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Enregistrement W611736287 · doi:10.1596/978-0-8213-8840-2

The Political Economy of Decentralization Reforms

2011· book· en· W611736287 sur OpenAlex

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Notice bibliographique

RevueWorld Bank eBooks · 2011
Typebook
Langueen
DomaineSocial Sciences
ThématiqueLocal Government Finance and Decentralization
Établissements canadiensnon disponible
Organismes subventionnairesYork University
Mots-clésDecentralizationPoliticsPolitical scienceEconomic systemPolitical economyEconomicsMarket economy

Résumé

récupéré en direct d'OpenAlex

No AccessDirections in Development - General1 Feb 2013The Political Economy of Decentralization ReformsImplications for Aid EffectivenessAuthors/Editors: Kent Eaton, Kai-Alexander Kaiser, Paul J. SmokeKent Eaton, Kai-Alexander Kaiser, Paul J. Smokehttps://doi.org/10.1596/978-0-8213-8840-2View ChaptersAboutPDF (1 MB)Other FormatsePUB ToolsAdd to favoritesDownload CitationsTrack Citations ShareFacebookTwitterLinked In Abstract:This volume presents a framework designed to help international development partners consider the relevance of political economy issues for their programmatic support to decentralization and local government reform. The intention is neither to advocate decentralization in general or in any particular form, nor to presume or privilege any particular decentralization objective. Instead, the purpose is to document the potential value of better understanding how (primarily national and intergovernmental) political and institutional dynamics do or could affect the scope for realizing decentralization reforms aligned with commonly advocated service delivery, governance, and poverty reduction goals. The underlying premise is that systematic analysis of these issues can productively complement the dominantly technical diagnostic work typically carried out by development partners. Specifically, development partners can benefit from better understanding the practical significance of motives that drive politicians and bureaucrats to support or oppose reform at various stages of the decentralization process, from making an initial reform decision to detailed design and implementation. In addition, the authors address how these incentives can weaken, strengthen, or shift in response to changes in political and economic conditions that arise after reform begins. A general approach to conducting political economy of decentralization analysis is outlined, recognizing the need to tailor such analysis to the particular country context. This volume is based on literature reviews and knowledge derived from selected country experiences. Previous bookNext book FiguresReferencesRecommendedDetailsCited ByThe legacy of the reformasi: the role of local government spending on industrial development in a decentralized IndonesiaJournal of Economic Structures, Vol.11, No.119 March 2022The Incoherence of Institutional Reform: Decentralization as a Structural Solution to Immediate Political NeedsStudies in Comparative International Development, Vol.57, No.19 November 2021Key Principles of Fiscal Decentralization17 November 2021Urban planning and public policy responses to the management of COVID-19 in GhanaCities & Health, Vol.5, No.sup14 February 2021Donors and local taxation: assessing the influence of development assistance on municipal revenue generationInternational Public Management Journal, Vol.24, No.44 May 2021Coping with intelligence deficits in poverty-alleviation policies in low-income countriesPolicy Sciences, Vol.54, No.22 January 2021Why do local institutions matter? The political economics of decentralisationReflets et perspectives de la vie économique, Vol.LVIII, No.1Paradox of Service DeliveryExploring effectiveness of different health financing mechanisms in Nigeria; what needs to change and how can it happen?BMC Health Services Research, Vol.19, No.113 September 2019Healthcare equity analysis: applying the Tanahashi model of health service coverage to community health systems following devolution in KenyaInternational Journal for Equity in Health, Vol.18, No.17 May 2019Not the only game in towns: explaining changes in municipal councils in post-revolutionary TunisiaDemocratization, Vol.26, No.81 August 2019Why Political Competition Can Increase PatronageStudies in Comparative International Development, Vol.53, No.418 March 2017"Sometimes it is difficult for us to stand up and change this": an analysis of power within priority-setting for health following devolution in KenyaBMC Health Services Research, Vol.18, No.129 November 2018Health system governance following devolution: comparing experiences of decentralisation in Kenya and IndonesiaBMJ Global Health, Vol.3, No.528 September 2018Taking Stock of the Political Economy of Power Sector Reforms in Developing Countries: A Literature Review8 August 2018Engaging decentralization in an uncertain political context: Lessons from LiberiaDevelopment Policy Review, Vol.36, No.31 February 2018Decentralization and Poverty Reduction: Opportunities and Challenges in KenyaSosyoekonomi30 April 2018Bosnia and Herzegovina: Local Government Debt1 November 2018Development Policy Review, Vol.36, No.3Intergovernmental Fiscal Transfers and Local Incentives and Responses: The Case of IndonesiaFiscal Studies, Vol.38, No.114 February 2017Identified vulnerability contexts for a paddy production assessment with climate change in Bali, IndonesiaClimate and Development, Vol.9, No.217 June 2016Paradox of Service DeliveryPolitical economy of decentralising HIV and AIDS treatment services to primary healthcare facilities in three Nigerian statesAfrican Journal of AIDS Research, Vol.15, No.328 September 2016THE MODEL OF SUSTAINABLE GROWTH: KEY INDICATORS AND IMPLIMENTATION IN UKRAINEBulletin of Taras Shevchenko National University of Kyiv Economics, No.1881 January 2016Blending Top-Down Federalism with Bottom-Up Engagement to Reduce Inequality in Ethiopia6 January 2016Managing Public Sector Decentralization in Developing Countries: Moving Beyond Conventional RecipesPublic Administration and Development, Vol.35, No.48 December 2015The 'local turn' saving liberal peacebuilding? Unpacking virtual peace in CambodiaThird World Quarterly, Vol.36, No.58 June 2015Rethinking Decentralization: Assessing Challenges to a Popular Public Sector ReformPublic Administration and Development, Vol.35, No.226 June 2015FOREIGN AID AND DECENTRALIZATION: LIMITATIONS ON IMPACT IN AUTONOMY AND RESPONSIVENESSPublic Administration and Development, Vol.34, No.35 August 2014China's provincial diplomacy to Africa: applications to health cooperationContemporary Politics, Vol.20, No.230 April 2014 View Published: June 2011ISBN: 978-0-8213-8840-2e-ISBN: 978-0-8213-8841-9 Copyright & Permissions Related TopicsFinance and Financial Sector DevelopmentMacroeconomics and Economic GrowthPublic Sector Development KeywordsCENTRAL GOVERNMENTCONSTITUTIONAL REFORMSDECENTRALIZATIONLOCAL GOVERNMENTSMUNICIPALITIESPOLITICAL DECENTRALIZATIONPROVINCESPROVINCIAL COUNCILSPROVINCIAL GOVERNMENTSSUBNATIONAL GOVERNMENT PDF DownloadLoading ...

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Prédiction distillée sur la base complète

Imitation des enseignants

Ni prévalence calibrée, ni vérité terrain. Validation humaine à venir. Apprise à partir de 10 348 étiquettes directes de Codex et de 10 348 étiquettes directes de Gemma. Le mode candidate est l'union des têtes enseignantes seuillées; le consensus est leur intersection. Ces sorties portent le statut machine_predicted_unvalidated et ne sont ni des étiquettes humaines ni des étiquettes directes de modèles de pointe.

score de la tête « metaresearch » (Codex)0,000
score de la tête « metaresearch » (Gemma)0,000
Version: codex-gemma-dda1882f352aStatut de validation: machine_predicted_unvalidated
Catégories candidatesaucune
Catégories consensuellesaucune
DomaineSignal candidat: aucune · Signal consensuel: aucune
Devis d'étudeSignal candidat: Théorique ou conceptuel · Signal consensuel: aucune
GenreSignal candidat: Autre · Signal consensuel: Autre
Score de désaccord entre enseignants0,621
Score d'incertitude au seuil0,482

Scores Codex et Gemma par catégorie

CatégorieCodexGemma
Métarecherche0,0000,000
Méta-épidémiologie (sens strict)0,0000,000
Méta-épidémiologie (sens large)0,0000,000
Bibliométrie0,0000,000
Études des sciences et des technologies0,0000,001
Communication savante0,0000,000
Science ouverte0,0000,000
Intégrité de la recherche0,0000,000
Charge utile insuffisante (le modèle a refusé de juger)0,0000,000

Scores machine (provisoires)

Les deux têtes enseignantes du modèle étudiant, lues sur ce travail. Un score ordonne la base pour la relecture; il n'affirme jamais une catégorie, et le statut de validation accompagne chaque rangée tel quel.

Scores de référence d'un modèle non mature (critères de maturité non atteints, 7 itérations). Un score ordonne; il n'affirme jamais une catégorie.

Tête enseignante Opus0,021
Tête enseignante GPT0,259
Écart entre enseignants0,238 · la distance entre les deux têtes enseignantes sur ce seul travail
Statut de validationscore_only:v0-immature-baseline · tel quel depuis la passe de notation : score_only signifie que le nombre peut ordonner les travaux, et qu'aucune étiquette de catégorie n'en découle