidemiology (narrow) | 0.000 | 0.000 |
| Meta-epidemiology (broad) | 0.000 | 0.000 |
| Bibliometrics | 0.000 | 0.001 |
| Science and technology studies | 0.000 | 0.000 |
| Scholarly communication | 0.000 | 0.000 |
| Open science | 0.000 | 0.000 |
| Research integrity | 0.000 | 0.000 |
| Insufficient payload (model declined to judge) | 0.000 | 0.000 |
Machine scores (provisional)
The two teacher heads of the student model, read on this work. A score orders the frame for review; it never asserts a category, and the validation status ships verbatim with every row.
Baseline scores from an immature model (maturity gate not passed, 7 training rounds). Scores rank; they never assert a category.
score_only:v0-immature-baseline · verbatim from the scoring run: score_only means the number may rank works, and no category label ships from itClassification
machine, unvalidatedMachine predicted; a candidate call from one teacher head, not a consensus.
How this classification was reached, model by model and score by score, is at the end of the page under "How this classification was reached".