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Record W4408011055 · doi:10.5539/ijef.v17n3p122

Impact Mechanism in Circular Public Procurement: Empirical Insights from Traditional Public Procurement and Public Private Partnership in China

2025· article· en· W4408011055 on OpenAlexvenueno aff
Feng Guo

Bibliographic record

VenueInternational Journal of Economics and Finance · 2025
Typearticle
Languageen
FieldBusiness, Management and Accounting
TopicPublic Procurement and Policy
Canadian institutionsnot available
Fundersnot available
KeywordsProcurementGeneral partnershipChinaPublic–private partnershipMechanism (biology)BusinessPublic administrationPublic economicsEconomicsPolitical scienceFinanceMarketingLawPhysics

Abstract

fetched live from OpenAlex

Circular Public Procurement (CPP) serves as a policy instrument aimed at advancing circular economy (CE) objectives through public contracting. Despite its growing adoption, the mechanisms underlying its implementation across different procurement types remain insufficiently understood. This study examines the impact of CE policies in both traditional public procurement (TPP) and Public-Private Partnership (PPP) projects in China. Using data from 45,131 TPP projects and 6,245 PPP projects (2015-2021), a probit regression model analyzes the effects of internal factors, including contract value, procurement method, sector, industry, and contract period, alongside external factors such as attention allocation and marketization. The findings indicate that higher contract values enhance CE policy implementation in TPP, while in PPP projects, larger contract values diminish policy effectiveness by increasing financing pressures. In PPP projects, longer contract periods may alleviate these pressures and facilitate policy implementation. Procurement methods shape policy outcomes differently across procurement types. Competitive bidding strengthens the implementation of CE policies in TPP, while negotiation-based approaches align sustainability goals with financing constraints in PPP projects. Sector- and industry-specific dynamics further influence policy implementation, suggesting that engineering procurement in TPP and transportation and agriculture/forestry PPP projects require more focused attention on CE policy implementation. On the other hand, attention allocation and marketization positively influence policy outcomes by strengthening institutional support and fostering incentives for environmental compliance. Explicit explanations of these relations are provided. This study highlights several key measures to improve the effectiveness of CE policies in China’s public procurement system, including enhancing the legal framework, allocating government attention to PPP projects, promoting market-oriented reforms, and strengthening policy implementation in specific sectors.

Fetched live from OpenAlex and de-inverted. Abstracts are not stored in this database: the inverted indexes are 8.6 GB of the frame’s 9.3 GB of text, and the host has 13 GB free.

How this classification was reachedexpand

Full frame machine prediction

Teacher imitation

Not calibrated prevalence, not ground truth. Human validation pending. The Gemma side is a direct model label for every work in the frame, read from the title-only record. The Codex side is a classifier learned from the 10,348 direct Codex labels and calibrated to design-weighted sample rates; fields without enough sample support carry no Codex call. Candidate is the union of the two sides; consensus is their intersection. These outputs are machine_predicted_unvalidated and are not human labels.

metaresearch head score (Codex)0.005
metaresearch head score (Gemma)0.008
Version: metacan-v3-hybrid-931329e0061cValidation status: machine_predicted_unvalidated
Candidate categoriesnone
Consensus categoriesnone
DomainCandidate signal: none · Consensus signal: none
Study designCandidate signal: Observational · Consensus signal: Observational
GenreCandidate signal: Empirical · Consensus signal: Empirical
Teacher disagreement score0.110
Threshold uncertainty score0.219

Distilled classifier scores by category (both heads)

CategoryCodexGemma
Metaresearch0.0050.008
Meta-epidemiology (narrow)0.0000.000
Meta-epidemiology (broad)0.0010.001
Bibliometrics0.0030.005
Science and technology studies0.0010.002
Scholarly communication0.0020.003
Open science0.0010.002
Research integrity0.0010.001
Insufficient payload (model declined to judge)0.0050.000

Machine scores (provisional)

The two teacher heads of the student model, read on this work. A score orders the frame for review; it never asserts a category, and the validation status ships verbatim with every row.

Baseline scores from an immature model (maturity gate not passed, 7 training rounds). Scores rank; they never assert a category.

Opus teacher head0.055
GPT teacher head0.271
Teacher spread0.216 · how far apart the two teachers sit on this one work
Validation statusscore_only:v0-immature-baseline · verbatim from the scoring run: score_only means the number may rank works, and no category label ships from it

Classification

machine, unvalidated

Machine predicted; a candidate call from one source (direct Gemma or distilled Codex), not a consensus.

The models applied no category: nothing in the taxonomy fit this work.
Study designObservational
Domainnot available
GenreEmpirical

How this classification was reached, model by model and score by score, is at the end of the page under "How this classification was reached".

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Citations1
Published2025
Admission routes1
Has abstractyes

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