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Record W4415593467 · doi:10.1109/tmc.2025.3625263

A QoE-Driven Personalized Incentive Mechanism Design for AIGC Services in Resource-Constrained Edge Networks

2025· article· en· W4415593467 on OpenAlexfundno aff
Hongjia Wu, Minrui Xu, Zehui Xiong, Lin Gao, Haoyuan Pan, Dusit Niyato, Tse-Tin Chan

Bibliographic record

VenueIEEE Transactions on Mobile Computing · 2025
Typearticle
Languageen
FieldComputer Science
TopicDistributed and Parallel Computing Systems
Canadian institutionsnot available
FundersNational Key Research and Development Program of ChinaNatural Science Foundation of Guangdong ProvinceQueen's UniversityNational Natural Science Foundation of ChinaQueen's University Belfast
KeywordsServerMobile edge computingEnhanced Data Rates for GSM EvolutionService (business)Service providerKey (lock)IncentiveEdge deviceResource allocationMobile telephony

Abstract

fetched live from OpenAlex

With rapid advancements in large language models (LLMs), AI-generated content (AIGC) has emerged as a key driver of technological innovation and economic transformation. Personalizing AIGC services to meet individual user demands is essential but challenging for AIGC service providers (ASPs) due to the subjective and complex demands of mobile users (MUs), as well as the computational and communication resource constraints faced by ASPs. To tackle these challenges, we first develop a novel multi-dimensional quality-of-experience (QoE) metric. This metric comprehensively evaluates AIGC services by integrating accuracy, token count, and timeliness. We focus on a mobile edge computing (MEC)-enabled AIGC network, consisting of multiple ASPs deploying differentiated AIGC models on edge servers and multiple MUs with heterogeneous QoE requirements requesting AIGC services from ASPs. To incentivize ASPs to provide personalized AIGC services under MEC resource constraints, we propose a QoE-driven incentive mechanism. We formulate the problem as an equilibrium problem with equilibrium constraints (EPEC), where MUs as leaders determine rewards, while ASPs as followers optimize resource allocation. To solve this, we develop a dual-perturbation reward optimization algorithm, reducing the implementation complexity of adaptive pricing. Experimental results demonstrate that our proposed mechanism achieves a reduction of approximately <inline-formula xmlns:mml="http://www.w3.org/1998/Math/MathML" xmlns:xlink="http://www.w3.org/1999/xlink"><tex-math notation="LaTeX">$64.9\%$</tex-math></inline-formula> in average computational and communication overhead, while the average service cost for MUs and the resource consumption of ASPs decrease by <inline-formula xmlns:mml="http://www.w3.org/1998/Math/MathML" xmlns:xlink="http://www.w3.org/1999/xlink"><tex-math notation="LaTeX">$66.5\%$</tex-math></inline-formula> and <inline-formula xmlns:mml="http://www.w3.org/1998/Math/MathML" xmlns:xlink="http://www.w3.org/1999/xlink"><tex-math notation="LaTeX">$76.8\%$</tex-math></inline-formula>, respectively, compared to state-of-the-art benchmarks.

Fetched live from OpenAlex and de-inverted. Abstracts are not stored in this database: the inverted indexes are 8.6 GB of the frame’s 9.3 GB of text, and the host has 13 GB free.

How this classification was reachedexpand

Full frame distilled prediction

Teacher imitation

Not calibrated prevalence, not ground truth. Human validation pending. Learned from the 10,348 direct Codex labels and 10,348 direct Gemma labels. Candidate is the union of thresholded teacher heads; consensus is their intersection. These outputs are machine_predicted_unvalidated and are not human labels or direct frontier model labels.

metaresearch head score (Codex)0.001
metaresearch head score (Gemma)0.000
Version: codex-gemma-dda1882f352aValidation status: machine_predicted_unvalidated
Candidate categoriesMeta-epidemiology (narrow)
Consensus categoriesnone
DomainCandidate signal: none · Consensus signal: none
Study designCandidate signal: Simulation or modeling · Consensus signal: Simulation or modeling
GenreCandidate signal: Methods · Consensus signal: none
Teacher disagreement score0.959
Threshold uncertainty score1.000

Codex and Gemma teacher scores by category

CategoryCodexGemma
Metaresearch0.0010.000
Meta-epidemiology (narrow)0.0000.000
Meta-epidemiology (broad)0.0000.000
Bibliometrics0.0000.001
Science and technology studies0.0010.000
Scholarly communication0.0000.000
Open science0.0010.000
Research integrity0.0000.000
Insufficient payload (model declined to judge)0.0000.000

Machine scores (provisional)

The two teacher heads of the student model, read on this work. A score orders the frame for review; it never asserts a category, and the validation status ships verbatim with every row.

Baseline scores from an immature model (maturity gate not passed, 7 training rounds). Scores rank; they never assert a category.

Opus teacher head0.015
GPT teacher head0.257
Teacher spread0.242 · how far apart the two teachers sit on this one work
Validation statusscore_only:v0-immature-baseline · verbatim from the scoring run: score_only means the number may rank works, and no category label ships from it

Classification

machine, unvalidated

Machine predicted; a candidate call from one teacher head, not a consensus.

Study designSimulation or modeling
Domainnot available
GenreMethods

How this classification was reached, model by model and score by score, is at the end of the page under "How this classification was reached".

Quick stats

Citations0
Published2025
Admission routes1
Has abstractyes

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