Perceiving the Body: On the Bodily Senses and the Nature of Perception
Bibliographic record
Abstract
Visual perception dominates the philosophical study of perception. This dissertation shows that a complete understanding of the nature of perception as a general category requires a consideration of the nature of the bodily modalities such as interoception, proprioception, pain, touch, and thermoception. By understanding these modalities, we come closer to understanding the nature of perception (what it is, how it works, and what systems it encompasses). While non-visual modalities have been gaining more attention in philosophy, much of this work looks to philosophical issues particular to these modalities—not necessarily how they relate to questions about the nature of perception in general. Thus, despite increasing work on non-visual modalities, visual perception still maintains as the dominant model of what perception—in general—is like, for visual perception is so commonly and unquestioningly used as a model for perception as a phenomenon. The overarching strategy of this dissertation is to analyze the similarities and differences between the bodily senses and uncontroversially perceptual faculties (such as vision and audition). Then, it looks at what these differences and similarities—the relationships between the various modalities—mean for understanding the nature of perception. It shows that claims about visual perception cannot and should not be uncritically extended to perception in general if perception in general includes the bodily modalities, for the bodily modalities do not necessarily work in the exact same way as vision. It also shows that there are good reasons for thinking that the bodily modalities belong in the perceptual category and are thus relevant to understanding perceptual as a general phenomenon. However, it does this in slightly different ways in each chapter, each with a different focus.
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How this classification was reachedexpand
Full frame machine prediction
Teacher imitationNot calibrated prevalence, not ground truth. Human validation pending. The Gemma side is a direct model label for every work in the frame, read from the title-only record. The Codex side is a classifier learned from the 10,348 direct Codex labels and calibrated to design-weighted sample rates; fields without enough sample support carry no Codex call. Candidate is the union of the two sides; consensus is their intersection. These outputs are machine_predicted_unvalidated and are not human labels.
Distilled classifier scores by category (both heads)
| Category | Codex | Gemma |
|---|---|---|
| Metaresearch | 0.002 | 0.003 |
| Meta-epidemiology (narrow) | 0.001 | 0.000 |
| Meta-epidemiology (broad) | 0.001 | 0.001 |
| Bibliometrics | 0.002 | 0.002 |
| Science and technology studies | 0.002 | 0.034 |
| Scholarly communication | 0.009 | 0.015 |
| Open science | 0.001 | 0.005 |
| Research integrity | 0.003 | 0.006 |
| Insufficient payload (model declined to judge) | 0.007 | 0.001 |
Machine scores (provisional)
The two teacher heads of the student model, read on this work. A score orders the frame for review; it never asserts a category, and the validation status ships verbatim with every row.
Baseline scores from an immature model (maturity gate not passed, 7 training rounds). Scores rank; they never assert a category.
score_only:v0-immature-baseline · verbatim from the scoring run: score_only means the number may rank works, and no category label ships from itClassification
machine, unvalidatedMachine predicted; a candidate call from one source (direct Gemma or distilled Codex), not a consensus.
How this classification was reached, model by model and score by score, is at the end of the page under "How this classification was reached".