Adaptive distributed honeypot detection network for enhanced cybersecurity against DoS and DDoS attacks
Bibliographic record
Abstract
The increasing prevalence and sophistication of Denial of Service (DoS) and Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) attacks present significant challenges in ensuring the security and stability of modern networked systems. These attacks, characterized by their ability to disrupt services and compromise resources, require innovative and robust detection mechanisms to safeguard highly interactive environments such as honeypot systems. Traditional detection techniques often fall short in addressing the complexities posed by dynamic traffic patterns, diverse attack types, and real-time processing demands. This study introduces the Adaptive Distributed Honeypot Detection Network (ADHDN), a novel framework that leverages deep learning and probabilistic modeling to address the limitations of existing solutions. ADHDN employs a combination of Deep Generative Adversarial Networks (DGANs) and Discrete Hidden Markov Models (DHMMs) to achieve superior detection precision across various DoS attack types, including application-level, protocol-level, and data volume attacks. Implemented in a highly interactive honeypot environment with distributed server and virtual machine configurations, ADHDN demonstrates remarkable adaptability and resilience. Performance evaluation using the IoTID20 dataset reveals that ADHDN consistently outperforms contemporary models, such as RBMD, BNDH, and AHDL. ADHDN achieves a true positive rate of 99.7% for protocol-level attacks, 99.4% for application-level attacks, and 97.5% for data volume attacks under low attack volumes, maintaining robust performance even as attack intensity scales. These results underscore ADHDN’s potential to redefine DoS detection in dynamic and high-interaction environments, offering a scalable and efficient solution to contemporary cybersecurity challenges.
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How this classification was reachedexpand
Full frame machine prediction
Teacher imitationNot calibrated prevalence, not ground truth. Human validation pending. The Gemma side is a direct model label for every work in the frame, read from the title-only record. The Codex side is a classifier learned from the 10,348 direct Codex labels and calibrated to design-weighted sample rates; fields without enough sample support carry no Codex call. Candidate is the union of the two sides; consensus is their intersection. These outputs are machine_predicted_unvalidated and are not human labels.
Distilled classifier scores by category (both heads)
| Category | Codex | Gemma |
|---|---|---|
| Metaresearch | 0.001 | 0.003 |
| Meta-epidemiology (narrow) | 0.001 | 0.000 |
| Meta-epidemiology (broad) | 0.001 | 0.000 |
| Bibliometrics | 0.001 | 0.000 |
| Science and technology studies | 0.000 | 0.001 |
| Scholarly communication | 0.001 | 0.002 |
| Open science | 0.001 | 0.002 |
| Research integrity | 0.001 | 0.001 |
| Insufficient payload (model declined to judge) | 0.001 | 0.000 |
Machine scores (provisional)
The two teacher heads of the student model, read on this work. A score orders the frame for review; it never asserts a category, and the validation status ships verbatim with every row.
Baseline scores from an immature model (maturity gate not passed, 7 training rounds). Scores rank; they never assert a category.
score_only:v0-immature-baseline · verbatim from the scoring run: score_only means the number may rank works, and no category label ships from itClassification
machine, unvalidatedMachine predicted; a candidate call from one source (direct Gemma or distilled Codex), not a consensus.
How this classification was reached, model by model and score by score, is at the end of the page under "How this classification was reached".