A Joint Secure Mechanism of Multi-Task Learning for a UAV Team Under FDI Attacks
Bibliographic record
Abstract
A UAV team shows tremendous potential for various mobile scenarios. However, some evidences reveal their vulnerability to False Data Injection (FDI) attacks, which can significantly jeopardize the flight security or even lead to catastrophic incidents. Existing studies primarily focus on detecting or defending against FDI attacks at the trajectory control of individual UAVs, leaving a gap in a comprehensive secure mechanism that can simultaneously detect, localize, and compensate for such attacks across an entire UAV team. The complexity of developing such a solution is magnified by the multiple design goals, the inherent sophistication of UAV team, and practical attack assumptions. In this paper, we propose a joint secure framework based on multi-task deep learning to simultaneously detect FDI attacks, localize the compromised components, and compensate control signals to mitigate the impact of FDI attacks on promising UAV teams. Specifically, we design an all-in-one deep learning model framework with a temporal-spatial information extraction module and a hierarchical multi-task module to perform three tasks simultaneously. Moreover, we introduce an iterative learning method with experience replay to counteract knowledge decay during model training. Extensive experiments and real flight demonstrations are presented to validate the improved performance and the benefits of our proposed secure method.
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How this classification was reachedexpand
Full frame machine prediction
Teacher imitationNot calibrated prevalence, not ground truth. Human validation pending. The Gemma side is a direct model label for every work in the frame, read from the title-only record. The Codex side is a classifier learned from the 10,348 direct Codex labels and calibrated to design-weighted sample rates; fields without enough sample support carry no Codex call. Candidate is the union of the two sides; consensus is their intersection. These outputs are machine_predicted_unvalidated and are not human labels.
Distilled classifier scores by category (both heads)
| Category | Codex | Gemma |
|---|---|---|
| Metaresearch | 0.002 | 0.003 |
| Meta-epidemiology (narrow) | 0.001 | 0.000 |
| Meta-epidemiology (broad) | 0.001 | 0.001 |
| Bibliometrics | 0.000 | 0.000 |
| Science and technology studies | 0.001 | 0.001 |
| Scholarly communication | 0.001 | 0.002 |
| Open science | 0.002 | 0.003 |
| Research integrity | 0.001 | 0.001 |
| Insufficient payload (model declined to judge) | 0.002 | 0.001 |
Machine scores (provisional)
The two teacher heads of the student model, read on this work. A score orders the frame for review; it never asserts a category, and the validation status ships verbatim with every row.
Baseline scores from an immature model (maturity gate not passed, 7 training rounds). Scores rank; they never assert a category.
score_only:v0-immature-baseline · verbatim from the scoring run: score_only means the number may rank works, and no category label ships from itClassification
machine, unvalidatedMachine predicted; a candidate call from one source (direct Gemma or distilled Codex), not a consensus.
How this classification was reached, model by model and score by score, is at the end of the page under "How this classification was reached".