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Record W4414591963 · doi:10.11647/obp.0490.15

15. Regime change

2025· book-chapter· en· W4414591963 on OpenAlexaff
Martin J. Osborne

Bibliographic record

VenueOpen Book Publishers · 2025
Typebook-chapter
Languageen
FieldEconomics, Econometrics and Finance
TopicEconomic theories and models
Canadian institutionsUniversity of Toronto
Fundersnot available
KeywordsSubgame perfect equilibriumDistribution (mathematics)RemainderControl (management)Regime change

Abstract

fetched live from OpenAlex

Suppose that initially the distribution of wealth is controlled by the rich members of a society. In some periods, the environment is favorable to a successful revolt by the poor. Such a revolt destroys some wealth and makes the remainder permanently available to the poor. If an environment favorable to revolt is rare, the game has a subgame perfect equilibrium in which the rich hand control of the distribution of wealth permanently to the poor (they "democratize") when an environment favorable to revolt occurs. In a model in which the poor members of society need to coordinate for a revolt to succeed, there is an equilibrium in which they coordinate perfectly if they observe the dictator's action, but not if they do not observe that action.

Fetched live from OpenAlex and de-inverted. Abstracts are not stored in this database: the inverted indexes are 8.6 GB of the frame’s 9.3 GB of text, and the host has 13 GB free.

How this classification was reachedexpand

Full frame distilled prediction

Teacher imitation

Not calibrated prevalence, not ground truth. Human validation pending. Learned from the 10,348 direct Codex labels and 10,348 direct Gemma labels. Candidate is the union of thresholded teacher heads; consensus is their intersection. These outputs are machine_predicted_unvalidated and are not human labels or direct frontier model labels.

metaresearch head score (Codex)0.001
metaresearch head score (Gemma)0.000
Version: codex-gemma-dda1882f352aValidation status: machine_predicted_unvalidated
Candidate categoriesMeta-epidemiology (narrow), Scholarly communication, Insufficient payload (model declined to judge)
Consensus categoriesInsufficient payload (model declined to judge)
DomainCandidate signal: none · Consensus signal: none
Study designCandidate signal: Not applicable · Consensus signal: none
GenreCandidate signal: Other · Consensus signal: Other
Teacher disagreement score0.267
Threshold uncertainty score1.000

Codex and Gemma teacher scores by category

CategoryCodexGemma
Metaresearch0.0010.000
Meta-epidemiology (narrow)0.0000.001
Meta-epidemiology (broad)0.0010.000
Bibliometrics0.0000.000
Science and technology studies0.0000.000
Scholarly communication0.0020.004
Open science0.0020.001
Research integrity0.0010.000
Insufficient payload (model declined to judge)0.0250.003

Machine scores (provisional)

The two teacher heads of the student model, read on this work. A score orders the frame for review; it never asserts a category, and the validation status ships verbatim with every row.

Baseline scores from an immature model (maturity gate not passed, 7 training rounds). Scores rank; they never assert a category.

Opus teacher head0.077
GPT teacher head0.232
Teacher spread0.156 · how far apart the two teachers sit on this one work
Validation statusscore_only:v0-immature-baseline · verbatim from the scoring run: score_only means the number may rank works, and no category label ships from it

Classification

machine, unvalidated

Machine predicted; both teacher heads agree on what is shown here.

Study designNot applicable
Domainnot available
GenreOther

How this classification was reached, model by model and score by score, is at the end of the page under "How this classification was reached".

Quick stats

Citations0
Published2025
Admission routes1
Has abstractyes

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