Impact Mechanism in Circular Public Procurement: Empirical Insights from Traditional Public Procurement and Public Private Partnership in China
Why this work is in the frame
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Bibliographic record
Abstract
Circular Public Procurement (CPP) serves as a policy instrument aimed at advancing circular economy (CE) objectives through public contracting. Despite its growing adoption, the mechanisms underlying its implementation across different procurement types remain insufficiently understood. This study examines the impact of CE policies in both traditional public procurement (TPP) and Public-Private Partnership (PPP) projects in China. Using data from 45,131 TPP projects and 6,245 PPP projects (2015-2021), a probit regression model analyzes the effects of internal factors, including contract value, procurement method, sector, industry, and contract period, alongside external factors such as attention allocation and marketization. The findings indicate that higher contract values enhance CE policy implementation in TPP, while in PPP projects, larger contract values diminish policy effectiveness by increasing financing pressures. In PPP projects, longer contract periods may alleviate these pressures and facilitate policy implementation. Procurement methods shape policy outcomes differently across procurement types. Competitive bidding strengthens the implementation of CE policies in TPP, while negotiation-based approaches align sustainability goals with financing constraints in PPP projects. Sector- and industry-specific dynamics further influence policy implementation, suggesting that engineering procurement in TPP and transportation and agriculture/forestry PPP projects require more focused attention on CE policy implementation. On the other hand, attention allocation and marketization positively influence policy outcomes by strengthening institutional support and fostering incentives for environmental compliance. Explicit explanations of these relations are provided. This study highlights several key measures to improve the effectiveness of CE policies in China’s public procurement system, including enhancing the legal framework, allocating government attention to PPP projects, promoting market-oriented reforms, and strengthening policy implementation in specific sectors.
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Full frame distilled prediction
Teacher imitationNot calibrated prevalence, not ground truth. Human validation pending. Learned from the 10,348 direct Codex labels and 10,348 direct Gemma labels. Candidate is the union of thresholded teacher heads; consensus is their intersection. These outputs are machine_predicted_unvalidated and are not human labels or direct frontier model labels.
Codex and Gemma teacher scores by category
| Category | Codex | Gemma |
|---|---|---|
| Metaresearch | 0.001 | 0.000 |
| Meta-epidemiology (narrow) | 0.000 | 0.000 |
| Meta-epidemiology (broad) | 0.000 | 0.000 |
| Bibliometrics | 0.001 | 0.000 |
| Science and technology studies | 0.000 | 0.000 |
| Scholarly communication | 0.001 | 0.003 |
| Open science | 0.000 | 0.000 |
| Research integrity | 0.000 | 0.000 |
| Insufficient payload (model declined to judge) | 0.000 | 0.000 |
Machine scores (provisional)
The two teacher heads of the student model, read on this work. A score orders the frame for review; it never asserts a category, and the validation status ships verbatim with every row.
Baseline scores from an immature model (maturity gate not passed, 7 training rounds). Scores rank; they never assert a category.
score_only:v0-immature-baseline · verbatim from the scoring run: score_only means the number may rank works, and no category label ships from it