Posterior Probability Matching and Human Perceptual Decision Making
Bibliographic record
Abstract
Probability matching is a classic theory of decision making that was first developed in models of cognition. Posterior probability matching, a variant in which observers match their response probabilities to the posterior probability of each response being correct, is being used increasingly often in models of perception. However, little is known about whether posterior probability matching is consistent with the vast literature on vision and hearing that has developed within signal detection theory. Here we test posterior probability matching models using two tools from detection theory. First, we examine the models' performance in a two-pass experiment, where each block of trials is presented twice, and we measure the proportion of times that the model gives the same response twice to repeated stimuli. We show that at low performance levels, posterior probability matching models give highly inconsistent responses across repeated presentations of identical trials. We find that practised human observers are more consistent across repeated trials than these models predict, and we find some evidence that less practised observers more consistent as well. Second, we compare the performance of posterior probability matching models on a discrimination task to the performance of a theoretical ideal observer that achieves the best possible performance. We find that posterior probability matching is very inefficient at low-to-moderate performance levels, and that human observers can be more efficient than is ever possible according to posterior probability matching models. These findings support classic signal detection models, and rule out a broad class of posterior probability matching models for expert performance on perceptual tasks that range in complexity from contrast discrimination to symmetry detection. However, our findings leave open the possibility that inexperienced observers may show posterior probability matching behaviour, and our methods provide new tools for testing for such a strategy.
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How this classification was reachedexpand
Full frame distilled prediction
Teacher imitationNot calibrated prevalence, not ground truth. Human validation pending. Learned from the 10,348 direct Codex labels and 10,348 direct Gemma labels. Candidate is the union of thresholded teacher heads; consensus is their intersection. These outputs are machine_predicted_unvalidated and are not human labels or direct frontier model labels.
Codex and Gemma teacher scores by category
| Category | Codex | Gemma |
|---|---|---|
| Metaresearch | 0.000 | 0.000 |
| Meta-epidemiology (narrow) | 0.000 | 0.000 |
| Meta-epidemiology (broad) | 0.000 | 0.000 |
| Bibliometrics | 0.000 | 0.000 |
| Science and technology studies | 0.000 | 0.000 |
| Scholarly communication | 0.000 | 0.000 |
| Open science | 0.000 | 0.000 |
| Research integrity | 0.000 | 0.000 |
| Insufficient payload (model declined to judge) | 0.001 | 0.000 |
Machine scores (provisional)
The two teacher heads of the student model, read on this work. A score orders the frame for review; it never asserts a category, and the validation status ships verbatim with every row.
Baseline scores from an immature model (maturity gate not passed, 7 training rounds). Scores rank; they never assert a category.
score_only:v0-immature-baseline · verbatim from the scoring run: score_only means the number may rank works, and no category label ships from itClassification
machine, unvalidatedMachine predicted; a candidate call from one teacher head, not a consensus.
How this classification was reached, model by model and score by score, is at the end of the page under "How this classification was reached".