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Record W4409364637 · doi:10.1609/aaai.v39i13.33499

Constrained Fair and Efficient Allocations

2025· article· en· W4409364637 on OpenAlexafffund
Benjamin Cookson, Soroush Ebadian, Nisarg Shah

Bibliographic record

VenueProceedings of the AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence · 2025
Typearticle
Languageen
FieldEconomics, Econometrics and Finance
TopicGame Theory and Voting Systems
Canadian institutionsUniversity of Toronto
FundersNatural Sciences and Engineering Research Council of Canada
KeywordsComputer science

Abstract

fetched live from OpenAlex

Fairness and efficiency have become the pillars of modern fair division research, but prior work on achieving both simultaneously is largely limited to the unconstrained setting. We study fair and efficient allocations of indivisible goods under additive valuations and various types of allocation feasibility constraints, and demonstrate the unreasonable effectiveness of the maximum Nash welfare (MNW) solution in this previously uncharted territory. Our main result is that MNW allocations are 1/2-envy-free up to one good (EF1) and Pareto optimal under the broad family of (arbitrary) matroid constraints. We extend these guarantees to complete MNW allocations for base-orderable matroid constraints, and to a family of non-matroid constraints (which includes balancedness). We establish tightness of our results by providing counterexamples for the satisfiability of certain stronger desiderata, but show an improved result for the special case of goods with copies (Gafni et al. 2023). Finally, we also establish novel best-of-both-worlds guarantees for goods with copies and balancedness.

Fetched live from OpenAlex and de-inverted. Abstracts are not stored in this database: the inverted indexes are 8.6 GB of the frame’s 9.3 GB of text, and the host has 13 GB free.

How this classification was reachedexpand

Full frame distilled prediction

Teacher imitation

Not calibrated prevalence, not ground truth. Human validation pending. Learned from the 10,348 direct Codex labels and 10,348 direct Gemma labels. Candidate is the union of thresholded teacher heads; consensus is their intersection. These outputs are machine_predicted_unvalidated and are not human labels or direct frontier model labels.

metaresearch head score (Codex)0.001
metaresearch head score (Gemma)0.001
Version: codex-gemma-dda1882f352aValidation status: machine_predicted_unvalidated
Candidate categoriesnone
Consensus categoriesnone
DomainCandidate signal: none · Consensus signal: none
Study designCandidate signal: Theoretical or conceptual · Consensus signal: Theoretical or conceptual
GenreCandidate signal: Empirical · Consensus signal: Empirical
Teacher disagreement score0.193
Threshold uncertainty score0.441

Codex and Gemma teacher scores by category

CategoryCodexGemma
Metaresearch0.0010.001
Meta-epidemiology (narrow)0.0000.000
Meta-epidemiology (broad)0.0000.000
Bibliometrics0.0000.000
Science and technology studies0.0000.000
Scholarly communication0.0000.000
Open science0.0000.000
Research integrity0.0000.000
Insufficient payload (model declined to judge)0.0000.000

Machine scores (provisional)

The two teacher heads of the student model, read on this work. A score orders the frame for review; it never asserts a category, and the validation status ships verbatim with every row.

Baseline scores from an immature model (maturity gate not passed, 7 training rounds). Scores rank; they never assert a category.

Opus teacher head0.068
GPT teacher head0.269
Teacher spread0.201 · how far apart the two teachers sit on this one work
Validation statusscore_only:v0-immature-baseline · verbatim from the scoring run: score_only means the number may rank works, and no category label ships from it

Classification

machine, unvalidated

Machine predicted; a candidate call from one teacher head, not a consensus.

The models applied no category: nothing in the taxonomy fit this work.
Study designTheoretical or conceptual
Domainnot available
GenreEmpirical

How this classification was reached, model by model and score by score, is at the end of the page under "How this classification was reached".

Quick stats

Citations1
Published2025
Admission routes2
Has abstractyes

Explore more

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