Diversity-seeking jump games in networks
Bibliographic record
Abstract
Abstract Recently, strategic games inspired by Schelling’s influential model of residential segregation have been studied in the TCS and AI literature. In these games, agents of k different types occupy the nodes of a network topology aiming to maximize their utility, which is a function of the fraction of same-type agents they are adjacent to in the network. As such, the agents exhibit similarity-seeking strategic behavior. In this paper, we introduce a class of strategic jump games in which the agents are diversity-seeking : The utility of an agent is defined as the fraction of its neighbors that are of different type than itself. We show that in general it is computationally hard to determine the existence of an equilibrium in such games. However, when the network is a tree, diversity-seeking jump games always admit an equilibrium assignment. For regular graphs and spider graphs with a single empty node, we prove a stronger result: The game is potential, that is, the improving response dynamics always converge to an equilibrium from any initial placement of the agents. We also show (nearly tight) bounds on the price of anarchy and price of stability in terms of the social welfare (the total utility of the agents).
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How this classification was reachedexpand
Full frame machine prediction
Teacher imitationNot calibrated prevalence, not ground truth. Human validation pending. The Gemma side is a direct model label for every work in the frame, read from the title-only record. The Codex side is a classifier learned from the 10,348 direct Codex labels and calibrated to design-weighted sample rates; fields without enough sample support carry no Codex call. Candidate is the union of the two sides; consensus is their intersection. These outputs are machine_predicted_unvalidated and are not human labels.
Distilled classifier scores by category (both heads)
| Category | Codex | Gemma |
|---|---|---|
| Metaresearch | 0.001 | 0.005 |
| Meta-epidemiology (narrow) | 0.000 | 0.000 |
| Meta-epidemiology (broad) | 0.001 | 0.000 |
| Bibliometrics | 0.001 | 0.001 |
| Science and technology studies | 0.001 | 0.002 |
| Scholarly communication | 0.001 | 0.002 |
| Open science | 0.001 | 0.001 |
| Research integrity | 0.001 | 0.001 |
| Insufficient payload (model declined to judge) | 0.002 | 0.000 |
Machine scores (provisional)
The two teacher heads of the student model, read on this work. A score orders the frame for review; it never asserts a category, and the validation status ships verbatim with every row.
Baseline scores from an immature model (maturity gate not passed, 7 training rounds). Scores rank; they never assert a category.
score_only:v0-immature-baseline · verbatim from the scoring run: score_only means the number may rank works, and no category label ships from itClassification
machine, unvalidatedMachine predicted; a candidate call from one source (direct Gemma or distilled Codex), not a consensus.
How this classification was reached, model by model and score by score, is at the end of the page under "How this classification was reached".