INN-based Secure Steganography Using Lost Information as Adversarial Perturbations
Bibliographic record
Abstract
Recently image steganography methods based on invertible neural networks (INNs) demonstrated the capability to automatically embed and extract secret messages while maintaining high visual quality in stego images. However, there remain concerns about security and invertibility of such methods. In this paper, for the first time, we introduce adversarial hiding into INN-based image steganography method to simultaneously perform steganographic embedding and adversarial perturbation generation, resulting in improved security. Our method enhances the invertibility of the INN structure: It utilizes the lost information of the INN to generate perturbations, which are then combined with the gradient of the cover image to produce an adversarial stego image. Also, a learnable noise layer is proposed to mitigate information loss caused by rounding and truncation during image storage. Therefore, the proposed method significantly improves security while enhancing extraction performance of INN-based steganography approach, as supported by our experimental results. For example, the steganalysis detection accuracy of SRNet decreases from 96.86% to 51.77% at a payload of 0.2 bits per pixel (bpp).
Fetched live from OpenAlex and de-inverted. Abstracts are not stored in this database: the inverted indexes are 8.6 GB of the frame’s 9.3 GB of text, and the host has 13 GB free.
How this classification was reachedexpand
Full frame machine prediction
Teacher imitationNot calibrated prevalence, not ground truth. Human validation pending. The Gemma side is a direct model label for every work in the frame, read from the title-only record. The Codex side is a classifier learned from the 10,348 direct Codex labels and calibrated to design-weighted sample rates; fields without enough sample support carry no Codex call. Candidate is the union of the two sides; consensus is their intersection. These outputs are machine_predicted_unvalidated and are not human labels.
Distilled classifier scores by category (both heads)
| Category | Codex | Gemma |
|---|---|---|
| Metaresearch | 0.000 | 0.001 |
| Meta-epidemiology (narrow) | 0.000 | 0.000 |
| Meta-epidemiology (broad) | 0.000 | 0.000 |
| Bibliometrics | 0.000 | 0.000 |
| Science and technology studies | 0.000 | 0.001 |
| Scholarly communication | 0.000 | 0.001 |
| Open science | 0.000 | 0.001 |
| Research integrity | 0.000 | 0.001 |
| Insufficient payload (model declined to judge) | 0.001 | 0.000 |
Machine scores (provisional)
The two teacher heads of the student model, read on this work. A score orders the frame for review; it never asserts a category, and the validation status ships verbatim with every row.
Baseline scores from an immature model (maturity gate not passed, 7 training rounds). Scores rank; they never assert a category.
score_only:v0-immature-baseline · verbatim from the scoring run: score_only means the number may rank works, and no category label ships from itClassification
machine, unvalidatedMachine predicted; a candidate call from one source (direct Gemma or distilled Codex), not a consensus.
How this classification was reached, model by model and score by score, is at the end of the page under "How this classification was reached".