Mutual V2I Multifactor Authentication Using PUFs in an Unsecure Multi-Hop Wi-Fi Environment
Bibliographic record
Abstract
Secure authentication in vehicular ad hoc networks (VANETs) remains a fundamental challenge due to their dynamic topology, susceptibility to attacks, and scalability constraints in multi-hop communication. Existing approaches based on elliptic curve cryptography (ECC), blockchain, and fog computing have achieved partial success but suffer from latency, resource overhead, and limited adaptability, leaving a gap for lightweight and hardware-rooted trust models. To address this, we propose a multi-hop mutual authentication protocol leveraging Physical Unclonable Functions (PUFs), which provide tamper-evident, device-specific responses for cryptographic key generation. Our design introduces a structured sequence of phases, including pre-deployment, registration, login, authentication, key establishment, and session maintenance, with optional multi-hop extension through relay vehicles. Unlike prior schemes, our protocol integrates fuzzy extractors for error tolerance, employs both inductive and game-based proofs for security guarantees, and maps BAN-logic reasoning to specific attack resistances, ensuring robustness against replay, impersonation, and man-in-the-middle attacks. The protocol achieves mutual trust between vehicles and RSUs while preserving anonymity via temporary identifiers and achieving forward secrecy through non-reused CRPs. Conceptual comparison with state-of-the-art PUF-based and non-PUF schemes highlights the potential for reduced latency, lower communication overhead, and improved scalability via cloud-assisted CRP lifecycle management, while pointing to the need for future empirical validation through simulation and prototyping. This work not only provides a secure and efficient solution for VANET authentication but also advances the field by offering the first integrated taxonomy-driven evaluation of PUF-enabled V2X protocols in multi-hop Wi-Fi environments.
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How this classification was reachedexpand
Full frame machine prediction
Teacher imitationNot calibrated prevalence, not ground truth. Human validation pending. The Gemma side is a direct model label for every work in the frame, read from the title-only record. The Codex side is a classifier learned from the 10,348 direct Codex labels and calibrated to design-weighted sample rates; fields without enough sample support carry no Codex call. Candidate is the union of the two sides; consensus is their intersection. These outputs are machine_predicted_unvalidated and are not human labels.
Distilled classifier scores by category (both heads)
| Category | Codex | Gemma |
|---|---|---|
| Metaresearch | 0.002 | 0.003 |
| Meta-epidemiology (narrow) | 0.001 | 0.000 |
| Meta-epidemiology (broad) | 0.001 | 0.000 |
| Bibliometrics | 0.001 | 0.000 |
| Science and technology studies | 0.001 | 0.002 |
| Scholarly communication | 0.001 | 0.004 |
| Open science | 0.001 | 0.003 |
| Research integrity | 0.001 | 0.001 |
| Insufficient payload (model declined to judge) | 0.002 | 0.001 |
Machine scores (provisional)
The two teacher heads of the student model, read on this work. A score orders the frame for review; it never asserts a category, and the validation status ships verbatim with every row.
Baseline scores from an immature model (maturity gate not passed, 7 training rounds). Scores rank; they never assert a category.
score_only:v0-immature-baseline · verbatim from the scoring run: score_only means the number may rank works, and no category label ships from itClassification
machine, unvalidatedMachine predicted; a candidate call from one source (direct Gemma or distilled Codex), not a consensus.
How this classification was reached, model by model and score by score, is at the end of the page under "How this classification was reached".