Pet Euthanasia and Human Euthanasia

Photo ID 213552852 © Yuryz | Dreamstime.com Abstract A criticism of assisted death is that it’s contrary to the Hippocratic Oath. This opposition to assisted death assumes that death is harmful to the person who dies. In this paper, I argue that the fact that we possess a rational nature is insufficient to preclude the possibility that death is in our best interest in the same way it is for our pets. I specifically respond to the objection posed by Leon Kass and Thomas Cavanaugh, who resist the comparison between pet euthanasia and human euthanasia. I show that their argument, that humans transcend suffering in a way that animals cannot, ultimately fails. Introduction A common criticism of assisted suicide and euthanasia, together “assisted death,” is that they violate the moral prohibition against intentionally killing innocent people. This prohibition often stems from the belief that death necessarily harms the person who dies, which is an idea found in numerous contexts, including discussions about the intrinsic goodness of life as well as the Hippocratic Oath that commands doctors to give no deadly drug and do no harm.[1] While the prohibition is appealing to many, it makes sense only if we assume that death is necessarily harmful to the person who dies, for if death were in someone’s best interest, then that prohibition would state that it would be wrong to do something beneficial, which is implausible.[2] Accordingly, if it is true that death can be in someone’s best interest, then invoking a prohibition against intentionally killing innocents on the basis of doing no harm would not constitute a strong objection to assisted death.[3] This paper uses the analogy of pet euthanasia to critique the claim that death is necessarily bad for us because our rational nature allows us to transcend our suffering,[4] arguing that the propositions that give us reason to think that death can be good for our pets also apply to human beings. Moreover, the concern that we cannot predict future quality of life and therefore cannot say for certain that death is ever in someone’s best interest also applies in the case of our pets. Ultimately, the pet-human euthanasia analogy gives one reason to think that since pet euthanasia is justified, human euthanasia is justified too. Pet Euthanasia It is a commonly accepted practice to euthanize our pets because we do not want them to continue to suffer.[5] This means that we often euthanize our pets for their sake. If this is true, which I assume it is, then this practice assumes that death can be in our pets’ best interest. There are a number of basic propositions that, when taken together, support this belief. Our pets’ lives can go better or worse, meaning that their well-being and ill-being can fluctuate. Their amount of future ill-being can outweigh their amount of future well-being.[6] It is prudentially better for our pets not to exist if the alternative is for them to have greater future ill-being than future well-being.[7] Death is characterized by nonexistence. My position is that our rational nature does not render any of the above basic propositions inapplicable to human beings. Like many philosophers, I assert that what mainly distinguishes us from the rest of the animal kingdom is our rational nature.[8] Accordingly, if there is reason to think death cannot be in our best interest, like it can be for our pets, it is likely grounded in the fact that we are the rational animal.[9] With that in mind, I propose that 1 and 4 are not the ones under debate in the pet-human euthanasia analogy. Both sides generally agree that human lives can go better or worse, and that death is characterized by nonexistence. This leaves propositions 2 and 3. So now the question is whether there is good reason to think that our rational nature renders 2 or 3 inapplicable to human beings. I do not believe there is. Regarding 2, the fact that we have theoretical and practical rationality, or whatever other trait that characterizes us, does not prevent us from having greater future ill-being than future well-being. Indeed, it seems obviously true that there are periods of our lives that can be dominated by more suffering, and there is no reason to think that our rational nature would make this imbalance impossible for the future of any particular individual. Furthermore, any plausible account of well-being must allow for the possible experience of overall suffering — that is, a greater amount of ill-being than well-being; thus, we need not be committed to any particular theory. Our rational nature would also not preclude the applicability of 3, which states that nonexistence is prudentially better than having greater future ill-being than well-being. Yes, we can attain truth, we have excellent means-ends reasoning, we are self-conscious, and we are moral agents, but these are not the right kinds of reasons to show that 3 is inapplicable to humans. What would be needed is a disproof of the position that death is good for us when it deprives us of overall future ill-being (deprivationism[10]), and specifically, a disproof of deprivationism for humans that simultaneously allows it to be true for nonhuman animals. The Transcendence of Suffering Some who push back against the pet-human euthanasia comparison emphasize our unique ability to transcend our suffering. In essence, they argue that due to our rational nature, we can find meaning, draw insights, and even grow spiritually when faced with significant obstacles, whereas animals cannot have any of these goods given their limited natures.[11] The argument of transcendence relates to well-being in the following way: Transcending our suffering amounts to attaining higher goods that result from our suffering, and attaining these higher goods means that suffering is not a net cost to our overall well-being. The transcendence claim is best understood as a challenge to proposition 2 (which is about weighing ill-being against well-being) in the case of humans. In response, it is true that humans can transcend suffering in a way that pets cannot; our rational nature does enable us to attain higher goods. And, indeed, humans voluntarily do many painful things because we find them to be meaningful — e.g., run marathons.[12] However, for a few reasons, the fact that we are able to does not mean that we will. First, while our rationality enables us to attain higher goods, it also enables us to suffer greater bads, so it is not clear that the former outweighs the latter. Our pets, on the other hand, presumably cannot suffer existentially.[13] They are presumably unable to believe that their life was wasted or that it had no meaning. They presumably do not feel toxic shame or deep regret. Moreover, while we do have access to medical care, and perhaps better medical care than our pets have, existential suffering persists. In fact, the primary reasons people seek an assisted death (in Oregon and Canada) are loss of autonomy and inability to engage in activities that make life meaningful to them. And most who seek it already receive palliative hospice care.[14] Second, not all human beings can experience those higher goods due to their age and/or cognitive decline. Infants, for instance, presumably do not possess the required cognitive capacities to find meaning, draw insights, or grow spiritually. Therefore, for these groups who suffer but will not improve, they will likely experience more overall future ill-being. And third, even in cases where a human being is attaining higher goods from their suffering, it does not follow that they will continue to gain if they continue to suffer. Suppose there is a cancer patient with six months to live. It seems unlikely that they must benefit overall from dying in six months rather than in five. On the contrary, it seems likely or reasonably expected that, at some point, their quality of life could be overall negative. For these reasons, our ability to transcend our suffering does not disprove proposition 2, which says future ill-being can outweigh future well-being, in the case of humans. The transcendence claim is also no challenge to proposition 3, which states that nonexistence is prudentially better than a future with greater overall ill-being, in the case of humans. In fact, it is consistent with it. Assuming the transcendence claim is true, i.e., that humans can attain higher goods despite (or even because of) our suffering due to our rational nature, it does not follow that nonexistence is worse than continued living. Actually, the transcendence claim does not deny the truth value of any comparison between nonexistence and quality of life; it merely speaks to the fact that suffering may contribute to overall well-being. To elaborate, proposition 3 for humans can be reformulated as a conditional. A simple version of it would say, “If a person will experience greater overall future ill-being, then nonexistence is prudentially better for them.” The transcendence claim aims to address the antecedent. It suggests that transcending suffering contributes to overall well-being, which ultimately outweighs the ill-being the person experiences. It does not address the conditional itself. Therefore, one could accept the conditional but deny that the antecedent ever obtains. So, the transcendence claim is not a challenge to proposition 3 in the case of humans. Overall, the fact that we can transcend our suffering does not render propositions 2 or 3 inapplicable to human beings. Ignorance An opponent may accept the possibility of death being in our best interest but still support a prohibition against assisted death because we cannot predict a person’s future quality of life. Since we cannot know if any particular person’s future ill-being will outweigh their future well-being, we should apply a precautionary principle that states that we should not intentionally end the life of an innocent human being. Such an argument

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