The evaluation of evidence and its judicial review in competition cases
Bibliographic record
Abstract
Introduction - Rules That Govern Rules: Evidence, Proof and Judicial Control in Competition Cases Mel Marquis Introduction to the Workshop - Competition enforcement and judicial review in Europe Presentations Written contributions Bruno Lasserre, The European Competition System in Context: Matching Old Constitutional Principles and New Policy Challenges Heike Schweitzer, The European Competition Law Enforcement System and the Evolution of Judicial Panel I The European Commission: Standard of Proof, burden of proof and evaluation of evidence in antitrust and merger cases Panel II The European Courts: Standard of proof, burden of proof, standards of review and evaluation of evidence antitrust and merger cases Written contributions to Panels I and II I Per Hellstroem, A Uniform Standard of Proof in EU Competition Proceedings II Philip Lowe, Taking Sound Decisions on the Basis of Available Evidence III Luis Ortiz Blanco, Standards of Proof and Personal Conviction in EU Antitrust and Merger Control Procedures IV James Venit, Human All Too Human: The Gathering and Assessment of Evidence and the Appropriate Standard of Proof and Judicial in Commission Enforcement Proceedings Applying Articles 81 and 82 V Nicholas Forwood, The Commission's More Economic Approach - Implications for the Role of the EU Courts, the Treatment of Economic Evidence and the Scope of Judicial VI Aindrias O Caoimh, Standard of Proof, Burden of Proof, Standards of and Evaluation of Evidence in Antitrust and Merger Cases: Perspective of Court of Justice of the European Union VII Nils Wahl, Standard of - Comprehensive or Limited? VIII Eric Gippini-Fournier, The Elusive Standard of Proof in EU Competition Cases IX Fernando Castillo de la Torre, Evidence, Proof and Judicial in Cartel Cases X Ian Forrester, A Bush in Need of Pruning: the Luxuriant Growth of Light Judicial Review XI John Ratliff, Judicial in EC competition cases before the European Courts: Avoiding double renvoi XII Justin Coombs and Jorge Padilla, The Use of Economic Evidence before the Courts of the European Union Panel III National competition authorities: standard of proof, burden of proof and evaluation of evidence in antitrust and merger cases Written contributions to Panel III I Alberto Heimler, The Legal Significance of Economic Evidence in Antitrust Cases: Some Comments Based on the Italian Experience II Pieter Kalbfleisch, Standard of Proof, Burden of Proof and Evaluation of Evidence in Antitrust and Merger Cases: A Perspective of the Netherlands Competition Authority III Jacques Steenbergen, Rules of Evidence in Competition Cases: An NCA Perspective IV J. Thomas Rosch, Observations on Evidentiary Issues in Antitrust Cases V Rafael Allendesalazar and Paloma Martinez Lage Evidence Gathered through Leniency: From the Prisoner's Dilemma to a Race to the Bottom VI Mario Siragusa, Antitrust and Merger Cases in Italy: Standard of Proof, Burden of Proof and Evaluation of Evidence VII James Rill and Jaimee Lederman, Evidence in Judicial of U.S. Federal Trade Commission and U.S. Department of Justice Merger Cases VIII Dennis Carlton, How Should Economic Evidence be Presented and Evaluated? Panel IV National courts in major jurisdictions: Standard of proof, burden of proof, standards of review and evaluation of evidence in antitrust and merger cases Written contributions to Panel IV I Vaughn Walker, Evidence in Competition Cases: An American Trial Judge's Perspective II Michael Boudin, Evidence and the Formulation of U.S. Antitrust Law III Kelyn Bacon, Standard of Proof, Standards of and Evaluation of Evidence in UK Antitrust and Merger Cases IV Jochen Burrichter and Hans Logemann, Evaluation of Evidence in National Courts: Reflections from the German Perspective V Calvin Goldman, Robert Kwinter, Navin Joneja and Chad Leddy, A Canadian Perspective on the Evaluation of Evidence in Antitrust and Merger Cases in the Context of Recent Changes to Canada's Competition Law VI Barry Hawk and James Keyte, Separating the Wheat from the Chaff: How the U.S. Courts Analyze Antitrust Evidence
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How this classification was reachedexpand
Full frame distilled prediction
Teacher imitationNot calibrated prevalence, not ground truth. Human validation pending. Learned from the 10,348 direct Codex labels and 10,348 direct Gemma labels. Candidate is the union of thresholded teacher heads; consensus is their intersection. These outputs are machine_predicted_unvalidated and are not human labels or direct frontier model labels.
Codex and Gemma teacher scores by category
| Category | Codex | Gemma |
|---|---|---|
| Metaresearch | 0.002 | 0.001 |
| Meta-epidemiology (narrow) | 0.000 | 0.000 |
| Meta-epidemiology (broad) | 0.000 | 0.000 |
| Bibliometrics | 0.000 | 0.000 |
| Science and technology studies | 0.000 | 0.000 |
| Scholarly communication | 0.000 | 0.000 |
| Open science | 0.000 | 0.000 |
| Research integrity | 0.000 | 0.000 |
| Insufficient payload (model declined to judge) | 0.000 | 0.000 |
Machine scores (provisional)
The two teacher heads of the student model, read on this work. A score orders the frame for review; it never asserts a category, and the validation status ships verbatim with every row.
Baseline scores from an immature model (maturity gate not passed, 7 training rounds). Scores rank; they never assert a category.
score_only:v0-immature-baseline · verbatim from the scoring run: score_only means the number may rank works, and no category label ships from itClassification
machine, unvalidatedMachine predicted; a candidate call from one teacher head, not a consensus.
How this classification was reached, model by model and score by score, is at the end of the page under "How this classification was reached".