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Record W4416054337 · doi:10.48550/arxiv.2402.19365

On Efficient Computation of DiRe Committees

2024· preprint· en· W4416054337 on OpenAlexfundno aff
Kunal Relia

Bibliographic record

VenuearXiv (Cornell University) · 2024
Typepreprint
Languageen
FieldEconomics, Econometrics and Finance
TopicGame Theory and Voting Systems
Canadian institutionsnot available
FundersYork UniversityNational Science Foundation
KeywordsConjectureSet cover problemSet (abstract data type)Constraint (computer-aided design)Cover (algebra)Representation (politics)Selection (genetic algorithm)Population

Abstract

fetched live from OpenAlex

Consider a committee election consisting of (i) a set of candidates who are divided into arbitrary groups each of size ${at~most}$ two and a diversity constraint that stipulates the selection of ${at~least}$ one candidate from each group and (ii) a set of voters who are divided into arbitrary populations each approving ${at~most}$ two candidates and a representation constraint that stipulates the selection of ${at~least}$ one candidate from each population who has a non-null set of approved candidates. The DiRe (Diverse + Representative) committee feasibility problem (a.k.a. the minimum vertex cover problem on unweighted undirected graphs) concerns the determination of the smallest size committee that satisfies the given constraints. Here, for this problem, we propose an algorithm that is an amalgamation of maximum matching, breadth-first search, maximal matching, and local minimization. We prove the algorithm terminates in polynomial-time. We conjecture the algorithm is an unconditional deterministic polynomial-time algorithm.

Fetched live from OpenAlex and de-inverted. Abstracts are not stored in this database: the inverted indexes are 8.6 GB of the frame’s 9.3 GB of text, and the host has 13 GB free.

How this classification was reachedexpand

Full frame distilled prediction

Teacher imitation

Not calibrated prevalence, not ground truth. Human validation pending. Learned from the 10,348 direct Codex labels and 10,348 direct Gemma labels. Candidate is the union of thresholded teacher heads; consensus is their intersection. These outputs are machine_predicted_unvalidated and are not human labels or direct frontier model labels.

metaresearch head score (Codex)0.000
metaresearch head score (Gemma)0.000
Version: codex-gemma-dda1882f352aValidation status: machine_predicted_unvalidated
Candidate categoriesnone
Consensus categoriesnone
DomainCandidate signal: none · Consensus signal: none
Study designCandidate signal: Theoretical or conceptual · Consensus signal: Theoretical or conceptual
GenreCandidate signal: Empirical · Consensus signal: Empirical
Teacher disagreement score0.040
Threshold uncertainty score0.933

Codex and Gemma teacher scores by category

CategoryCodexGemma
Metaresearch0.0000.000
Meta-epidemiology (narrow)0.0000.000
Meta-epidemiology (broad)0.0000.000
Bibliometrics0.0000.000
Science and technology studies0.0000.000
Scholarly communication0.0000.000
Open science0.0000.000
Research integrity0.0000.000
Insufficient payload (model declined to judge)0.0000.001

Machine scores (provisional)

The two teacher heads of the student model, read on this work. A score orders the frame for review; it never asserts a category, and the validation status ships verbatim with every row.

Baseline scores from an immature model (maturity gate not passed, 7 training rounds). Scores rank; they never assert a category.

Opus teacher head0.086
GPT teacher head0.179
Teacher spread0.093 · how far apart the two teachers sit on this one work
Validation statusscore_only:v0-immature-baseline · verbatim from the scoring run: score_only means the number may rank works, and no category label ships from it

Classification

machine, unvalidated

Machine predicted; a candidate call from one teacher head, not a consensus.

The models applied no category: nothing in the taxonomy fit this work.
Study designTheoretical or conceptual
Domainnot available
GenreEmpirical

How this classification was reached, model by model and score by score, is at the end of the page under "How this classification was reached".

Quick stats

Citations0
Published2024
Admission routes1
Has abstractyes

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