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Record W611736287 · doi:10.1596/978-0-8213-8840-2

The Political Economy of Decentralization Reforms

2011· book· en· W611736287 on OpenAlex

Why this work is in the frame

A frame that forgets how it found something cannot be audited. These are the routes that admitted this work.

fundA Canadian funder is recorded on the work.
no affNo Canadian affiliation: this work is invisible to an affiliation-only frame.
No Canadian affiliation. An affiliation-only frame, the usual design, would never have seen this work. It is one of the works that make the case for inverting the frame.

Bibliographic record

VenueWorld Bank eBooks · 2011
Typebook
Languageen
FieldSocial Sciences
TopicLocal Government Finance and Decentralization
Canadian institutionsnot available
FundersYork University
KeywordsDecentralizationPoliticsPolitical scienceEconomic systemPolitical economyEconomicsMarket economy

Abstract

fetched live from OpenAlex

No AccessDirections in Development - General1 Feb 2013The Political Economy of Decentralization ReformsImplications for Aid EffectivenessAuthors/Editors: Kent Eaton, Kai-Alexander Kaiser, Paul J. SmokeKent Eaton, Kai-Alexander Kaiser, Paul J. Smokehttps://doi.org/10.1596/978-0-8213-8840-2View ChaptersAboutPDF (1 MB)Other FormatsePUB ToolsAdd to favoritesDownload CitationsTrack Citations ShareFacebookTwitterLinked In Abstract:This volume presents a framework designed to help international development partners consider the relevance of political economy issues for their programmatic support to decentralization and local government reform. The intention is neither to advocate decentralization in general or in any particular form, nor to presume or privilege any particular decentralization objective. Instead, the purpose is to document the potential value of better understanding how (primarily national and intergovernmental) political and institutional dynamics do or could affect the scope for realizing decentralization reforms aligned with commonly advocated service delivery, governance, and poverty reduction goals. The underlying premise is that systematic analysis of these issues can productively complement the dominantly technical diagnostic work typically carried out by development partners. Specifically, development partners can benefit from better understanding the practical significance of motives that drive politicians and bureaucrats to support or oppose reform at various stages of the decentralization process, from making an initial reform decision to detailed design and implementation. In addition, the authors address how these incentives can weaken, strengthen, or shift in response to changes in political and economic conditions that arise after reform begins. A general approach to conducting political economy of decentralization analysis is outlined, recognizing the need to tailor such analysis to the particular country context. This volume is based on literature reviews and knowledge derived from selected country experiences. Previous bookNext book FiguresReferencesRecommendedDetailsCited ByThe legacy of the reformasi: the role of local government spending on industrial development in a decentralized IndonesiaJournal of Economic Structures, Vol.11, No.119 March 2022The Incoherence of Institutional Reform: Decentralization as a Structural Solution to Immediate Political NeedsStudies in Comparative International Development, Vol.57, No.19 November 2021Key Principles of Fiscal Decentralization17 November 2021Urban planning and public policy responses to the management of COVID-19 in GhanaCities & Health, Vol.5, No.sup14 February 2021Donors and local taxation: assessing the influence of development assistance on municipal revenue generationInternational Public Management Journal, Vol.24, No.44 May 2021Coping with intelligence deficits in poverty-alleviation policies in low-income countriesPolicy Sciences, Vol.54, No.22 January 2021Why do local institutions matter? The political economics of decentralisationReflets et perspectives de la vie économique, Vol.LVIII, No.1Paradox of Service DeliveryExploring effectiveness of different health financing mechanisms in Nigeria; what needs to change and how can it happen?BMC Health Services Research, Vol.19, No.113 September 2019Healthcare equity analysis: applying the Tanahashi model of health service coverage to community health systems following devolution in KenyaInternational Journal for Equity in Health, Vol.18, No.17 May 2019Not the only game in towns: explaining changes in municipal councils in post-revolutionary TunisiaDemocratization, Vol.26, No.81 August 2019Why Political Competition Can Increase PatronageStudies in Comparative International Development, Vol.53, No.418 March 2017"Sometimes it is difficult for us to stand up and change this": an analysis of power within priority-setting for health following devolution in KenyaBMC Health Services Research, Vol.18, No.129 November 2018Health system governance following devolution: comparing experiences of decentralisation in Kenya and IndonesiaBMJ Global Health, Vol.3, No.528 September 2018Taking Stock of the Political Economy of Power Sector Reforms in Developing Countries: A Literature Review8 August 2018Engaging decentralization in an uncertain political context: Lessons from LiberiaDevelopment Policy Review, Vol.36, No.31 February 2018Decentralization and Poverty Reduction: Opportunities and Challenges in KenyaSosyoekonomi30 April 2018Bosnia and Herzegovina: Local Government Debt1 November 2018Development Policy Review, Vol.36, No.3Intergovernmental Fiscal Transfers and Local Incentives and Responses: The Case of IndonesiaFiscal Studies, Vol.38, No.114 February 2017Identified vulnerability contexts for a paddy production assessment with climate change in Bali, IndonesiaClimate and Development, Vol.9, No.217 June 2016Paradox of Service DeliveryPolitical economy of decentralising HIV and AIDS treatment services to primary healthcare facilities in three Nigerian statesAfrican Journal of AIDS Research, Vol.15, No.328 September 2016THE MODEL OF SUSTAINABLE GROWTH: KEY INDICATORS AND IMPLIMENTATION IN UKRAINEBulletin of Taras Shevchenko National University of Kyiv Economics, No.1881 January 2016Blending Top-Down Federalism with Bottom-Up Engagement to Reduce Inequality in Ethiopia6 January 2016Managing Public Sector Decentralization in Developing Countries: Moving Beyond Conventional RecipesPublic Administration and Development, Vol.35, No.48 December 2015The 'local turn' saving liberal peacebuilding? Unpacking virtual peace in CambodiaThird World Quarterly, Vol.36, No.58 June 2015Rethinking Decentralization: Assessing Challenges to a Popular Public Sector ReformPublic Administration and Development, Vol.35, No.226 June 2015FOREIGN AID AND DECENTRALIZATION: LIMITATIONS ON IMPACT IN AUTONOMY AND RESPONSIVENESSPublic Administration and Development, Vol.34, No.35 August 2014China's provincial diplomacy to Africa: applications to health cooperationContemporary Politics, Vol.20, No.230 April 2014 View Published: June 2011ISBN: 978-0-8213-8840-2e-ISBN: 978-0-8213-8841-9 Copyright & Permissions Related TopicsFinance and Financial Sector DevelopmentMacroeconomics and Economic GrowthPublic Sector Development KeywordsCENTRAL GOVERNMENTCONSTITUTIONAL REFORMSDECENTRALIZATIONLOCAL GOVERNMENTSMUNICIPALITIESPOLITICAL DECENTRALIZATIONPROVINCESPROVINCIAL COUNCILSPROVINCIAL GOVERNMENTSSUBNATIONAL GOVERNMENT PDF DownloadLoading ...

Fetched live from OpenAlex and de-inverted. Abstracts are not stored in this database: the inverted indexes are 8.6 GB of the frame’s 9.3 GB of text, and the host has 13 GB free.

Full frame distilled prediction

Teacher imitation

Not calibrated prevalence, not ground truth. Human validation pending. Learned from the 10,348 direct Codex labels and 10,348 direct Gemma labels. Candidate is the union of thresholded teacher heads; consensus is their intersection. These outputs are machine_predicted_unvalidated and are not human labels or direct frontier model labels.

metaresearch head score (Codex)0.000
metaresearch head score (Gemma)0.000
Version: codex-gemma-dda1882f352aValidation status: machine_predicted_unvalidated
Candidate categoriesnone
Consensus categoriesnone
DomainCandidate signal: none · Consensus signal: none
Study designCandidate signal: Theoretical or conceptual · Consensus signal: none
GenreCandidate signal: Other · Consensus signal: Other
Teacher disagreement score0.621
Threshold uncertainty score0.482

Codex and Gemma teacher scores by category

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Meta-epidemiology (narrow)0.0000.000
Meta-epidemiology (broad)0.0000.000
Bibliometrics0.0000.000
Science and technology studies0.0000.001
Scholarly communication0.0000.000
Open science0.0000.000
Research integrity0.0000.000
Insufficient payload (model declined to judge)0.0000.000

Machine scores (provisional)

The two teacher heads of the student model, read on this work. A score orders the frame for review; it never asserts a category, and the validation status ships verbatim with every row.

Baseline scores from an immature model (maturity gate not passed, 7 training rounds). Scores rank; they never assert a category.

Opus teacher head0.021
GPT teacher head0.259
Teacher spread0.238 · how far apart the two teachers sit on this one work
Validation statusscore_only:v0-immature-baseline · verbatim from the scoring run: score_only means the number may rank works, and no category label ships from it