Practical security analysis and attack strategies on permutation functions used in IoT supply chain systems
Bibliographic record
Abstract
The widespread adoption of IoT devices has made the production of low-cost systems a priority. Since construction costs are generally directly related to the complexity of security methods, researchers are exploring methods that provide acceptable security with minimal hardware complexity. One such method is the use of permutation functions in ultra-lightweight authentication protocols that employ simple operators such as XOR and Shift. This paper demonstrates the critical importance of the internal structure of a permutation function in ensuring system security. This implies that even if a protocol is designed securely and efficiently, structural weaknesses in the function can render the protocol vulnerable. To illustrate this, we examine a recently published protocol named ULBRAP for supply chain management systems and reveal its security flaws, including secret disclosure and traceability attacks. We also demonstrate the attack step-by-step on Raspberry Pi devices, publishing the details on GitHub and presenting them in a video. The attack method requires 1,710,947 hash calculations, which takes approximately 5 min in our experiments. Finally, we propose a solution to address the issues associated with these functions.
Fetched live from OpenAlex and de-inverted. Abstracts are not stored in this database: the inverted indexes are 8.6 GB of the frame’s 9.3 GB of text, and the host has 13 GB free.
How this classification was reachedexpand
Full frame machine prediction
Teacher imitationNot calibrated prevalence, not ground truth. Human validation pending. The Gemma side is a direct model label for every work in the frame, read from the title-only record. The Codex side is a classifier learned from the 10,348 direct Codex labels and calibrated to design-weighted sample rates; fields without enough sample support carry no Codex call. Candidate is the union of the two sides; consensus is their intersection. These outputs are machine_predicted_unvalidated and are not human labels.
Distilled classifier scores by category (both heads)
| Category | Codex | Gemma |
|---|---|---|
| Metaresearch | 0.002 | 0.006 |
| Meta-epidemiology (narrow) | 0.001 | 0.000 |
| Meta-epidemiology (broad) | 0.000 | 0.001 |
| Bibliometrics | 0.001 | 0.001 |
| Science and technology studies | 0.001 | 0.002 |
| Scholarly communication | 0.001 | 0.003 |
| Open science | 0.001 | 0.001 |
| Research integrity | 0.001 | 0.001 |
| Insufficient payload (model declined to judge) | 0.003 | 0.000 |
Machine scores (provisional)
The two teacher heads of the student model, read on this work. A score orders the frame for review; it never asserts a category, and the validation status ships verbatim with every row.
Baseline scores from an immature model (maturity gate not passed, 7 training rounds). Scores rank; they never assert a category.
score_only:v0-immature-baseline · verbatim from the scoring run: score_only means the number may rank works, and no category label ships from itClassification
machine, unvalidatedMachine predicted; a candidate call from one source (direct Gemma or distilled Codex), not a consensus.
How this classification was reached, model by model and score by score, is at the end of the page under "How this classification was reached".