The Effect of Sanction Target on Managers’ Compliance with Regulations
Why this work is in the frame
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Bibliographic record
Abstract
ABSTRACT Regulators use sanctions to deter managers of organizations from harmful conduct. Regulatory sanctions sometimes target individual violating managers but sometimes target entire violating organizations. We use an economic experiment to study the effect of targeting individuals versus entire organizations on managers’ compliance decisions, both of which are compared to a condition with no sanctions. Leveraging theories on social norms and distributive fairness, we predict that managers will become less compliant when sanctions target individuals compared with no sanctions. However, firm-targeted sanctions do not reduce compliance, even if the monetary value of the sanction on the manager is the same across both conditions. Our results suggest that managers react to sanctions for social motivations and the effects are not always as intended. Data Availability: Data are available upon request. JEL Classifications: K20; K40; M48.
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Full frame distilled prediction
Teacher imitationNot calibrated prevalence, not ground truth. Human validation pending. Learned from the 10,348 direct Codex labels and 10,348 direct Gemma labels. Candidate is the union of thresholded teacher heads; consensus is their intersection. These outputs are machine_predicted_unvalidated and are not human labels or direct frontier model labels.
Codex and Gemma teacher scores by category
| Category | Codex | Gemma |
|---|---|---|
| Metaresearch | 0.002 | 0.000 |
| Meta-epidemiology (narrow) | 0.000 | 0.000 |
| Meta-epidemiology (broad) | 0.000 | 0.000 |
| Bibliometrics | 0.001 | 0.001 |
| Science and technology studies | 0.000 | 0.000 |
| Scholarly communication | 0.000 | 0.000 |
| Open science | 0.000 | 0.000 |
| Research integrity | 0.000 | 0.000 |
| Insufficient payload (model declined to judge) | 0.000 | 0.000 |
Machine scores (provisional)
The two teacher heads of the student model, read on this work. A score orders the frame for review; it never asserts a category, and the validation status ships verbatim with every row.
Baseline scores from an immature model (maturity gate not passed, 7 training rounds). Scores rank; they never assert a category.
score_only:v0-immature-baseline · verbatim from the scoring run: score_only means the number may rank works, and no category label ships from it