A Joint Secure Mechanism of Multi-Task Learning for a UAV Team Under FDI Attacks
Why this work is in the frame
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Bibliographic record
Abstract
A UAV team shows tremendous potential for various mobile scenarios. However, some evidences reveal their vulnerability to False Data Injection (FDI) attacks, which can significantly jeopardize the flight security or even lead to catastrophic incidents. Existing studies primarily focus on detecting or defending against FDI attacks at the trajectory control of individual UAVs, leaving a gap in a comprehensive secure mechanism that can simultaneously detect, localize, and compensate for such attacks across an entire UAV team. The complexity of developing such a solution is magnified by the multiple design goals, the inherent sophistication of UAV team, and practical attack assumptions. In this paper, we propose a joint secure framework based on multi-task deep learning to simultaneously detect FDI attacks, localize the compromised components, and compensate control signals to mitigate the impact of FDI attacks on promising UAV teams. Specifically, we design an all-in-one deep learning model framework with a temporal-spatial information extraction module and a hierarchical multi-task module to perform three tasks simultaneously. Moreover, we introduce an iterative learning method with experience replay to counteract knowledge decay during model training. Extensive experiments and real flight demonstrations are presented to validate the improved performance and the benefits of our proposed secure method.
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Full frame distilled prediction
Teacher imitationNot calibrated prevalence, not ground truth. Human validation pending. Learned from the 10,348 direct Codex labels and 10,348 direct Gemma labels. Candidate is the union of thresholded teacher heads; consensus is their intersection. These outputs are machine_predicted_unvalidated and are not human labels or direct frontier model labels.
Codex and Gemma teacher scores by category
| Category | Codex | Gemma |
|---|---|---|
| Metaresearch | 0.001 | 0.000 |
| Meta-epidemiology (narrow) | 0.000 | 0.000 |
| Meta-epidemiology (broad) | 0.000 | 0.000 |
| Bibliometrics | 0.000 | 0.001 |
| Science and technology studies | 0.001 | 0.000 |
| Scholarly communication | 0.000 | 0.000 |
| Open science | 0.001 | 0.000 |
| Research integrity | 0.000 | 0.001 |
| Insufficient payload (model declined to judge) | 0.000 | 0.000 |
Machine scores (provisional)
The two teacher heads of the student model, read on this work. A score orders the frame for review; it never asserts a category, and the validation status ships verbatim with every row.
Baseline scores from an immature model (maturity gate not passed, 7 training rounds). Scores rank; they never assert a category.
score_only:v0-immature-baseline · verbatim from the scoring run: score_only means the number may rank works, and no category label ships from it