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Record W4416410339 · doi:10.1016/j.geb.2025.11.004

Non-manipulable house exchange under (minimum) equilibrium prices

2025· article· en· W4416410339 on OpenAlexafffund
Lars–Gunnar Svensson, Tommy Andersson, Lars Ehlers

Bibliographic record

VenueGames and Economic Behavior · 2025
Typearticle
Languageen
FieldEconomics, Econometrics and Finance
TopicEconomic theories and models
Canadian institutionsUniversité de Montréal
FundersSocial Sciences and Humanities Research Council of CanadaFonds de recherche du QuébecJan Wallanders och Tom Hedelius Stiftelse samt Tore Browaldhs Stiftelse
KeywordsGeneral equilibrium theoryEconomic equilibriumExchange rateForeign exchange

Abstract

fetched live from OpenAlex

We consider a market with indivisible objects, called houses, and monetary transfers. Each house is initially occupied by one agent and each agent demands exactly one house. The problem is to identify the complete set of direct allocation mechanisms that can be used to reallocate the houses among the agents. On the one hand, for price eq1uilibrium mechanisms, we show that the only non-manipulable mechanism is one with a minimum equilibrium price vector. The result is not true on the classic or the quasi-linear domains, but on reduced domains of preference profiles containing “almost all” profiles in the classic or the quasi-linear domain, respectively. On the other hand, while minimum price equilibrium mechanisms are not necessarily efficient (as prices are not zero), we show that no non-manipulable mechanism Pareto dominates a minimum price equilibrium mechanism, making them constrained efficient in the class of non-manipulable mechanisms.

Fetched live from OpenAlex and de-inverted. Abstracts are not stored in this database: the inverted indexes are 8.6 GB of the frame’s 9.3 GB of text, and the host has 13 GB free.

How this classification was reachedexpand

Full frame distilled prediction

Teacher imitation

Not calibrated prevalence, not ground truth. Human validation pending. Learned from the 10,348 direct Codex labels and 10,348 direct Gemma labels. Candidate is the union of thresholded teacher heads; consensus is their intersection. These outputs are machine_predicted_unvalidated and are not human labels or direct frontier model labels.

metaresearch head score (Codex)0.000
metaresearch head score (Gemma)0.000
Version: codex-gemma-dda1882f352aValidation status: machine_predicted_unvalidated
Candidate categoriesMeta-epidemiology (narrow), Insufficient payload (model declined to judge)
Consensus categoriesnone
DomainCandidate signal: none · Consensus signal: none
Study designCandidate signal: Theoretical or conceptual · Consensus signal: none
GenreCandidate signal: Empirical · Consensus signal: Empirical
Teacher disagreement score0.641
Threshold uncertainty score1.000

Codex and Gemma teacher scores by category

CategoryCodexGemma
Metaresearch0.0000.000
Meta-epidemiology (narrow)0.0000.000
Meta-epidemiology (broad)0.0010.000
Bibliometrics0.0000.000
Science and technology studies0.0000.000
Scholarly communication0.0000.000
Open science0.0000.000
Research integrity0.0000.000
Insufficient payload (model declined to judge)0.0010.001

Machine scores (provisional)

The two teacher heads of the student model, read on this work. A score orders the frame for review; it never asserts a category, and the validation status ships verbatim with every row.

Baseline scores from an immature model (maturity gate not passed, 7 training rounds). Scores rank; they never assert a category.

Opus teacher head0.030
GPT teacher head0.239
Teacher spread0.208 · how far apart the two teachers sit on this one work
Validation statusscore_only:v0-immature-baseline · verbatim from the scoring run: score_only means the number may rank works, and no category label ships from it

Classification

machine, unvalidated

Machine predicted; a candidate call from one teacher head, not a consensus.

Study designTheoretical or conceptual
Domainnot available
GenreEmpirical

How this classification was reached, model by model and score by score, is at the end of the page under "How this classification was reached".

Quick stats

Citations0
Published2025
Admission routes2
Has abstractyes

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