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Record W4410632503 · doi:10.22215/etd/2025-16435

Confidence Game: How the Rules of the Confidence Relationship Impact Accountability and Executive- Legislative Relations in Parliamentary Democracies

2025· dissertation· en· W4410632503 on OpenAlexaff
Elsa Sophie Piersig

Bibliographic record

Venuenot available
Typedissertation
Languageen
FieldSocial Sciences
TopicEuropean and International Law Studies
Canadian institutionsCarleton University
Fundersnot available
KeywordsLegislatureAccountabilityPolitical sciencePsychologyAccountingPublic administrationBusinessLaw

Abstract

fetched live from OpenAlex

The confidence connection linking cabinets to parliaments is the defining feature of parliamentary democracies. Citizens elect a parliament, parliament delegates to cabinet through an investiture vote, and cabinet retains office so long as it holds the confidence of parliament. If confidence is lost through a vote of confidence or non-confidence, the cabinet is expected to resign, opening the door to a new government or an early dissolution and election. Yet, evidence from a sample of 28 established parliamentary democracies suggests parliament has a limited capacity to carry out these functions. This is driven in part by growing democratic sensibilities and the electoral theory of democracy, that demand citizens ‘select’ the government, giving it a democratic mandate to govern, and hold it accountable at the next election. Existing research into the confidence connection is both limited and compartmentalized. It is limited because events that pull back the curtain on the confidence connection are infrequent – especially non-confidence votes with a reasonable chance of defeating the government. Compartmentalization results from the focus in the comparative literature on the individual mechanisms that parliaments use to delegate to cabinet and hold it accountable. Consequently, comparative studies isolate investiture votes, confidence votes, non-confidence votes, and dissolution rules from each other, overlooking how the rules for each mechanism were designed to work together. This project develops the confidence relationship to unite the four delegation and accountability mechanisms, plus the relevant constitutional and procedural rules, that establish the rules of the game between executives and legislatures. It then operationalizes the confidence relationship as the Parliamentary Selectoral Power Index (PSPI) to capture the relative balance of selectoral power over the confidence relationship. I find that parliamentary democracies have, despite the wide variety of rules, adopted confidence relationships that generally privilege the executive relative to parliament and cluster around the mean PSPI score. This becomes more pronounced as countries have turned towards more constructive rules that, in theory, give more power to parliament over the executive, but in practice make it more difficult for parliament to act and ultimately shift power away from parliament to a direct relationship between the executive and electorate.

Fetched live from OpenAlex and de-inverted. Abstracts are not stored in this database: the inverted indexes are 8.6 GB of the frame’s 9.3 GB of text, and the host has 13 GB free.

How this classification was reachedexpand

Full frame machine prediction

Teacher imitation

Not calibrated prevalence, not ground truth. Human validation pending. The Gemma side is a direct model label for every work in the frame, read from the title-only record. The Codex side is a classifier learned from the 10,348 direct Codex labels and calibrated to design-weighted sample rates; fields without enough sample support carry no Codex call. Candidate is the union of the two sides; consensus is their intersection. These outputs are machine_predicted_unvalidated and are not human labels.

metaresearch head score (Codex)0.007
metaresearch head score (Gemma)0.036
Version: metacan-v3-hybrid-931329e0061cValidation status: machine_predicted_unvalidated
Candidate categoriesnone
Consensus categoriesnone
DomainCandidate signal: none · Consensus signal: none
Study designCandidate signal: Not applicable · Consensus signal: none
GenreCandidate signal: Other · Consensus signal: none
Teacher disagreement score0.017
Threshold uncertainty score0.058

Distilled classifier scores by category (both heads)

CategoryCodexGemma
Metaresearch0.0070.036
Meta-epidemiology (narrow)0.0000.000
Meta-epidemiology (broad)0.0010.001
Bibliometrics0.0010.001
Science and technology studies0.0020.006
Scholarly communication0.0100.008
Open science0.0010.004
Research integrity0.0020.004
Insufficient payload (model declined to judge)0.0170.001

Machine scores (provisional)

The two teacher heads of the student model, read on this work. A score orders the frame for review; it never asserts a category, and the validation status ships verbatim with every row.

Baseline scores from an immature model (maturity gate not passed, 7 training rounds). Scores rank; they never assert a category.

Opus teacher head0.044
GPT teacher head0.349
Teacher spread0.305 · how far apart the two teachers sit on this one work
Validation statusscore_only:v0-immature-baseline · verbatim from the scoring run: score_only means the number may rank works, and no category label ships from it

Classification

machine, unvalidated

Machine predicted; a candidate call from one source (direct Gemma or distilled Codex), not a consensus.

The models applied no category: nothing in the taxonomy fit this work.
Study designNot applicable
Domainnot available
GenreOther

How this classification was reached, model by model and score by score, is at the end of the page under "How this classification was reached".

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Citations0
Published2025
Admission routes1
Has abstractyes

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