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Record W4414266818 · doi:10.11647/obp.0490.03

3. Voting with two alternatives

2025· book-chapter· en· W4414266818 on OpenAlexaff
Martin J. Osborne

Bibliographic record

VenueOpen Book Publishers · 2025
Typebook-chapter
Languageen
FieldEconomics, Econometrics and Finance
TopicGame Theory and Voting Systems
Canadian institutionsUniversity of Toronto
Fundersnot available
KeywordsVotingBullet votingCardinal voting systemsAnti-plurality votingPopulationRanked voting systemApproval votingCondorcet method

Abstract

fetched live from OpenAlex

A group of individuals selects one of two alternatives by voting, which may entail a cost. How do the individuals' decisions to vote depend on their preferences and voting costs? How does the fraction of individuals who vote depend on the population size? Voting is modeled as a strategic game. In this game, an individual's voting for her favored alternative is a dominant strategy. When voting is costly and each individual's voting cost is known only to her, the game has an equilibrium in which each individual votes only if her cost is at most some threshold. In this model, if the population is large, few individuals vote. However, if each individual votes so as to minimize her worst regret, rather than to maximize her expected payoff, a high turnout in a large population is possible.

Fetched live from OpenAlex and de-inverted. Abstracts are not stored in this database: the inverted indexes are 8.6 GB of the frame’s 9.3 GB of text, and the host has 13 GB free.

How this classification was reachedexpand

Full frame distilled prediction

Teacher imitation

Not calibrated prevalence, not ground truth. Human validation pending. Learned from the 10,348 direct Codex labels and 10,348 direct Gemma labels. Candidate is the union of thresholded teacher heads; consensus is their intersection. These outputs are machine_predicted_unvalidated and are not human labels or direct frontier model labels.

metaresearch head score (Codex)0.001
metaresearch head score (Gemma)0.000
Version: codex-gemma-dda1882f352aValidation status: machine_predicted_unvalidated
Candidate categoriesMeta-epidemiology (narrow), Scholarly communication, Insufficient payload (model declined to judge)
Consensus categoriesInsufficient payload (model declined to judge)
DomainCandidate signal: none · Consensus signal: none
Study designCandidate signal: Theoretical or conceptual · Consensus signal: none
GenreCandidate signal: Other · Consensus signal: Other
Teacher disagreement score0.874
Threshold uncertainty score1.000

Codex and Gemma teacher scores by category

CategoryCodexGemma
Metaresearch0.0010.000
Meta-epidemiology (narrow)0.0000.000
Meta-epidemiology (broad)0.0010.000
Bibliometrics0.0000.000
Science and technology studies0.0000.000
Scholarly communication0.0020.002
Open science0.0020.000
Research integrity0.0000.001
Insufficient payload (model declined to judge)0.0040.001

Machine scores (provisional)

The two teacher heads of the student model, read on this work. A score orders the frame for review; it never asserts a category, and the validation status ships verbatim with every row.

Baseline scores from an immature model (maturity gate not passed, 7 training rounds). Scores rank; they never assert a category.

Opus teacher head0.038
GPT teacher head0.244
Teacher spread0.206 · how far apart the two teachers sit on this one work
Validation statusscore_only:v0-immature-baseline · verbatim from the scoring run: score_only means the number may rank works, and no category label ships from it

Classification

machine, unvalidated

Machine predicted; both teacher heads agree on what is shown here.

Study designTheoretical or conceptual
Domainnot available
GenreOther

How this classification was reached, model by model and score by score, is at the end of the page under "How this classification was reached".

Quick stats

Citations0
Published2025
Admission routes1
Has abstractyes

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