Parmenides and Dr. Strangelove, Or How I Learned to Stop Worrying about Monism and Accept the World of Relations, at least for the sake of the Good

I want to start with a movie: Dr. Strangelove or: How I Learned to Stop Worrying and Love the Bomb.1 This 1964 film, directed by Stanley Kubrick, and starring Peter Sellers in multiple roles, satirizes the Cold War defense establishment. It tells the story of a renegade base commander, General Jack D. Ripper, played by Sterling Hayden, who takes advantage of a malfunction in the communications system to send his wing of B-52 bombers to attack the Soviet Union. When the President of the United States is alerted to this dire state of affairs by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Buck Turgidson, played by George C. Scott, he tries to make a deal with his Soviet counterpart, Premier Kissov, for a limited proportional response, but is startled to discover, as his advisor, the former Nazi scientist, Dr. Strangelove, informs him, that the Soviets have recently activated a “Doomsday” device, whose purpose is to deter a single attack by immediately triggering a conflagration that would destroy the entire world. After failed attempts to thwart the attack, whether by the visiting British officer, Group Captain Lionel Mandrake, at Burpelson Airbase, or by the Soviet Air Defense system, the defense officials gathered in the War Room are left to contemplate their only option, which is to gather top government officials in a deep underground shelter, where they will work to repopulate the world. At the end, one bomber, piloted by Major T. J. “King” Kong, manages to get through to deliver the payload and trigger Armageddon. The final scene is of Dr. Strangelove getting out of his wheelchair, exclaiming ecstatically, “Mein Führer, I can walk!,” which then cuts to scenes of giant nuclear mushroom clouds exploding in the air accompanied by the melancholy song, “We'll meet again.” This is a great movie, undoubtedly a classic, and you should see it, if you haven't already. But why am I bringing it up here? The answer is that, in my view, it perfectly illustrates the nature of acosmism. As I was reading Michael Della Rocca's recent book, The Parmenidean Ascent, this was the story that almost immediately came to mind. At first, I tried to ignore it, thinking that it was just a glib association, but when it came back again, I realized that my philosophical unconscious was speaking to me and that perhaps I should pay attention to it. Here are some of the points of comparison. The main point is the doomsday principle of deterrence. Half measures don't add up to much. If you want to preserve the world, then you must threaten to destroy it completely. There is the mad scientist, Dr. Strangelove, whose very name embodies the paradox. He is one of the designers of the system itself, the Parmenides figure. One thing to note is that in the movie, this character has a dubious past, as a servant to a totalizing Reich, and also a weak character. In contrast to Major Kong, who has the simple-minded audacity to carry out his world-destroying duty, we learn in the end, when it becomes apparent that no-one can stop the renegade bomber, that Dr. Strangelove is not committed fully to the principle that he has articulated. He is secretly a “tamer” who, even as the rest of the world has been destroyed, embraces the idea that a small group of elites will survive in a deep mine, stocked for the duration of a radioactive future, whose only purpose will be to breed a new race of people to repopulate the world. There is the instigator, General Jack D. Ripper: who unleashes the whole thing via a pathological concern for purity focused on his fear of fluoride being added to the water. Despite his paranoia, he can be quite reasonable. He asks the right questions. If we have devoted so much time and energy to developing this project, and we have a functioning system in place, then why not use it? The modern rationalist. Ripper's counterpoint is the Group Captain Lionel Mandrake, who tries to reason with Gen. Ripper through appeals to common sense. The “tamer” par excellence, the British philosopher of common sense. He is doomed to be ineffectual. Then there is the loyal soldier: Major T. J. “King” Kong, who commands the B-52 that eludes the Soviet air defense system. Played by the well-known former rodeo performer and star of Westerns, “Slim” Pickens, Kong is single-mindedly driven by his duty. When the bomb doors of the plane he is piloting become stuck, he descends into the belly of the beast to fix the problem. He literally rides the bomb to its target, whooping with joy, as he initiates the doomsday scenario and the end of the world. This image is the epitome of the “happy suicide of thought,” as the philosopher F.H. Bradley labeled the ideal. The most important character of the film, of course, is the Bomb, a.k.a., the PSR (Principle of Sufficient Reason). It is the technology that not only gets the job done but determines the values of the system of which it is the heart. What is the purpose of the satire? Let us remember that, although the movie gleefully recounts how the world is destroyed, that the purpose of the system was deterrence, that is, to preserve the world. At its margins, then, the film considers some obvious and important questions: What would a world without any living beings within it look like? What would the value of such a world be? Some would argue that these questions are not really the point of the film, though. The real issue is to highlight the inefficacy of the instrument chosen to protect the world. Both critics and proponents of deterrence share the same concerns. While a critic would point out the folies of deterrence, as it raises the chances that the very world we want to protect might be destroyed, a proponent would just say, on the very same grounds, that we simply need to correct and improve the systems that we have in place. It is a debate about the means and not the ends. Of course, along these lines, Kubrick also wants to point out the hypocrisy, which is revealed among those that benefit from the system. The secret taming strategy of the inventors of the system reveals that they do care about finite existence. What is problematic about it is that it shows that they only value their own lives and not those of everyone else who will be destroyed. But the subversive purpose of the satire might be something more sinister than either questioning the instrumental value of a system of deterrence or pointing out the hypocrisy of its advocates. Rather, the point of the film is something else entirely, namely, that the technology of the system is no longer an instrument to preserve some other set of values—say the glories of mid-century American capitalism or the Soviet version of communism—but itself the true meaning of the system. We need an elaborate system to maintain the bomb, but the ostensible purpose of the weapon—to prevent war—is belied by the fact that the key to the whole principle of deterrence is destruction itself. That, Kubrick suggests, is the ultimate value of the system, as the true heroes of the film demonstrate in their actions, when they embrace it. Hegel's critique of Spinoza is not comedic in form but straightforwardly philosophical. He aims to show that Spinoza's pantheism—the view that nature and God are one—leads to a perverse effect—the denial that all things in the world except for God are real—in other words, acosmism. Nonetheless, the comparison to Kubrick's film is useful in two ways. For one thing, the film, as I hope to show, reveals something about the structure of Hegel's argument. For another, Hegel's argument shares some elements of literary satire in its reliance upon ironic effects and an implicit moral and social critique. In contrast to Kubrick's Dr. Strangelove, however, Hegel's version of satire is far less bleak. You might see what I mean if I distinguish between two traditional kinds of satire: one that assumes a moral vision and of which it is in service; and another one that is darker and calls into question the possibility of moral value itself. Hegel offers the first version. As Yitzhak Melamed reminds us, Hegel's reading of Spinoza depends on, but also starkly differs from that of Friedrich Heinrich Jacobi (79).2 Like Hegel, Jacobi wants to use Spinoza's views as a kind of warning, though his fear is more extreme. Jacobi thought that Spinoza had obliterated not only the finite (“Individual things, therefore, so far as they only exist in a certain determinate mode, are non-entia” [220]) but the infinite as well,3 at least in the sense that the infinite, which Jacobi thinks can have neither intellect nor will (222), has any resemblance to a traditional idea of God, which leads to the that Spinoza is not only an is but also a Hegel, in Spinoza as a kind of one who has As he of which to be it has of has the more the of that it has much of For Hegel, it is that leads to acosmism. The with have been in by In a Hegel thinks that for Spinoza the only thing that is a single It is thought and There what he two of within itself, one that is and has being for itself, the other that is the and has being only in a Hegel thinks that of Spinoza's and between and not but only He to as a principle the that is even though it is in the and the of its in Spinoza's system. Hegel thinks that Spinoza to how the finite can be from the only are the of Spinoza's view but so it its Of course, there is a great deal of debate these Some would with as a of Spinoza's system, would that they have some The one that I want to on, to the of his What and Hegel's critique of is his own view of the of When he his critique of through how denial of finite from it, he has an of on his of for God and for us, as finite that is his For Hegel, the with Spinoza in this is that the not the principle of idea of is not and be I am not that Hegel simply has some moral that he with that of He thinks that he has a for his view of and finite and the moral and system that from it. The point is that if we Spinoza's view, that reason leads us to an God, which the possibility of moral then we must have an view either of reason itself or the that reason has For Hegel, the of is from its moral In he Spinoza's view to and it as an of thought and As had the of Spinoza with the and it a among other In the Hegel is to have was a by and what in the form of thought in his is in on the to which finite as something as something by The and is not a God to be Rather, he is an version of a who his either as or as The in with this of as if they don't that is, as for Hegel, is the of a It is the of a system, in which God the world the of a philosophical system in which are through the of and the of a moral and system, in which is the It is true that Spinoza that he a of at the of his system, but he has a time to his attack on and This is a point to back to a of Michael Della Rocca's book, The Parmenidean Della and Hegel share some important Both Della and Hegel share an in Spinoza and But they also in For one thing, Della is an Hegel a of Della or no he has a sense of which he he is in his embrace of though Spinoza is in the as he in a of there is or no of is perhaps on his reading at Spinoza is not one of the so common among Spinoza is the only who be as living up to his own and among the of that he in to an of either we make a would be where we the as or we are with a or we are with an that all of the in question that make a certain the that we are with of the must to meet the in this Della that the of this as Bradley is the argument the of the kind of and the of or The then, is that if we the of we can the world without on any into an infinite or getting in a by with all and the of the world that from I will not a Parmenidean with to moral the of in this a more fully out of and moral in my Parmenidean will be a for The fact that he has it for another is a that he is also of the of the I would argue that the of the moral is not just one of philosophical to which we can the PSR but in a to the of the PSR itself. How then are we to the of if we the as I do in We to just as Parmenides is, as I to show in in a to at the end of his We must that the that have us to this point are and also that we to from which those have to deliver What can be then, as it, to see the world we must or the problematic on which we have we as he it, use as a which we and then this answer is I that Della not that it something that I to at the But the point of bringing it up is that I that it is a that Spinoza to be at the of his In Della Rocca's on and he Bradley and but pointing out that Spinoza also to the idea of the of through of the he not own moral or what the of view might be for his I want to that we an of the moral of the itself, that is, of the moral of the then we be with this of the Let us to There has been a of in the reading of Spinoza and the of its within Spinoza's system. Some have for the of the finite in the for its ultimate Here I want to on the moral question of the I want to something about the of Spinoza's system and how that some on how he of the nature of the Then I will to his of the meaning of the and how that on the nature of the I at to to out whether there was which would be the true of itself, and which would the all being there was something and would me the joy, to a he that he has an idea of the true and then in the he tells us in in what this we have to that and are of things only in a certain and that from the point of view of the is in itself or we must that, to we do not the point of view of the and a nature much and more than his important to this point is that we to that we this nature and that we the means to do we that this nature the of the that the has with the whole of We an structure in the two of the in the of Spinoza that, far as and are they also in things, in nor are they other than of or we form we things to one these we to form a of whose very purpose is to a common of idea of this some have can be in the of the at the end of then this in is a to the of God that as the of what Spinoza in of the calls this we or or in a and Love of God, or in Love for But there are also some important between the and in and in the The that Spinoza In the it is which in the but although we do see the in we see of it that to the state of such as the or as we just Spinoza only the with God in the In the there is no such between the and We do of and the of God are one and the which some might argue is more or less with the idea of a As we have whether the of the kind of is a finite or an infinite the fact that we need to argue for an of the at this point that there is at least a with any on the of the The of a between the finite and the infinite is not only in the but also in the and kind of work that is to the In the Spinoza takes what might be as a to in which we at the through the of There is for the of the which he as but there is or no of social and When we do it is as a for of as is in the on God, and or where he from this fact that we are of nature and are by its that we are his that is to be such as I and have Spinoza's with in the and of the his of the Spinoza not the philosopher to correct his and a of the he also I am the to us that Spinoza to his as to in as a of the We see this in the of of the to preserve the that the of is the of the to with the state and and the in the that, if we not that is we would as of the first and all the things we have to be to and are but they are only to and Here I want to a of a philosophical reading of Spinoza's of the that it more in the as we with a The idea is that the idea of the that Spinoza is but that it is only to this fact with we the point of view of the infinite, which itself is There are points that this all then, it is that we neither nor neither nor we it to be on the we something to be we for it, will it, want it, and it. The not exist of us, whether in God, in or in some it is a of the this of the will to be to with the world and even to which to be far less or than we had The attempts to these of the in a of which can be either or do add a of when they are When Spinoza the at the of he I what we to be useful to however, I what we us from being of some The useful be just what we the is with the of and value in Spinoza that this is a any even from the point of view of the when he an and these see the he us back to the of of which are to a for value even these are in some sense. In the of an of then we are with the that we are just a set of and the of those into a single idea that we as a In the of an the idea is more certain it is on that reason are in the and common Nonetheless, the idea is to the set of in nature that we as which in are to other of in the world. In other words, a true idea of depends on the of and the with other of in the world, all of which leads us to the and system of nature itself that this infinite We can to the through reason that not any There is a and of this The view is in the to of the Spinoza that traditional of God, his and to nature are to an of the of nature itself. If we can argue for a of God that not these then we can not only that God not have these but that he have in the the that Spinoza thought something Spinoza that this that of is it that if the had only it would form no of But this is it is with the and philosophical of as a or something that has no at Spinoza a more they would form no of and so as they who reason into question the of value nature and that, the of is a being that not have would not have any of the and we also from the point of own that we form of and and we can see on the of reason that it is nature to do When we the of God, then we see the as we use of the nature of the The is that when we that own sense of value is and that God not have any values that might in any sense than the we in then we can embrace the idea of an sense of in which we to with one another but more than not In other words, we have an of moral world. is not but also is not in and is in other in a or in a with a of I my for or in with will also to The reason to be that the very nature of an an ultimate which an can in principle simply we can see that a to this leads to an when it to the nature of the at least in namely, that it be except as The nature of the in Spinoza's system is a very and my purpose is to even a an of it. Nonetheless, the I have should me to make a of that are to the of the moral of acosmism. Spinoza be committed to the of some of the that the system itself. can he be committed to the entire of the idea of the in either the of the with God in the or the of God the as I have are more about the of the we must this and and for an one that us to maintain the that we have at the of the system. is, we the when we that there is no ultimate that is, a that is I at the that I thought we use the of deterrence in Dr. Strangelove to us some of the of acosmism. Let me in that we can use it as the for a to the moral problem. it the Strangelove of that we need to threaten to destroy the world to it, us that we need to embrace the world in to destroy it. it, if the Parmenidean as Della is a of the though one he for and philosophical What we when we the PSR and to the of is that the world of finite beings is to the possibility of sense of the so we the of the of the or what the PSR reveals about what the nature of the is, namely, the of it in of finite back into the of to a reason to the to Della Rocca's we do with the Rather, we must embrace it. The for any finite thing is in to itself and to other finite things if we into an or some true that they share in what we as we the nature of God is that what is the infinite or nature or God, not have any in its For that Spinoza thinks that is, as would it, and But if we are to be to the of we must the for us, that is, as finite of the and with which Spinoza would be the I don't if Della thinks this or the is that we must back from the One to the which is the very of the to this state of If this is true of then perhaps this might be true of other as of with the the for the One us to to finite we this or as another will be the of the

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