The Probabilistic Foundations of Surveillance Failure: From False Alerts to Structural Bias
Bibliographic record
Abstract
Forensic statisticians have long debated whether searching large DNA databases undermines the evidential value of matches. Modern surveillance faces an exponentially harder problem: screening populations across thousands of attributes using threshold rules. Intuition suggests that requiring many coincidental matches should make false alerts astronomically unlikely. This intuition fails. Consider a system monitoring 1000 attributes, each with a 0.5 percent innocent match rate. Matching 15 pre-specified attributes has probability 10−35, 1 in 30 decillion, effectively impossible. But operational systems may flag anyone matching any 15 of the 1000. In a city of one million innocents, this produces about 226 false alerts. A seemingly impossible event becomes guaranteed. This is a mathematical consequence of high-dimensional screening, not implementation failure. We identify fundamental probabilistic limits on screening reliability. Systems undergo sharp transitions from reliable to unreliable with small data scale increases, a fragility worsened by data growth and correlations. As data accumulate and correlation collapses effective dimensionality, systems enter regimes where alerts lose evidential value even when individual coincidences remain vanishingly rare. This framework reframes the DNA database controversy as a regime shift. Unequal surveillance exposures magnify failure, making “structural bias” mathematically inevitable. Beyond a critical scale, failure cannot be prevented through threshold adjustment or algorithmic refinement.
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How this classification was reachedexpand
Full frame distilled prediction
Teacher imitationNot calibrated prevalence, not ground truth. Human validation pending. Learned from the 10,348 direct Codex labels and 10,348 direct Gemma labels. Candidate is the union of thresholded teacher heads; consensus is their intersection. These outputs are machine_predicted_unvalidated and are not human labels or direct frontier model labels.
Codex and Gemma teacher scores by category
| Category | Codex | Gemma |
|---|---|---|
| Metaresearch | 0.000 | 0.001 |
| Meta-epidemiology (narrow) | 0.000 | 0.000 |
| Meta-epidemiology (broad) | 0.000 | 0.000 |
| Bibliometrics | 0.000 | 0.000 |
| Science and technology studies | 0.000 | 0.000 |
| Scholarly communication | 0.000 | 0.000 |
| Open science | 0.000 | 0.000 |
| Research integrity | 0.000 | 0.000 |
| Insufficient payload (model declined to judge) | 0.000 | 0.000 |
Machine scores (provisional)
The two teacher heads of the student model, read on this work. A score orders the frame for review; it never asserts a category, and the validation status ships verbatim with every row.
Baseline scores from an immature model (maturity gate not passed, 7 training rounds). Scores rank; they never assert a category.
score_only:v0-immature-baseline · verbatim from the scoring run: score_only means the number may rank works, and no category label ships from itClassification
machine, unvalidatedMachine predicted; a candidate call from one teacher head, not a consensus.
How this classification was reached, model by model and score by score, is at the end of the page under "How this classification was reached".