Coordination contract in supply chain system with product quality, promotional effort and carbon emission reduction efforts using control theory
Bibliographic record
Abstract
The present scholarly work attempts to investigate the optimality of a low-carbon supply chain system. In this chain, the manufacturer and retailer work together under a wholesale price–cost sharing (WP–CS) agreement, where the manufacturer focuses on emission reduction and quality improvement, while the retailer handles promotional efforts. The proposed model is formulated taking variable retailers’ demand rates under the new coordination contract. Here, manufacturer contributes to a fraction of the promotional costs borne by the retailer, while as a return, retailer assists with a part of the quality enhancement and emission reduction costs of manufacturer. Then, to control the efforts of emission reduction and quality improvement over an infinite time horizon, several optimal control problems arise for both centralized and decentralized systems. All these problems are solved by implementing theories of optimal control and the Stackelberg game. The optimality conditions of the proposed system are illustrated numerically for the centralized, decentralized and coordination scenarios. The study finds that coordination contracts give better benefits to both the manufacturer and the retailer than non-coordination strategies.
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How this classification was reachedexpand
Full frame machine prediction
Teacher imitationNot calibrated prevalence, not ground truth. Human validation pending. The Gemma side is a direct model label for every work in the frame, read from the title-only record. The Codex side is a classifier learned from the 10,348 direct Codex labels and calibrated to design-weighted sample rates; fields without enough sample support carry no Codex call. Candidate is the union of the two sides; consensus is their intersection. These outputs are machine_predicted_unvalidated and are not human labels.
Distilled classifier scores by category (both heads)
| Category | Codex | Gemma |
|---|---|---|
| Metaresearch | 0.004 | 0.007 |
| Meta-epidemiology (narrow) | 0.001 | 0.001 |
| Meta-epidemiology (broad) | 0.002 | 0.001 |
| Bibliometrics | 0.001 | 0.001 |
| Science and technology studies | 0.001 | 0.003 |
| Scholarly communication | 0.004 | 0.004 |
| Open science | 0.002 | 0.002 |
| Research integrity | 0.002 | 0.002 |
| Insufficient payload (model declined to judge) | 0.004 | 0.000 |
Machine scores (provisional)
The two teacher heads of the student model, read on this work. A score orders the frame for review; it never asserts a category, and the validation status ships verbatim with every row.
Baseline scores from an immature model (maturity gate not passed, 7 training rounds). Scores rank; they never assert a category.
score_only:v0-immature-baseline · verbatim from the scoring run: score_only means the number may rank works, and no category label ships from itClassification
machine, unvalidatedMachine predicted; a candidate call from one source (direct Gemma or distilled Codex), not a consensus.
How this classification was reached, model by model and score by score, is at the end of the page under "How this classification was reached".