Seed system security assessment: Zimbabwe
Bibliographic record
Abstract
This report presents the results of a Seed System Security Assessment in Zimbabwe, implemented during July 2009.A seed system security assessment (SSSA) reviews the functioning of seed systems which farmers use, both formal and informal.It assesses whether seed of adequate quality is available and whether farmers can access it.The approach also promotes strategic thinking about the relief, recovery or development vision needed.For instance, during the stress period, should aid aim to restore the system as it was, ex ante, or aim to strengthen it?A SSSA goes well beyond a conventional seed needs assessment as it hones in on specific seed security problems communities face, and then steers response to actions which alleviate specific constraints, and often improve systems.(For full description of method, see http://www.ciat.cgiar.org/africa/pdf/sssa_manual_ciat.pdf). viii Current trends-with liberalization• With liberalization of the regulatory/policy environment and introduction of US$/ZAR (Rand) in the first quarter of 2009, most seed houses have been expanding grower networks and are re-opening retail outlets.o Seed houses have been significantly scaling up production in-country, For instance, in the 2008/09 season, Pioneer produced at least 4000 mt of hybrids in-country , and Agri Seeds between 5000 -6000 mt (up from 1200 mt in 2007/08).It is not possible to get precise figures on total supplies available for the upcoming season, as: a) seed companies prefer not to divulge figures on stocks now in country; and b) certified supplies for sale to Zimbabwe farmers can come from seed house branches in neighboring countries, particularly South Africa and to a lesser extent Zambia.Discussions with seed houses suggest that they can import very significant quantities with only 4-weeks' notice.o Agro-dealers were open in every city, town and growth center visited during the assessment.New outlets even opened during the course of the field assessment, indicating that the next few months could be a dynamic period of transition: e.g. a SeedCo outlet opened its doors in Murewha on July 10, 2009.Anticipating expanded business, not only were agro-dealers selling seed and fertilizer, but so were general delivery stores, and many non-specialty shops, such as grocers and clothes stores, which would put 5-10 bags of inputs on offer.o The amount of stocks available for sale in July 2009 was impressive for the time of year, many months before sowing and well before farmers' main period seed purchases in September and October .At that time, established agro-dealers had generally upwards of 15T maize for immediate sale, with the majority indicating that these were just initial stocks, which could be replenished when, or if, depleted.o Dealers generally assessed farmer buying patterns as quite positive.In Masvingo, for example, Masvingo Farm Supplies (MFS) had sold 8T maize immediately upon opening in March 2009, while N. Richards, had sold 15T in one week mid-July and had ordered another 15T to arrive the following week.Anticipating farmers' limited access to US$ currency, dealers are making available smaller packets on inputs: two, and particularly five and 10kg packs of maize and fertilizer, along with the normal 20 and 25 kg packs.o Innovative efforts have been catalyzed to extend the reach of agro-dealers.Starting from 1995, CARE International in Zimbabwe has supported an 'Agribusiness Entrepreneur Network (AGENT) program, a network of communitybased agents which sell agri-inputs and allied products to smallholder farmers.The program has trained over 800 agents and at its height covered five provinces and 33 districts.Basically, the work brings a network of retail shops much closer to its rural buyers.Currently the program is active in Masvingo and the Midlands and has 106 trader agents.CARE not only provides services to farmers through supporting such trader agents, but equally enhances agents' own business skills, loan prospects and entrepreneurial opportunities.o Agro-dealers were optimistic but expressed concerns over staying open during this critical period.Masvingo Farm Supplies (MFS), the largest agro-dealer in the province (Masvingo), provides a compelling example.At its peak, MFS had 14 branches and moved over 210T of maize seed each season, serving over 100,000 commercial and communal farmers with agricultural inputs.August 2008, MFSx processes such as participatory variety selection, on-farm trials, cross-border trade, seed fairs.The 2008/09 season: overview• Informal sector supplies are abundant after the 2008/09 season.o The 2008-09 harvest was a good one, as assessed by all four farming communities, and supported by the Ministry of Agriculture Crop and Livestock Assessment Mission.Following on a 'bad' year, maize production 2008-09 was 160% more than that of 2007-08; and the 2008-09 combined small grains was 190% more than the previous year (and 110% more that the recent five-year national production average) (Ministry of Agriculture, Mechanisation and Irrigation Development, 2009).o Social networks of exchange remain strong and continued to function during the 2008-09 season, providing 10 to 38% of the seed sown of maize, groundnut, finger millet, cowpea, sorghum, pearl millet and Bambara nut.It is impressive that such extensive gift-giving took place, just after the 'bad season of 2007-08.o Open markets in all sites visited had good supplies of a large variety of crops, many of which constitute 'potential seed'.Part of the abundance was attributed to a good harvest and part due to improved access to fuel and transport facilities which helped agricultural produce move.Overall, the quality of potential seed on offer generally looked good to excellent: the legumes in particular were full grained, generally sorted to a single variety (except cowpea), free from inert material and with little evidence of damage in storage.• The big surprise in the informal sector was an abundance, not a lack.This abundance was most apparent where local level seed production has been given special technical and organizational support, particularly in the Tsholotsho region.In Tsholotsho, Farmer Field Schools (FFS) produced 155 mt pearl millet, groundnut, sorghum and cowpea during the 2008/09 season These FFS groups ask that outside agencies purchase their FFS-produced seed-rather than give outside seed aid.While FFS groups have mastered the seed production techniques, they need help in identifying markets and to build their agro-business expertise more generally.The 2008/09 season: specific seed sources• Individual farmer assessments of the 2008/09season, showed the majority in the SSSA sample appreciated the varieties they sowed-and the seed condition.• In terms of seed sources for the 2008/09 season, seed obtained from farmers own stocks or through social networks was key across crops; agro-dealers and local shops were particularly important sources for maize seed, and local markets for the legumes, especially groundnut and Bambara nut.Development interventions were a significant seed source only for maize (13.6% of total seed supply) and much of this was obtained through the government program of Operation Maguta.Within the SSSA sample, food aid and seed aid together provided just over 1/10 of the maize seed (and some of this was probably also Operation Maguta) .Figures are 2.4% and 8.1% for food aid and seed aid respectively. xii• Reviewing the overall evidence (qualitative and quantitative data), the SSSA team would be slightly more conservative than the community in assessing seed security.Particularly for maize, we would put figures of 'maize needy', at around 10% or a high of 15% , with the bulk of the needy coinciding with those who are chronically poor.(So the issue would be purchasing power, not lack of seed per se.)This 10-15% figure for maize-related aid is based on a assumption that other farmers will have the opportunity to themselves acquire needed inputs.This implies that input supplies of seed and fertilizer will continue to reach rural shops in important quantities. Fertilizer and costs of inputsFertilizer assessments were not done extensively.Communities themselves raised access to fertilizer rather than to maize seed per se, as the major constraint, mainly due to its unusually high cost Current coping strategies are then highlighted, along with special issues related to Gender and Seed Security.Sections VI presents the field findings as drawn across sites, while Section VII contains the four detailed cases studies, along with the site-specific recommendations.Section VIII presents the Overall Recommendations.The report ends with a set of references, along with annexes addressing some of the assessment-related logistical issues.Throughout the report, boxes are inserted to highlight important experiences and to raise issues for further discussion.We start the assessment report by emphasizing that the Zimbabwe case is not so much a complex emergency as an ongoing complex chronic stress situation---which is largely manmade.Also, events are moving quickly.Some of the assessment findings of July 2009 might not have been remarked even in February 2009, four months earlier (for instance, the opening of agro-dealers).Recognizing this dynamism, this report aims to provide a seed security assessment for a given period (post harvest 2008/09) as well as to highlight emerging trends.We are able to do this as the assessment has focused on the functioning of seed systems.This is distinctly different from a standard needs assessment which may calculate potential seed needs at any one point in time.This is not an academic report: the fieldwork has been effected in a relatively short time to allow for planning of the upcoming agricultural season, starting with sowing in October and November 2009.Having said this, the assessment has aimed for consider rigor: including use of multiple methods, triangulation of results (with quantitati
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How this classification was reachedexpand
Full frame machine prediction
Teacher imitationNot calibrated prevalence, not ground truth. Human validation pending. The Gemma side is a direct model label for every work in the frame, read from the title-only record. The Codex side is a classifier learned from the 10,348 direct Codex labels and calibrated to design-weighted sample rates; fields without enough sample support carry no Codex call. Candidate is the union of the two sides; consensus is their intersection. These outputs are machine_predicted_unvalidated and are not human labels.
Distilled classifier scores by category (both heads)
| Category | Codex | Gemma |
|---|---|---|
| Metaresearch | 0.001 | 0.003 |
| Meta-epidemiology (narrow) | 0.001 | 0.000 |
| Meta-epidemiology (broad) | 0.000 | 0.000 |
| Bibliometrics | 0.003 | 0.004 |
| Science and technology studies | 0.001 | 0.000 |
| Scholarly communication | 0.002 | 0.001 |
| Open science | 0.001 | 0.001 |
| Research integrity | 0.001 | 0.001 |
| Insufficient payload (model declined to judge) | 0.019 | 0.002 |
Machine scores (provisional)
The two teacher heads of the student model, read on this work. A score orders the frame for review; it never asserts a category, and the validation status ships verbatim with every row.
Baseline scores from an immature model (maturity gate not passed, 7 training rounds). Scores rank; they never assert a category.
score_only:v0-immature-baseline · verbatim from the scoring run: score_only means the number may rank works, and no category label ships from itClassification
machine, unvalidatedMachine predicted; a candidate call from one source (direct Gemma or distilled Codex), not a consensus.
How this classification was reached, model by model and score by score, is at the end of the page under "How this classification was reached".