Monitoring Role of the Board and Ownership Concentration: From Interests Misalignment to Expropriation
Bibliographic record
Abstract
Board independence is considered as a key corporate governance mechanism to help preserve the necessary checks and balances between the board and executive management. Despite all the value placed on the independent director by financial market participants and regulators, empirical evidence on the relation between board independence and firm performance is largely inconclusive. The objective of this paper is to revisit the board independence-performance relationship while taking into account the ownership structure of the firm. Two effects are unfolding along the ownership concentration spectrum: separation of ownership and control (Principal-Agent problems) and separation of voting and cash flow rights (Principal-Principal problems). The study is conducted over a four-year period (2002-2005) using panel regressions on a sample of Canadian publicly traded companies (502 firm-year observations). The results show a positive and significant relationship between board independence and Tobin’s Q only when ownership is concentrated in the hands of a controlling shareholder (legal control). The highest level of separation between voting and cash flow rights is also found in controlled entities. The higher the gap between voting and cash flow rights, the stronger the relationship between board independence and performance. Overall, evidence supports the expropriation effect argument. The findings underline the importance of putting in place independent directors in countries like Canada characterized by high ownership concentration and high levels of private benefits of control.
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How this classification was reachedexpand
Full frame machine prediction
Teacher imitationNot calibrated prevalence, not ground truth. Human validation pending. The Gemma side is a direct model label for every work in the frame, read from the title-only record. The Codex side is a classifier learned from the 10,348 direct Codex labels and calibrated to design-weighted sample rates; fields without enough sample support carry no Codex call. Candidate is the union of the two sides; consensus is their intersection. These outputs are machine_predicted_unvalidated and are not human labels.
Distilled classifier scores by category (both heads)
| Category | Codex | Gemma |
|---|---|---|
| Metaresearch | 0.003 | 0.018 |
| Meta-epidemiology (narrow) | 0.000 | 0.000 |
| Meta-epidemiology (broad) | 0.000 | 0.000 |
| Bibliometrics | 0.001 | 0.001 |
| Science and technology studies | 0.001 | 0.002 |
| Scholarly communication | 0.002 | 0.002 |
| Open science | 0.001 | 0.001 |
| Research integrity | 0.000 | 0.001 |
| Insufficient payload (model declined to judge) | 0.002 | 0.000 |
Machine scores (provisional)
The two teacher heads of the student model, read on this work. A score orders the frame for review; it never asserts a category, and the validation status ships verbatim with every row.
Baseline scores from an immature model (maturity gate not passed, 7 training rounds). Scores rank; they never assert a category.
score_only:v0-immature-baseline · verbatim from the scoring run: score_only means the number may rank works, and no category label ships from itClassification
machine, unvalidatedMachine predicted; a candidate call from one source (direct Gemma or distilled Codex), not a consensus.
How this classification was reached, model by model and score by score, is at the end of the page under "How this classification was reached".