Toward Efficient and Secure Hypercube Tree Building for Vertically Distributed Data in Cloud
Bibliographic record
Abstract
The rapid development of big data and Internet of Things has promoted the formation of data silos, and cloud computing has facilitated the outsourcing of vertically distributed data to cloud servers. In outsourced query scenarios, building query indexes is crucial for balancing data utility and data privacy protection. The hypercube tree is a widely used index for multi-dimensional data, supporting various query types. Although secure hypercube tree-based queries have been extensively studied in existing works, they are not applicable for building a hypercube tree over vertically distributed ciphertext data. To address this issue, we propose the first efficient and secure hypercube tree building scheme for vertically distributed data, named SCTBuild. We first design a flexible three-party secret sharing (fTPSS) scheme, allowing data owners to flexibly configure secret sharing forms based on real-world computational, communication, and storage constraints. Then, we design a communication-efficient data outsourcing algorithm, a secure data permutation algorithm, and a secure data comparison algorithm based on the fTPSS scheme. After that, we propose our SCTBuild scheme based on the aforementioned algorithms, in which data owners first perform pre-computation on their data to improve tree-building efficiency. We prove that our fTPSS scheme, private algorithms, and the SCTBuild scheme are semantically secure in the simulation-based real and ideal worlds security model; and conduct experiments to validate their high efficiency.
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How this classification was reachedexpand
Full frame distilled prediction
Teacher imitationNot calibrated prevalence, not ground truth. Human validation pending. Learned from the 10,348 direct Codex labels and 10,348 direct Gemma labels. Candidate is the union of thresholded teacher heads; consensus is their intersection. These outputs are machine_predicted_unvalidated and are not human labels or direct frontier model labels.
Codex and Gemma teacher scores by category
| Category | Codex | Gemma |
|---|---|---|
| Metaresearch | 0.000 | 0.000 |
| Meta-epidemiology (narrow) | 0.000 | 0.000 |
| Meta-epidemiology (broad) | 0.000 | 0.000 |
| Bibliometrics | 0.000 | 0.000 |
| Science and technology studies | 0.000 | 0.000 |
| Scholarly communication | 0.000 | 0.000 |
| Open science | 0.000 | 0.000 |
| Research integrity | 0.000 | 0.000 |
| Insufficient payload (model declined to judge) | 0.000 | 0.000 |
Machine scores (provisional)
The two teacher heads of the student model, read on this work. A score orders the frame for review; it never asserts a category, and the validation status ships verbatim with every row.
Baseline scores from an immature model (maturity gate not passed, 7 training rounds). Scores rank; they never assert a category.
score_only:v0-immature-baseline · verbatim from the scoring run: score_only means the number may rank works, and no category label ships from itClassification
machine, unvalidatedMachine predicted; a candidate call from one teacher head, not a consensus.
How this classification was reached, model by model and score by score, is at the end of the page under "How this classification was reached".